Mathias, J.,
Theresa England appeals the trial court’s dismissal of her complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. England raises four issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as the following two issues:
1. Whether the trial court’s dismissal of England’s complaint was contrary to Indiana’s Worker’s Compensation Act (“the Act”).
2. Whether Indiana Code section 22-3-6-1(a), which defines an “employer” under the Act to encompass parent and subsidiary companies, violates the Indiana Constitution.
We affirm.
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1. Indiana’s judiciary does not have original jurisdiction over England’s claims against a joint employer or its employee.
On appeal, England first contends that the trial court misapplied the Act when it dismissed her complaint. We do not agree.
Our Supreme Court has long made clear that
recovery for personal injury or death by accident arising out of employment and in the course of employment [must] be sought exclusively under the Worker’s Compensation Act and . . . such actions are cognizable only by the Worker’s Compensation Board. The legislature intended the board’s jurisdiction in such cases to be original and exclusive, and resort may not be had to the courts until the administrative process has been completely exhausted. Claims which do not meet any one of the jurisdictional prerequisites do not fall within the act and may be pursued in court.
Perry, 637 N.E.2d at 1285 (citations omitted).
The Act defines an “employer” in relevant part to expressly include “a parent corporation and its subsidiaries,” which “shall each be considered joint employers” of the injured employee. Ind. Code § 22-3-6-1(a) (2020)…
Here, England was an employee of FedEx Express. FedEx Express is a 100% owned subsidiary of FedEx Corporation. She has filed suit against FedEx Freight and its employee; however, FedEx Freight is a 100% owned subsidiary of FedEx Freight Corporation, and FedEx Freight Corporation, like FedEx Express, is a 100% owned subsidiary of FedEx Corporation. Thus, like the employee in Hall, both England’s direct employer (FedEx Express) and the alleged tortfeasor (vicariously, FedEx Freight) have the same parent company (FedEx Corporation). Accordingly, England’s direct employer and the alleged tortfeasor are joint employers under the Act, and her claims against Siebe and FedEx Freight are barred by the Act’s exclusive remedies provision.
Still, England argues that Indiana Code section 22-3-6-1(a) “does not say . . . that sibling corporations are ‘joint employers’ under the Act.” Appellant’s Br. at 12. England is incorrect. The statute says, “a parent corporation and its subsidiaries . . . shall each be considered joint employers . . . .” I.C. § 22-3-6-1(a) (emphases added). That language unambiguously identifies parent companies of the employee’s direct employer as joint employers, and it likewise unambiguously and separately identifies all of the parent company’s subsidiaries—and, thus, “sibling corporations”—as joint employers.
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2. Indiana Code section 22-3-6-1(a) is constitutional.
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In a similar challenge to the constitutionality of the Act in Sims, our Supreme Court made clear that the Act did not violate either the Open Courts Clause or the Right to Trial by Jury Clause. As the Court explained, an employee under the Act “is not completely denied access to the courts. Rather, he is merely required to present his claim first to the full Worker’s Compensation Board.” Id. at 351. Further, claims covered by the Act are “part of a special statutory proceeding” and are not a “‘civil case’ as contemplated by” the Right to Trial by Jury Clause. Id. We conclude that Sims forecloses England’s similar arguments under Sections 12 and 20 of Article 1.
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Conclusion
For all of these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of England’s complaint against Siebe and FedEx Freight.
Affirmed. Brown, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur