Slaughter, J.
Our legislature limits the duties that a nonprofit religious organization, like a church, owes to persons entering its premises. For an invitee—one who enters the premises with the church’s actual or implied permission— the church’s twin duties are to warn of hidden dangers of which it has actual knowledge and not to harm the entrant intentionally. Unless the church breaches one of these limited duties, it is not liable for injuries sustained on its premises. This limitation of liability does not apply to all church premises. It applies only to the “premises owned, operated, or controlled by the nonprofit religious organization and used primarily for worship services”. We hold that “premises” includes a whole parcel of land, and that a church has limited premises liability so long as the parcel is “owned, operated, or controlled by the nonprofit religious organization and used primarily for worship services”.
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To win his negligence claim at trial, Kirsch must show that the church owed him a legal duty that it breached, proximately causing him injury. See Pfenning v. Lineman, 947 N.E.2d 392, 398 (Ind. 2011). The dispositive issue here—whether the church owed Kirsch a duty of reasonable care— turns on whether section 34-31-7-2 applies. If it applies, the statute bars Kirsch’s claim by relieving the church of its duty to exercise reasonable care for those who enter its premises. But if the statute does not apply, his claim avoids summary judgment and can proceed to trial. The trial court held the statute does not apply. We review the court’s interpretation of section 34-31-7-2, like any other statute, de novo. Bojko v. Anonymous Physician, 232 N.E.3d 1155, 1158 (Ind. 2024).
We hold that section 34-31-7-2 applies because “premises” in this section has an expansive meaning and includes the entire parcel of land where Kirsch was injured.
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Unlike the court of appeals, we are not persuaded that Kirsch’s proposed interpretation is reasonable. His analysis skips a step. He interprets “premises” in light of the statute’s requirement that a nonprofit religious organization use its premises “primarily for worship services”. But we must first determine what “premises” means before assessing whether the disputed premises are both (1) owned by the church and (2) used primarily for worship services. Put differently, whether church-owned premises are “used primarily for worship services” merely tells us for which “premises” the church has limited liability. It does not answer the threshold question of what “premises” means. Common-language dictionaries make clear that “premises” includes an entire parcel of land. Supra, at 5.
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Here, the church’s entire parcel of land qualifies as its “premises” under this statute. Supra, at 5 (quoting common dictionary definitions of “premises”). Thus, Kirsch had “enter[ed]” and was on the church’s “premises” when he was injured. I.C. § 34-31-7-2.
Section 34-31-7-2 is not without limit. By its terms, the statute does not apply to all church “premises”. It applies only to those “premises” a “nonprofit religious organization” both “owns, operates, or controls” and “uses primarily for worship services”. Ibid. (cleaned up). The “use” requirement is that “the premises as a whole [be] used primarily for worship services”. Henderson v. New Wineskin Ministries Corp., 160 N.E.3d 582, 585 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (emphasis added). How a church uses its premises determines whether the statute applies….
Here, in contrast, there is no doubt the premises on which Kirsch was injured meet the statute’s “use” requirement. The church designated evidence showing the whole parcel is used primarily for worship services. In response, Kirsch designated evidence showing the discrete subpart of the land on which he was injured (the barn site), along with other subparts, are not used for worship services. Even if true, that does not defeat summary judgment. The statute applies so long as the overall parcel—the “premises as a whole”—are used primarily for worship services. Ibid.
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Because Kirsch was injured while on “premises” the church “own[s]” and “use[s] primarily for worship services”, the church needed only to warn him of known hidden dangers and to refrain from harming him intentionally. I.C. § 34-31-7-2. Kirsch admits the church breached neither duty. Thus, his premises-liability claim fails.
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For these reasons, we reverse the trial court’s order denying the church summary judgment and remand with instructions to enter summary judgment for the church and against Kirsch.
Rush, C.J., and Massa, Goff, and Molter, JJ., concur.