Slaughter, J.
Indiana has long been an employment-at-will state. An employer generally may terminate an employee for any reason. A narrow exception to this general rule is that an employer may not fire an employee for pursuing a statutory right. One such example, at issue here, is the right to file a claim for workers’ compensation. This narrow exception applies when the employee is fired (or, here, constructively discharged) “solely” for filing (or indicating an intention to file) a workers’ compensation claim. Here, the jury’s verdict for the employee cannot stand. There is no evidence that the employer discharged the employee solely to avoid workers’ compensation liability. We reverse the entry of judgment for the employee and remand with instructions to enter judgment for the employer.
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After resigning, Grabowski brought two separate proceedings. First, she filed a claim with the EEOC, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, alleging racial discrimination against the school corporation. Second, Grabowski brought this suit for wrongful termination. She charged the school corporation with retaliating against her for expressing an intent to file a claim for workers’ compensation. This is colloquially called a “Frampton claim”, referring to our 1973 opinion creating a limited exception to Indiana’s strong employment-at-will doctrine “when an employee is discharged solely for exercising a statutorily conferred right”. Frampton v. Cent. Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425, 428 (Ind. 1973). Grabowski alleged the school’s actions—investigating her for bullying, placing her on leave, offering her a last-chance agreement with strict terms—forced her resignation.
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At the close of Grabowski’s case in chief, the school corporation moved for judgment on the evidence under Trial Rule 50(A). It argued, among other things, that Grabowski’s claim fails because she did not show that “the only reason” the school corporation “engaged in the allegedly hostile conduct is because of worker’s compensation.” The school corporation noted that the jury had heard evidence about “familial relationships” between S.J. and school officials; evidence that these school officials were “irritated or angry” that S.J. was named in the workers’ compensation form; and evidence of “racial discrimination” by both sides, referring to the NAACP’s demands and Grabowski’s EEOC claim. None of these things, the school corporation said, concerned alleged retaliation against Grabowski for seeking workers’ compensation benefits. Thus, the school corporation contended, “no reasonable jury could find that the only reason” for the school corporation’s actions was retaliation against Grabowski for stating that she might file a workers’ compensation claim.
Grabowski disagreed that she needed to show that the school corporation retaliated against her solely for seeking workers’ compensation benefits. She admitted that “the retaliation here was slightly different than the norm”, explaining that her theory of retaliation was that “in following [the school corporation’s] own policy she identified the name of the person involved which happened to be the [grand]son of a very powerful, and influential board member.” Even so, Grabowski insisted it was “up to the jury to decide . . . whether [her discharge] was caused by the [workers’ compensation] claim.” After considering the arguments, the trial court denied the school corporation’s motion for judgment on the evidence. The school corporation repeated its Rule 50(A) motion at the close of all the evidence, which the trial court effectively denied. The jury returned a verdict for Grabowski awarding her $600,000 in damages.
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We reverse the trial court’s denial of the school corporation’s motion for judgment on the evidence. The evidence at trial did not show—and Grabowski did not contend—that her injury (constructive retaliatory discharge) was caused solely because the school corporation was trying to avoid workers’ compensation liability. Thus, this case should not have gone to the jury.
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We proceed in two parts. First, we lay out the narrow exceptions, reflected in Frampton, to Indiana’s strong employment-at-will doctrine. In doing so, we recognize the novelty of Grabowski’s Frampton claim. Second, we apply our standard for reviewing a motion for judgment on the evidence and find the claim here fails to clear Frampton’s requirement of sole causation.
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Grabowski acknowledges that hers is not a typical Frampton claim, where the claimant files for workers’ compensation and then is fired by her employer. Neither of these things happened here. Grabowski did not file a claim for workers’ compensation; she merely filled out an accident-report form with her employer. And she was not fired; she resigned when presented with the school corporation’s “last chance agreement”. To be sure, each theory is recognized separately in Indiana. But we have never addressed whether both theories in tandem might support a Frampton claim. We need not answer that question today. To decide this case, we need only observe that a Frampton claim requires the claimant to prove that her employer actually or constructively discharged her solely to deter her from seeking workers’ compensation benefits.
To succeed on her Frampton claim, Grabowski had to prove three elements: (1) she engaged in statutorily protected activity (seeking workers’ compensation); (2) she was discharged; and (3) a causal connection links the two. See Best Formed Plastics, LLC v. Shoun, 51 N.E.3d 345, 351 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied. For purposes of this appeal, we focus only on the causation element. We assume without deciding that Grabowski’s actions showed her intent to seek workers’ compensation, and the school corporation’s actions amounted to constructive discharge.
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As Grabowski tells the story, the school corporation did not act against her “until she made a worker’s compensation claim that involved naming the grandson of a powerful and influential school board member.” Indeed, Grabowski admitted to the trial court that “the retaliation here was slightly different than the norm”. At trial, she was upfront that her retaliation theory rested on her having submitted a workers’ compensation form that implicated the board member’s grandson. And she doubles down on this same theory of the case on appeal. She calls S.J.’s family relationship to a school-board member the “elephant in the room” and says although “many reasons” may support a Frampton claim—like “animus toward the worker” or “the high cost of benefits that must be paid”—the “present case” is based on the school corporation’s desire to “defend and exonerate” S.J. In Grabowski’s own telling, accordingly, the school corporation’s actions were not solely about workers’ compensation but school politics.
Frampton does not protect this type of claim. Frampton’s animating principle is that a narrow exception to our otherwise strict employment-at-will doctrine is necessary so employees can vindicate their statutory right to receive compensation for work-related injuries..
Frampton’s edifice was and remains that employers that would shirk their “duty . . . to compensate employees for work-related injuries (through insurance)” must be held to account…
But there is no such dispute on this record. Grabowski’s own theory of the case is that the school corporation’s mistreatment of her, up to and including its constructive discharge of her, was not “solely” (or even principally) about avoiding workers’ compensation liability. It was, instead, about nepotism and school politics—specifically, about “defend[ing] and exonerat[ing]” the board member’s grandson.
In sum, the fatal flaw in Grabowski’s case is her acknowledgment, consistent with the evidence adduced at trial, that the school corporation’s adverse employment action was not motivated solely by its desire to avoid workers’ compensation liability. It was motivated, in part, by its desire to insulate the board member’s grandson from further scrutiny. Though the school corporation’s treatment of this former teacher of the year likely influenced the jury’s verdict, this case should not have gone to the jury.
For these reasons, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand with instructions to enter judgment for the school corporation.
Rush, C.J., and Massa, J., concur.
Goff, J., dissents with separate opinion in which Molter, J., joins as to Part I.C.
Goff, J., dissenting.
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In my view, there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that Grabowski succeeded in her Frampton claim. Accordingly, I dissent from the Court’s holding that “the jury’s verdict for the employee cannot stand” because “[t]here is no evidence that the employer discharged the employee solely to avoid workers’ compensation liability.” Ante, at 2.
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Here, the jury heard all the evidence, was instructed by the trial court on the elements of a Frampton claim, and from that evidence concluded that (1) Grabowski indicated she might file a worker’s compensation claim, (2) she was constructively discharged, and (3) she was discharged solely for her intent to file a worker’s compensation claim. Because we must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the jury verdict, and there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict, the trial court did not err in denying the School’s Rule 50(A) motion. I would therefore affirm the jury verdict. [Footnote omitted.]
Molter, J., joins part I.C.