Slaughter, J.,
R.L., a sheriff’s deputy, was charged with driving while intoxicated. The State later dropped criminal charges. But the Indiana Law Enforcement Training Board, which credentials Indiana’s law-enforcement officers, brought proceedings to revoke R.L.’s basic-training certificate, without which R.L. cannot work as an officer. Board decisions are reviewable only under AOPA, the Administrative Orders and Procedures Act. Yet before the board issued a final decision, R.L. went to court and obtained a declaration that the board could not discipline him and an injunction barring the board from revoking his basic-training certificate.
We hold that the trial court erred in granting R.L.’s request for declaratory and injunctive relief. The only route by which R.L. can challenge the board’s decisions is through AOPA’s judicial-review framework. But R.L. is not entitled to this review. He did not exhaust administrative remedies but sued in court before the board’s proceedings concluded. His failure to exhaust leaves us, a reviewing court, with no final agency action to review. We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand with instructions to dismiss R.L.’s declaratory-judgment action.
….
AOPA governs how to obtain relief in court from decisions of certain agencies. One of those agencies is the law enforcement training board. I.C. § 5-2-1-12.5(k). AOPA’s procedure is the “exclusive means for judicial review of” board rulings. Id. § 4-21.5-5-1. Put differently, a party aggrieved by the board’s final order must follow AOPA’s procedures to challenge the order in court.
We hold that R.L.’s declaratory-judgment action in the trial court was premature because he did not exhaust available remedies before the board. Contrary to R.L.’s arguments, neither the declaratory-judgment act nor the expungement statute gives him another route to sue in court; he must follow AOPA’s path. We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand with instructions to dismiss R.L.’s action. Because we reverse on these grounds, we do not address the board’s other asserted grounds for reversal.
…
We hold that skirting board proceedings—as R.L. did here by running to court for relief before the board decided whether charges against him merit discipline—contravenes AOPA’s exhaustion mandate. Id. § 4-21.5-5- 2(b)(2); id. § 4-21.5-5-4(a). The hearing statute gives R.L. many opportunities to challenge any misconduct allegations. If the board decides not to discipline R.L., he keeps his basic-training certificate and need not seek relief in court. If the board instead revokes his certificate, R.L. may challenge the board’s decision on judicial review. Id. § 5-2-1-12.5(k). Either way, AOPA does not permit R.L. to seek judicial review until the board’s proceedings conclude and the board reaches a final decision. Id. § 4-21.5-5- 2(b)(2); id. § 4-21.5-5-4(a). Of course, a board decision favorable to R.L. would obviate the need for judicial review.
….
In sum, R.L.’s failure to exhaust his remedies before the board leaves us without a final agency action to review. Id. § 4-21.5-1-6; id. § 4-21.5-5-2…
R.L. tries to justify his failure to comply with AOPA’s exhaustion requirement by relying on two statutes, the expungement statute’s anti-discrimination provision, id. § 35-38-9-10, and the declaratory-judgment act, id. ch. 34-14-1. R.L. makes the procedural argument that the anti-discrimination provision permits him to seek relief in court before the board concludes its proceedings. He also argues that the declaratory-judgment act authorizes his action outside AOPA’s strictures. Both arguments fail.
….
As for the declaratory-judgment act, Indiana courts have long recognized that petitioners may not use the act to sidestep AOPA. “Where such an administrative remedy is readily available, filing a declaratory judgment action is not a suitable alternative.” Carter, 925 N.E.2d at 360 (citing Advantage Home Health Care, Inc., 829 N.E.2d at 503). Holding otherwise would gut the legislature’s demand that petitioners exhaust agency remedies before going to court, and it would undermine the very litigation efficiency the exhaustion requirement seeks to advance.
Neither the expungement statute’s anti-discrimination provision nor the declaratory-judgment act permits R.L. to bypass available remedies before the board.
* * *
For these reasons, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand with instructions to dismiss R.L.’s declaratory-judgment action.
Rush, C.J., and Massa, Goff, and Molter, JJ., concur.