Mathias, J.
M.S. appeals his adjudication as a delinquent child for dangerous possession of a firearm, a Class A misdemeanor. Specifically, M.S. claims that the adjudication must be set aside because the State failed to prove an alleged element of the offense, i.e., that he was in possession of the firearm without his parent’s permission.
We affirm.
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I.C. § 35-47-10-5, the statute under which M.S. was adjudicated delinquent, provides that “a child who knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly possesses a firearm for any purpose other than a purpose described in section 1 of this chapter commits dangerous possession of a firearm, a Class A misdemeanor.” I.C. § 35-47-10-1 of this chapter enumerates exemptions from culpability. More particularly—and relevant here—are I.C. § 35-47-10-1(b)(7)(A) and (B), which provide that “this chapter does not apply to . . . a child who is (A) at the child’s residence; and (B) has the permission of the child’s parent, an adult family member of the child, or the child’s legal guardian to possess a firearm.”
I.C. § 35-47-10-5, the statute under which M.S. was adjudicated delinquent, provides that “a child who knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly possesses a firearm for any purpose other than a purpose described in section 1 of this chapter commits dangerous possession of a firearm, a Class A misdemeanor.” I.C. § 35-47-10-1 of this chapter enumerates exemptions from culpability. More particularly—and relevant here—are I.C. § 35-47-10-1(b)(7)(A) and (B), which provide that “this chapter does not apply to . . . a child who is (A) at the child’s residence; and (B) has the permission of the child’s parent, an adult family member of the child, or the child’s legal guardian to possess a firearm.” Here, M.S. argues that the State failed to disprove that he fell within one of the exemptions or exceptions to I.C. § 35-47-10-5. Notwithstanding M.S.’s contention, our Supreme Court rejected a similar argument in A.W. v. State, 229 N.E.3d 1060 (Ind. 2024), explaining that “the statutory language—‘for any purpose other than a [lawful] purpose’ set forth in I.C. § 35-47-10-5, —is not an essential element the State was required to prove, but rather an affirmative defense[.]” Id. at 1072 n.15 (citing Washington v. State, 517 N.E.2d 77, 79 (Ind. 1987), where it was explained that possession of a valid license to carry a firearm is an affirmative defense and the burden is on the defendant to prove that he possessed a valid license) (emphasis in original). In other words, when a statute exempts a defendant from liability, it is the defendant’s burden to initially prove that the exemption or exception applies. See, e.g., Page v. State, 173 N.E.3d 723, 726 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (observing that the existence of a valid prescription is a defense to possession of a narcotic drug rather than an element of the crime, and the defendant bears the initial burden of establishing this defense).
Here, to the extent that M.S. asserts on appeal that he had a parent’s permission to possess the firearm, he presented no evidence at the adjudication hearing proving that exemption. And M.S. makes no other sufficiency challenges to the adjudication. For these reasons, we affirm M.S.’s adjudication.
Judgment affirmed.
Vaidik, J. and Crone, Sr.J., concur.