Goff, J.
The Indiana Sex Offender Registration Act (or SORA) requires a person to register with local law enforcement if that person is a “sex or violent offender” who resides, works, or attends school in Indiana. [Footnote omitted.] A “sex or violent offender” includes a person “required to register as a sex or violent offender in any jurisdiction.” [Footnote omitted.] A person meeting that definition must “register for the period required by the other jurisdiction or the period described in” code section 11-8-8-19, “whichever is longer.” [Footnote omitted.] The question here is whether such a person must register for the period required by the other jurisdiction even though they committed no offense in the other jurisdiction that imposed the triggering registration requirement. We answer that question in the affirmative. But because the plaintiff here is not currently required to register in another jurisdiction, we hold that he need not currently register as a sex or violent offender in Indiana. We thus reverse the trial court and remand for entry of summary judgment in plaintiff’s favor.
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If a person “is required to register as a sex or violent offender in any jurisdiction,” that person must “register for the period required by the other jurisdiction or the period described in this section, whichever is longer.” I.C. § 11-8-8-19(f). By imposing such a requirement, “Indiana avoids becoming a safe haven for offenders attempting to evade their obligation.” Tyson v. State, 51 N.E.3d 88, 96 (Ind. 2016). The parties here dispute whether this requirement applies to a person residing, working, or attending school in Indiana even though that person committed no offense in the other jurisdiction that imposed the triggering registration requirement. In Part I of our opinion, we conclude that it does. But whether the Jurisdiction Statute applies to Peters is another question. In Part II, we hold that, because Peters is not currently required to register in another jurisdiction, the Jurisdiction Statute does not apply to him.
I. The Jurisdiction Statute applies to a person with out-of-state-registration obligations, regardless of the source of those obligations.
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The Court of Appeals’ majority here declined to follow Marroquin, explaining that “the plain language” of the Jurisdiction Statute “compels registration for individuals with out-of-state registration obligations regardless of the source of those obligations.” Peters, 243 N.E.3d at 1151. We agree. And, though we deny transfer today in Marroquin, we expressly disavow the court’s reasoning in that case. Indeed, the Jurisdiction Statute says nothing of the crime’s location; rather, its plain text refers to “any jurisdiction,” not “another jurisdiction,” as the Marroquin court interpreted it. See I.C. § 11-8-8-19(f) (emphasis added). And as this Court stressed in State v. Zerbe, it’s “not [the offender’s] crime that triggers his obligation to register as a sex offender in Indiana; rather, it is [the other state’s] registry requirement that does so.” 50 N.E.3d 368, 370 (Ind. 2016).
Our conclusion here notwithstanding, we must still decide whether the State of Florida requires Peters to register there as a sex offender and, thus, whether the Jurisdiction Statute applies to him. For the reasons below, we conclude that it does not.
II. Because Peters need not currently register in Florida, the Jurisdiction Statute does not apply to him.
To reiterate, when a person in Indiana “is required to register as a sex or violent offender in any jurisdiction,” the Jurisdiction Statute requires that person to “register for the period required by the other jurisdiction or the period described in this section, whichever is longer.” I.C. § 11-8-8- 19(f). Peters argues that, because the Jurisdiction Statute is “written in the present tense,” it “applies only to people who presently have a duty to register in any other jurisdiction.” Appellant’s Br. at 17. So, once he left Florida, he insists, he no longer had a duty to register there “because he no longer maintains a temporary residence there.” Pet. to Trans. at 10. Peters admits that Florida maintains—and has no obligation to remove—his public profile from its online sex-offender registry. Appellant’s Br. at 15. But he distinguishes a “state’s obligation to notify the community of registrants in the state” from an offender’s “duty to register” in that state. Id. at 13.
For its part, the State acknowledges that Peters “might not have to update his information personally in Florida while living and remaining in Indiana.” Resp. to Pet. to Trans. at 16. But the duty to personally “update registration information,” the State submits, is “the only obligation terminated” by leaving the State of Florida, “not the duty to register.” Id. at 17. A “sex offender’s registration requirement does not terminate when that offender moves to another jurisdiction,” the State contends, so “Peters has a continuing obligation to register in Florida.” Id. at 6, 11.
Based on our reading of the applicable statutes and pertinent case law, we agree with Peters.
A. Under the applicable Florida statute, the registration obligations of a former Florida resident effectively lapse, with no requirement to “reregister.”
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In short, while establishing an out-of-state permanent residence does not “de-register” the offender in Florida, as the State characterizes it, see Appellees’ Br. at 26, the former Florida resident’s registration obligations effectively lapse, with no requirement to “reregister.” The offender need only “reregister” in Florida if he later returns there to take up residence— whether permanent or temporary—for three or more days. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 943.0435(14); id. § 775.21(2)(k), (n).
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B. Even if it could be interpreted as imposing an ongoing obligation, the Florida statute requires no in-person registration for permanent out-of-state offenders, rendering the Jurisdiction Statute inapplicable.
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In short, even if it could be interpreted as imposing an ongoing obligation,13 the Florida statute does not require in-person registration for permanent out-of-state offenders (like Peters), thus rendering the Jurisdiction Statute inapplicable.14
Conclusion
For the reasons above, we hold that the Jurisdiction Statute applies to a person with out-of-state-registration obligations, regardless of the source of those obligations. But because Peters is not currently required to register in Florida, we hold that the Jurisdiction Statute does not apply to him. We thus reverse the trial court and remand for entry of summary judgment in Peters’ favor.
Rush, C.J., and Massa, J., concur.
Molter, J., concurs in part and in the judgment with separate opinion.
Slaughter, J., concurs in the judgment with separate opinion
Molter, J., concurring in part and in the judgment.
I concur in the judgment and join all but footnotes 12 and 14 of the Court’s opinion. I write separately to note that recent cases involving what the Court refers to as the Jurisdiction Statute, Ind. Code § 11-8-8-19(f), reveal three areas where, without further legislative clarification, courts may continue to struggle interpreting the statute.
Timing. The Jurisdiction Statute says: “A person who is required to register as a sex or violent offender in any jurisdiction shall register for the period required by the other jurisdiction or the period described in this section, whichever is longer.” Id. (emphasis added). Ambiguity emerges from the verb tense.
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Definition of “Register.” The General Assembly used a single definition for “register” throughout the Sex Offender Registration chapter, which is “to report in person to a local law enforcement authority and provide the information required under” Indiana Code section 11-8-8-8. I.C. § 11-8-8-4. It certainly makes sense to use the same definition for all references to Indiana’s registry. But using that same definition for other states’ registries poses at least three problems.
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Indiana Offenses…
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Slaughter, J., concurring in the judgment.
I concur with the Court’s judgment that Peters need not register for life in Indiana. I write separately to note that I am unable to join the Court’s opinion, which concludes that Peters is no longer a “sexual offender” under Florida law. The Court decides a question of Florida law I believe to be unnecessary to resolve this case. I prefer the simpler, narrower approach of basing our decision on the meaning of “register”, as Indiana’s statute defines it.
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