Rush, C.J.
The Indiana General Assembly’s statutory framework governing children-in-need-of-services (CHINS) proceedings imposes two overarching duties on trial courts: to exercise independent discretion in assessing a child’s best interests and to safeguard parties’ rights by ensuring due process and entering CHINS adjudications only when all statutory elements are met. By fulfilling these duties of independent judgment and adherence to the law, courts can balance the State’s interest in protecting vulnerable children with a parent’s right to raise their children.
Here, an adoptive mother declined to take back into her home a teenage son with a long history of violence toward her and his siblings. The Department of Child Services (DCS) sought a CHINS 1 adjudication on the basis that the mother failed to supply the child with necessary shelter. At the fact-finding hearing, the mother asked the court to enter one of two alternative CHINS adjudications: a CHINS 6 based on the child endangering himself or others; or a CHINS 10 based on his fetal alcohol syndrome diagnosis. The court deferred to DCS’s filing decision in denying the mother’s request and entered a CHINS 1 adjudication.
We vacate and remand. In reaching this disposition, we first provide a statutory roadmap of CHINS proceedings—from investigation through fact-finding—for the benefit of not only these parties but also our trial courts, DCS, practitioners, and families. Then, in applying that roadmap, we hold that DCS failed to present evidence showing the mother either had the financial means to provide her son with a safe home or failed to seek other reasonable means to do so—a requisite element of CHINS 1. We also hold that the trial court should have independently assessed whether the child’s best interests called for a CHINS 6 or 10 adjudication. But because significant procedural shortcomings make it inappropriate on this record to adjudicate the child under either category, we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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Mother challenges E.K.’s CHINS 1 adjudication, contending that DCS failed to prove she refused to supply E.K. with necessary shelter because she persistently sought services for him and decided not to take him home only because doing so would have endangered E.K., her other children, herself, and Stepfather. And she contends the trial court improperly deferred to DCS’s decision to seek only a CHINS 1 adjudication when considering her request to instead enter adjudications under CHINS 6 or 10. DCS responds that the evidence supports the CHINS 1 adjudication because Mother would not provide a home for E.K. and that the trial court appropriately decided not to “insert its own opinions about how DCS chose to file its CHINS petition.”
We agree with Mother. The trial court could only adjudicate E.K. under CHINS 1 if Mother failed to supply him with “necessary . . . shelter” when she was “financially able to do so” or due to her “failure, refusal, or inability . . . to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so.” I.C. 31- 34-1-1(1). Viewed in light of the trial court’s well-supported finding that E.K. posed a danger to himself or others, the record is devoid of evidence that Mother could have done more—financially or otherwise—to provide E.K. with the safe, secure, and stable shelter he needed. Indeed, the record is replete with evidence that E.K. would not have been safe in Mother’s home with only the resources and services DCS made available. As for the alternative CHINS 6 and 10 categories Mother put forward, the trial court was statutorily required to consider whether entering such adjudications would advance E.K.’s best interests, rather than deferring to DCS. But based on significant procedural omissions, we will not order such adjudications at this stage. We instead remand the case with instructions for the trial court to conduct further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Before analyzing the precise issues presented here, we begin by taking this vital opportunity to set out a roadmap for safeguarding the rights of parties and the best interests of children in CHINS proceedings.
I. Statutes governing CHINS proceedings provide procedural and substantive rights to parents and children and give trial courts independent discretion to advance children’s best interests.
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Consistent with that policy, we take this opportunity to provide a statutory roadmap of CHINS proceedings—from investigation through fact-finding—for the benefit of our trial courts, DCS, practitioners, and families. In doing so, we expand on a trial court’s two overarching duties: to exercise its independent discretion when assessing a child’s best interests and to safeguard the parties’ procedural and substantive rights. And in detailing those duties, we identify three principal guideposts relating to DCS’s burden of proof, the procedural rights of parents and children, and a trial court’s responsibility to consider amending a CHINS petition in a child’s best interests.
We begin at the point DCS becomes aware that a child “may be a victim of child abuse or neglect.” I.C. § 31-33-7-4(a). Within forty-eight hours, DCS must produce a written report containing specified information. I.C. § 31-33-7-4(a), (c). And it must also “initiate an appropriately thorough child protection assessment.” I.C. § 31-33-8-1(a). Upon completion of that assessment, DCS classifies each report as “substantiated or unsubstantiated,” I.C. § 31-33-8-12, which depends on whether the “facts obtained . . . provide a preponderance of evidence that child abuse or neglect has occurred,” I.C. § 31-9-2-123. DCS then enters “data regarding substantiated reports of child abuse and neglect” into the child protection index (CPI), I.C. § 31-33-26-2, which triggers a requirement to notify the child’s parents and any other identified “perpetrator,” I.C. § 31-33-26-8(b). Additionally, when an intake officer “has reason to believe that the child is a child in need of services,” they must make a “preliminary inquiry” and recommend whether DCS should seek permission to file a CHINS petition or pursue an informal adjustment, among other options. I.C. §§ 31-9-2-62, 31-34-7-1, 31-34-7-2; see also infra, at 18 (explaining the difference between CHINS status and “child abuse or neglect”). Throughout this investigation process, any person accused of committing child abuse or neglect is entitled to access “a report relevant to an alleged accusation.” I.C. § 31-34-7-4.
Before seeking authorization to file a CHINS petition, DCS has other options to assist families. It can “refer the parent or guardian to a community service program that provides respite care, voluntary guardianship, or other support services for families in crisis as appropriate to meet the needs of the family.” I.C. § 31-33-8-15(c). And it may “enter into a voluntary service referral agreement with the child’s parent,” under which the parent must “successfully participate in and complete any family or rehabilitative services recommended by” DCS. I.C. § 31-33-8-16. An intake officer may also, with the trial court’s approval, implement a “program of informal adjustment.” I.C. § 31-34-8-1(a). But if DCS “determines that the best interests of the child” require a juvenile court’s intervention, it must “refer the case” to the court under Chapter 31-34-7. I.C. § 31-33-14-1(1).
Under that chapter, either DCS or a prosecutor can ask the trial court to authorize the filing of a CHINS petition. I.C. §§ 31-34-7-3, 31-34-9-1(a)–(b). The court must approve the filing if it “finds probable cause to believe that the child is a child in need of services.” I.C. § 31-34-9-2(2). The petition must be verified and provide enumerated information, including a citation to the relevant statute defining “a child in need of services.” I.C. § 31-34-9-3(1), (4)(B). A misleading error in, or omission of, a citation subjects the petition to dismissal. I.C. § 31-34-9-4.
Our Legislature has defined a CHINS in twelve statutes, which are commonly referred to as categories. I.C. §§ 31-34-1-1 to -11. [Footnote omitted.] Each category applies to different circumstances, but all of them require the child to need care, treatment, or rehabilitation they are not receiving and that is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the court’s coercive intervention. Id. Three categories are relevant here. CHINS 1—commonly known as the “neglect” category and the one DCS invokes most often—applies to a child whose “physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect” of the child’s parent “to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision.” I.C. § 31-34-1-1(1). But since 2019, CHINS 1 applies only if the parent failed to supply the child’s necessities when the parent was “financially able to do so” or due to their “failure, refusal, or inability . . . to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so.” Pub. L. No. 198-2019, § 8, 2019 Ind. Acts 2355, 2361 (codified at I.C. § 31-34-1-1(1)(A)–(B)). [Footnote omitted.] CHINS 6—which is not based on a child being the victim of abuse or neglect—concerns a child who “substantially endangers the child’s own health or the health of another individual.” I.C. §§ 31-34-1-6(1), 31-9-2-14(a)(1), 31-9-2-133(a)(1). And CHINS 10 concerns a child who is “born with . . . fetal alcohol syndrome,” “neonatal abstinence syndrome,” or with certain drugs or metabolites in their body. I.C. § 31-34-1-10(1). Because a child described in CHINS 10 is deemed to be a victim of child abuse or neglect, I.C. § 31-9-2-133(a)(1)(B), the perpetrator of such conduct will often be the child’s birthmother.
After authorizing DCS to file a CHINS petition, the court must appoint a guardian ad litem (GAL), CASA, or both to represent and protect the child’s best interests. I.C. §§ 31-32-3-6, 31-34-10-3. The court may also appoint counsel to represent the child. I.C. § 31-32-4-2(b); see also Katherine Meger Kelsey, A Child’s Right to Counsel: The Case for Indiana to Craft Its Own Framework, 9 Ind. J.L. & Soc. Equal. 167, 196–97 (2021) (providing a list of factors for trial courts to consider in deciding whether to appoint counsel for a child). From filing onward, each party to the proceedings—including the child, their parents, DCS, and the GAL or CASA—has “all rights of parties under the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure.” I.C. § 31-34-9-7. Those rights include the ability to file pleadings, receive service, obtain and present evidence, seek relief from the court, and otherwise use compulsory process. See Ind. Trial Rules 3, 4, 5, 26, 43. [Footnote omitted.]
Sometimes, a CHINS petition is filed either before or at the time a child is removed from their home due to alleged abuse or neglect. When this happens, DCS must promptly notify the child’s parents and provide them with a person or entity to contact for more information. I.C. §§ 31-34-3-1 to -4. DCS must also submit written information to the child’s parents regarding their legal rights, including the rights to be represented by an attorney, cross-examine witnesses, and present evidence on their behalf at each proceeding. I.C. § 31-34-4-6(a). DCS must provide this information when the child is removed or when the petition is filed, whichever occurs first. I.C. § 31-34-4-6(b). A combined detention and initial hearing must then be held within forty-eight hours. I.C. §§ 31-34-5-1, 31-34-10-2(j). And notice must be given to the child, their parents, and any foster parent or caretaker with whom the child has been placed. I.C. § 31-34-5-1(a). After the hearing, the court can either release the child to their parent or order the child placed elsewhere if it makes specified written factual findings. I.C. § 31-34-5-3.
When a detention hearing is not required, the court must set a time for an initial hearing and issue summonses for the child, parents, appointed GAL or CASA, and any “other person necessary for the proceedings.” I.C. § 31-34-10-2(b). The summons must include a copy of the petition. I.C. § 31-34-10-2(c). And the initial hearing must take place within ten days. I.C. § 31-34-10-2(a).
At the initial hearing, the court must inform the child—if they are “at an age of understanding”—and the parents of the nature of the allegations and the dispositional alternatives that might follow a CHINS adjudication. I.C. § 31-34-10-4; see also I.C. § 31-34-10-5 (identifying other information that must be given to parents). The court must also determine whether the proper party or parties admit or deny the allegations. For petitions alleging the child is a CHINS 3.5 or 6, the child is the respondent who must either admit or deny. I.C. § 31-34-10-7. For petitions alleging any other category, the parents must admit or deny. I.C. § 31-34-10-6. When a child has two parents and one admits to the allegations but the other denies them, adjudication does not immediately follow. K.D., 962 N.E.2d at 1255–57. Rather, DCS’s allegations may require separate analysis of the facts concerning each parent’s conduct. Id. at 1256. And either parent can challenge whether the court’s coercive intervention is necessary. Id. at 1257. Thus, even when only one parent denies the child is a CHINS, DCS must still prove its case. Id. at 1259–60.
If the proper parties admit the allegations, the court may immediately hold a dispositional hearing. I.C. § 31-34-10-9(a). But if the allegations are denied, the court must hold a fact-finding hearing. I.C. §§ 31-34-10-9(b), 31-34-11-1(a). That hearing can occur immediately after the initial hearing, but only if all listed persons consent, including the “child if competent to do so.” I.C. § 31-34-10-9(b)–(c). Absent such consent, the fact-finding hearing must be held within sixty days of the petition’s filing unless all parties consent to extending the deadline by another sixty days. I.C. § 31- 34-11-1(a)–(b). [FN: Effective July 1, 2025, a new code section provides that most other CHINS deadlines are not waivable. Pub. L. No. 179-2025, § 7 (to be codified at I.C. § 31-32-1-5).] Aside from ensuring the parties receive notice of a scheduled fact-finding hearing, DCS must also notify “each foster parent or other caretaker with whom the child has been placed for temporary care.” I.C. § 31-34-11-1(c).
At the fact-finding hearing, the parents and the child have the right to introduce evidence, obtain evidence and witnesses by compulsory process, and cross-examine witnesses. I.C. §§ 31-32-2-1, 31-32-2-3(b). As for the child, any waiver of these rights must comply with the heightened requirements of the juvenile waiver statute. See I.C. § 31-32-5-1. But even absent waiver, a court can limit the child’s rights by excluding them “from any part of any hearing for good cause shown upon the record.” I.C. §§ 31-32-2-1, 31-32-6-8(2).
During the fact-finding hearing, DCS must prove each element of the alleged CHINS category by a preponderance of the evidence. I.C. § 31-34- 12-3. But even when DCS alleges a child is a CHINS under one category, the evidence presented at the hearing may show the child’s circumstances fit a different category. In such cases, a party can ask the court to adjudicate the child under that other category. Indeed, Trial Rule 15(B) allows parties to try issues not raised in the pleadings by “express or implied consent.” T.R. 15(B). And even when a nonmoving party objects, the court may still amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence “and shall do so freely when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence would” cause prejudice. Id. Thus, the trial court is not bound by DCS’s filing decision when asked to amend a CHINS petition. Rather, our Legislature has directed courts to independently consider—in this decision as in “all decisions”—the best interests of the child. I.C. § 31-10-2-2(2).
That said, amending certain CHINS categories under Trial Rule 15(B) at fact-finding becomes complicated when the child is excluded from the hearing or unrepresented by counsel. Such a child can neither meaningfully consent to nor object to trying issues outside the pleadings. In these circumstances, the court should consider whether the requested amendment will promote “the presentation of the merits of the action.” T.R. 15(B). Naturally, fuller presentation of the merits will generally advance the child’s best interests. But the trial court must also identify whether the amendment implicates CHINS 3.5 or 6—the categories requiring the child to admit or deny the allegations. If so, the court should ensure, when appropriate, that the child receives this opportunity and that the amendment does not prejudice their defense under these categories. The court should also determine, based on any new allegations, whether the child’s participation in the hearing and the appointment of counsel are appropriate. And when facing CHINS 3.5 or 6 allegations, a child will need the assistance of counsel to meaningfully respond. See Kelsey, supra, at 181 (noting that “a child is even more ill-equipped than an adult party to exercise the rights granted to them as a self-represented litigant”). Thus, the best practice is for the court and counsel on all sides to determine at the earliest opportunity whether any party might request adjudication under an alternative CHINS category. All parties can then receive proper notice. See In re M.O., 72 N.E.3d 527, 532 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (finding parties were put on notice when parents filed a notice of intent to seek a CHINS 6 adjudication).
If, after the fact-finding hearing, the trial court finds that DCS has met its burden, the court must, among other tasks, enter judgment and schedule a dispositional hearing. I.C. § 31-34-11-2. And if the court’s CHINS finding is based on a substantiated report of “child abuse or neglect,” DCS must add identifiable information about the judgment to the CPI. I.C. § 31-33-8-13. For purposes of the CPI, only CHINS categories 1 through 5 and 8 through 11 implicate “child abuse or neglect.” I.C. §§ 31- 9-2-14(a)(1), 31-33-26-2. And childcare providers, among others, can access the CPI with respect to current and prospective employees and volunteers who give their consent. I.C. § 31-33-26-16(a)(2)(A)–(B). Thus, a court’s decision to adjudicate a child a CHINS under one category rather than another can carry serious collateral consequences.
In concluding our statutory roadmap of CHINS proceedings from investigation through fact-finding, we identify three guideposts: (1) DCS must prove every substantive element of a CHINS category to obtain an adjudication, including the CHINS 1 requirement that a child’s parents either have the means to supply the child’s necessities or fail to seek them; (2) DCS and courts must afford to parents and children all the notice and opportunities to be heard to which they are entitled by statute or trial rule; and (3) courts can amend petitions on a party’s request to include CHINS allegations not pled by DCS when doing so serves the child’s best interests and does not prejudice the child’s rights. With the statutory roadmap and these guideposts in mind, we now address the issues raised in this appeal.
II. The trial court erred in adjudicating E.K. under CHINS 1 based on insufficient evidence and misinterpreted the law when considering whether to adjudicate him under CHINS 6 or 10.
Recall that Mother advances two arguments in this appeal: the evidence was insufficient for the trial court to adjudicate E.K. a CHINS 1; and the court incorrectly believed it was compelled to defer to DCS when deciding whether to amend the CHINS petition and adjudicate E.K. under CHINS 6 or 10. We agree with Mother on both issues.
We first explain that CHINS 1 requires a parent to provide a child with necessary shelter—that is, safe, secure, and stable housing. And here, given the danger E.K. posed to himself and others, the record contains no evidence that Mother either had the financial means or failed to seek other reasonable means to provide him with such shelter. Rather, all the evidence establishes that Mother did all she reasonably could to keep E.K. safe. We then explain that the trial court should have independently assessed whether adjudicating E.K. under CHINS 6 or 10 would advance his best interests, rather than deferring to DCS’s decision to allege only CHINS 1.
A. There was insufficient evidence that Mother either had or failed to seek the means to supply E.K. with necessary shelter as required under CHINS 1.
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B. The trial court erred in deferring to DCS when considering whether to adjudicate E.K. under CHINS 6 or 10.
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III. Due to procedural shortcomings below, the appropriate remedy is to remand for further CHINS proceedings.
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Conclusion
For the reasons explained above, we vacate the trial court’s judgment adjudicating E.K. a CHINS and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. [Footnote omitted.]
Massa, Slaughter, Goff, and Molter, JJ., concur.