Mathias, J.
Salvador A. Jones appeals his conviction for Level 5 felony robbery. Jones raises eight issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as the following five issues: 1. Whether Jones properly invoked his right to be tried within 180 days under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (“IAD”). 2. Whether Jones’s right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution attached prior to his initial hearing before an Indiana judicial officer, and whether his right to counsel under Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution attached prior to Indiana officials taking custody over him. 3. Whether the trial court committed fundamental error when it permitted the State to use self-authenticating affidavits as part of the foundation for the admissibility of surveillance videos and photographs. 4. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in the admission of certain evidence. 5. Whether Jones’s six-year sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character.
We affirm.
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On appeal, Jones first contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss because he was not timely brought to trial under the IAD.
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Our Supreme Court has expressly held that that language means that the defendant cannot simply deliver his request to the prosecuting attorney and the appropriate court; he must deliver it through his custodial authority. Greenwood, 665 N.E.2d at 58182. Jones did not deliver either his May 12 request or his May 19 request through his custodial authority; he therefore cannot rely on those requests.
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Jones next asserts that, in his May 12, 2023, letter to the trial court, he requested the appointment of counsel, which he did not receive. Jones thus argues that the trial court denied him his right to counsel under both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution when the court did not immediately appoint him counsel pursuant to that request, which he contends was prejudicial to him as he could have used the assistance of legal counsel to properly navigate the IAD process.
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The trial court was not obliged under the Sixth Amendment to appoint counsel for Jones in response to his May 12, 2023, request. The Supreme Court of the United States has made clear that “a criminal defendant’s initial appearance before a judicial officer, where he learns the charge against him and his liberty is subject to restriction, marks the start of adversary judicial proceedings that trigger attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.” Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191, 213 (2008).
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Thus, Rothgery has superseded our Supreme Court’s interpretation in Winston as to when the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches in Indiana. We are, of course, obliged to follow Rothgery on this question of federal law. Accordingly, the trial court did not err under the Sixth Amendment when it did not appoint counsel for Jones prior to the November 14, 2023, initial hearing because Jones’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not attached prior to that date.
We thus consider whether Jones’s May 12, 2023, request required the trial court to appoint him counsel under Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution. Whether Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution applies to a defendant who is in the custody of foreign officials and engaged in the IAD process is a question of first impression for Indiana’s courts.
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Jones’s argument under Article 1, Section 13 is premised on his assertion that that right to counsel attaches at the filing of an information. In support of his premise, Jones cites only a plurality opinion of our Supreme Court in Hoy v. State, 225 Ind. 428, 432-34, 75 N.E.2d 915, 917 (1947) (plurality opinion). But nothing in either that plurality opinion or the separate opinion concurring in the result (which had the vote of three Justices) declares that the right to counsel under Article 1, Section 13 attaches upon the filing of an information. To the contrary, as our Supreme Court made clear in Sims, the right attaches at the “point of arrest.” 413 N.E.2d at 559-60. Indeed, our Supreme Court has recognized several occasions in which the right to counsel under Article 1, Section 13 applies after an arrest and prior to the filing of an information. See, e.g., Jewell, 957 N.E.2d at 634; see also Pirtle v. State, 163 Ind. 16, 29, 323 N.E.2d 634, 640 (1975).
But what our Supreme Court has never held is that the Article 1, Section 13 right to counsel attaches upon a defendant’s arrest and custody in a foreign jurisdiction. And Jones provides no argument on appeal as to how it would be possible to even implement such a holding. We therefore conclude that the right to counsel under Article 1, Section 13 attaches at the “point of arrest” by an Indiana official. Here, that means the point at which Indiana obtained physical custody over Jones, which was at the conclusion of the IAD process on November 13, 2023. He therefore had no right to counsel under Article 1, Section 13 prior to that moment, and the trial court did not err under the Indiana Constitution when it did not act on Jones’s May 12, 2023, request.
The parties’ right-to-counsel arguments on appeal focus on the right to counsel during a critical stage of a criminal proceeding. Appellant’s Br. at 27-29; Appellee’s Br. at 31-35. But the critical-stage question under both the United States Constitution and the Indiana Constitution is a post-attachment question. See Rothgery, 554 U.S. 211-12; Sims, 413 N.E.2d 559-60. That is, once the right to counsel has attached, a defendant must be afforded counsel at all critical stages of the proceeding after that attachment. See Rothgery, 554 U.S. 211-12; Sims, 413 N.E.2d 559-60. There is, legally at least, no such thing under either constitutional provision as a critical stage of a criminal proceeding prior to the attachment of the right to counsel. See Rothgery, 554 U.S. 211-12; Sims, 413 N.E.2d 559-60. Accordingly, the parties’ arguments on appeal are nonstarters as neither of Jones’s constitutional rights to counsel attached prior to the conclusion of the IAD process.
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For all of these reasons, we affirm Jones’s conviction and sentence.
Affirmed.
Foley, J., and Felix, J., concur.