Rush, C.J.
The United States and Indiana Constitutions protect Hoosiers’ rights against self-incrimination and ensure that only voluntary statements made to police can be used against them in criminal prosecutions. We have long recognized that children are uniquely vulnerable to the coercive pressure of police interrogation, and our General Assembly has imposed additional safeguards through the juvenile-waiver statute. This statute limits a child’s ability to waive their rights and speak to police by imposing several procedural prerequisites. Among these requirements, a parent may waive their child’s rights only if they have no interest adverse to the child. This case presents a question of first impression: whether a parent’s own criminal conduct can produce an adverse interest.
Here, a fifteen-year-old child’s father twice waived the child’s rights, and the child made incriminating statements to a detective about selling pills to his classmates. At the time of both waivers, the detective had discovered evidence that the child’s father was also engaged in illegal drug activity. And three other relatives were present but not consulted before the first waiver. During the delinquency proceedings, the child objected to the admission of his statements to the detective, arguing that his father had an adverse interest at the time of both waivers. The trial court disagreed and admitted the child’s statements into evidence, ultimately adjudicating him a delinquent child.
Based on the text of the juvenile-waiver statute, we hold that an adverse interest may arise if the evidence shows an adult stands to personally benefit from waiving a child’s rights to the child’s detriment. Because the record here unequivocally includes such evidence, the State failed to meet its burden to prove the father had no interest adverse to the child each time he waived his son’s rights. Thus, we hold that the trial court erred in admitting the child’s statements. But because we hold that the error was harmless, we affirm.
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Under the Juvenile Waiver Statute, an unemancipated child cannot unilaterally waive their Miranda rights. See Ind. Code § 31-32-5-1. One way such a child can waive these rights is through a “custodial parent, guardian, custodian, or guardian ad litem” but only if four requirements are satisfied. Id. § -1(2). The qualified adult must knowingly and voluntarily waive the child’s rights, and the child must knowingly and voluntarily join the waiver. Id. § -1(2)(A), (D). They must also engage together in “meaningful consultation,” id. § -1(2)(C), which is designed to ensure that the child can decide whether to waive their rights “in a comparatively relaxed and stable atmosphere,” D.M., 949 N.E.2d at 335. Finally, the adult must have “no interest adverse to the child.” Id. § – 1(2)(B). The State bears the heavy burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that each requirement was met. See Taylor v. State, 438 N.E.2d 275, 283 (Ind. 1982); D.M., 949 N.E.2d at 334. If that burden is not satisfied, “the introduction in evidence of a statement made by” the child “is forbidden.” Stewart v. State, 754 N.E.2d 492, 495 (Ind. 2001) (quoting Stidham v. State, 608 N.E.2d 699, 700 (Ind. 1993)).
At issue here is whether the record supports a conclusion that the State met its burden to satisfy the Juvenile Waiver Statute’s requirement that Father had “no interest adverse” to J.Q.R. at the time of the waivers. I.C. § 31-32-5-1(2)(B). Though the subsequent statute permits a child to waive their right to meaningful consultation, id. § -5-2, no provision allows a child to waive the no-adverse-interest requirement. And unlike other protections in the Juvenile Waiver Statute, we have rarely had occasion to interpret the meaning and scope of what constitutes an “interest adverse to the child.” See Taylor, 438 N.E.2d at 283–84; Graham v. State, 464 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ind. 1984); Whipple v. State, 523 N.E.2d 1363, 1369–70 (Ind. 1988); Trowbridge v. State, 717 N.E.2d 138, 147 (Ind. 1999). And we have never faced the precise inquiry presented here: whether and under what circumstances an adult’s criminal conduct can render their interests adverse to a child.
J.Q.R. contends that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the inculpatory statements he made during the custodial interrogations at his home and at the police station, asserting the State failed to prove Father had no interest adverse to J.Q.R. either time he waived J.Q.R.’s rights….
We agree in part with both parties. Based on the plain text of the Juvenile Waiver Statute, we conclude that an adverse interest may arise if the evidence shows the adult stands to personally benefit from waiving the juvenile’s rights to the juvenile’s detriment. Here, at both moments J.Q.R.’s rights were waived, the police had uncovered evidence of Father’s illegal drug activity. This evidence revealed Father had an interest in avoiding or mitigating police suspicion against him and thus could personally benefit from waiving J.Q.R.’s rights to J.Q.R.’s detriment. Given this evidence, the State failed to meet its burden to show Father did not have an adverse interest either time he waived J.Q.R.’s rights. And so, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting J.Q.R.’s inculpatory statements. But we conclude this error was harmless because its probable impact was minor in light of independent, unchallenged evidence establishing that J.Q.R. knew the pills contained fentanyl. Accordingly, we affirm.
I. The trial court abused its discretion by admitting J.Q.R.’s inculpatory statements because the State failed to prove Father had no adverse interest.
We first determine whether and under what circumstances an adult’s criminal conduct can render their interests adverse to a child by examining the text of the Juvenile Waiver Statute. Based on that text and plain-language definitions of relevant terms, we conclude that an adult may have an adverse interest if, at the time the adult waives the child’s rights, the evidence shows the adult stands to personally benefit from waiving the child’s rights to the child’s detriment. This conclusion is also consistent with our caselaw applying the no-adverse-interest requirement. We then examine the facts here and conclude the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Father had no interest adverse to J.Q.R. either time Father waived J.Q.R.’s rights.
A. An adverse interest may arise if the evidence shows the adult stands to personally benefit from waiving the juvenile’s rights to the juvenile’s detriment.
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B. The State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Father had no interest adverse to J.Q.R. either time J.Q.R.’s rights were waived.
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As these conclusions are necessarily bound by the particular facts of this case, we decline to draw a bright-line rule that any evidence of an adult’s criminal conduct will render their interests adverse to a child. See N.B., 971 N.E.2d at 1254–55. Indeed, most parents have every capacity to safeguard their child’s best interests when helping them decide whether to waive their rights. And we have no doubt that Father loves J.Q.R. But parental love alone does not negate evidence that a parent possesses an interest adverse to their child at the time the child’s rights are waived. And when, as here, the evidence shows that a parent may be preoccupied with obscuring from police evidence of their own wrongdoing and thus might struggle to safeguard their child’s best interests, officers must exercise caution in allowing the parent to waive their child’s rights.
In summary, the facts and circumstances at the time of each waiver establish the State failed to show beyond a reasonable doubt that Father had no interest adverse to J.Q.R. either time he waived J.Q.R.’s rights. And thus, the trial court abused its discretion by admitting J.Q.R.’s inculpatory statements during the fact-finding hearing. We now assess the effect of this non-constitutional error to determine whether reversal is required.
II. The error in admitting J.Q.R.’s statements was harmless.
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Conclusion
The State failed to meet its burden to show Father had no interest adverse to J.Q.R. at the times Father waived J.Q.R.’s rights and they spoke to a detective. We therefore hold that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting J.Q.R.’s inculpatory statements. But because we hold the error was harmless, we affirm.
Massa, Slaughter, Goff, and Molter, JJ., concur.