Vaidik, J.
A jury found James Francisco Payne guilty of Level 5 felony battery with a deadly weapon. At trial, the judge, the deputy prosecutors, and Payne’s attorney were unaware that two psychologists had recently found Payne incompetent to stand trial in two new cases filed while he was in jail for this case. Upon learning this information, Payne’s attorney moved to set aside the verdict. The court stayed consideration of the motion while Payne received competency-restoration services at a state hospital. When Payne returned, the court held a hearing and then denied the motion, concluding that Payne was competent at the time of trial. Payne appeals, and we reverse. Given Payne’s well-documented history of mental illness, the incompetency findings shortly before trial, and Payne’s bizarre statements and conduct before, during, and after trial, the court should have found that he had been incompetent at trial and set aside the verdict.
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Payne contends the trial court erred by finding that he was competent to stand trial and denying his motion to set aside the verdict. To be competent to stand trial, the defendant must have “the ability to understand the proceedings and assist in the preparation of the defendant’s defense.” Ind. Code § 35-36-3-1.
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Having closely reviewed the entire record, we are compelled to hold that the motion to set aside the verdict should have been granted. By the time the trial court ruled on the motion, the evidence that Payne was incompetent at the time of trial was overwhelming. The evidence can be divided into five groups: (1) Payne’s previous cases before the trial court; (2) Payne’s statements and conduct before trial; (3) the competency proceedings in the Misdemeanor Cases; (4) Payne’s statements and testimony at trial; and (5) Payne’s statements and conduct after trial.
While Payne’s previous cases with the trial court are the least relevant evidence of his mental state at the time of this trial, they did set a baseline: the court was well aware that Payne had a history of serious mental illness. Three years before the trial in this case, the court ordered a competency evaluation for Payne in a group of misdemeanor cases and later accepted a plea agreement that required a mental-health evaluation. Two years before the trial in this case, the court ordered another competency evaluation in two felony cases and then sent Payne to Logansport State Hospital for restoration services. One year before the trial in this case, the court was dealing with petitions to revoke Payne’s probation in another felony case because of his failure to comply with mental-health services.
Then came the pretrial proceedings in this case, during which Payne remained incarcerated. Payne said at his initial hearing that Christians are “undergoing terrorism per nano technology program 18 United States Code Section 7501” and that the Indiana Supreme Court is a “military court.” At another hearing two weeks later, the trial court denied Payne’s request to represent himself because he was “not capable of providing circumstances that would establish anything close to a fair trial for his claims.” Shortly thereafter, Payne sent the court an incomprehensible letter in which he referenced, among other things, “AN ENTIRE PERJURIED CIVIL COURT,” a “SPY WIRETAB OPT RECORD MACHINE SEEKER MONOGRAM SYMBOL SCRAPPLER SCRAMBLER TERRORISM STRATEGY,” and the size of a civil jury.
At a hearing in October 2022, Payne mentioned “radar design technology in Popular Science” while discussing DNA evidence, and the trial court told him, “[Y]ou’re not making any sense.” Payne referred to himself as “the universal opperhouse (sic) of the reserve room throne” and the “king of the world,” referred to the prosecutor as a “maygoner,” and referred to Gangwer as “a motion of wash.” Payne said he couldn’t obey the court’s order to provide a DNA sample because “I am not a yet a [sic] conviction settlement.” He said the judge is a “universal terrorist” and that his family was there to “execute” the judge. He said “this maygonar (sic) solictris (sic) is, is, is not of use” and that “no one is supposed to be in this place, right now. No one.” He said “I’m not in Nebraska” and “I’m of this bailiwick.” After the hearing, Payne fought with sheriff’s deputies in the hallway outside the courtroom.
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We acknowledge the State’s suggestion that Payne’s mental condition might have improved in the weeks between his evaluations in the Misdemeanor Cases and his trial in this case. This seems highly unlikely, since there is no indication in the record that Payne received any mental-health treatment during the eight months he was incarcerated before trial. That said, we understand that mental competency is not a static condition, Edwards v. State, 902 N.E.2d 821, 827 (Ind. 2009), so the fact that Payne was incompetent weeks or years before this trial does not necessarily mean he was incompetent at the time of this trial. Therefore, we also look to whether Payne showed any signs of incompetency at trial. The trial court found there was “no evidence” of incompetency and that Payne’s testimony was “pretty effective.” The transcript clearly shows otherwise.
Almost every time Payne opened his mouth at trial, he said something nonsensical.
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Payne’s mental struggles continued after trial. During his interview for the presentence investigation report, he “seemed detached from reality,” stated “there is no such thing as a criminal court, all court is civil,” and asked if the interviewer said Payne’s family “was in room 202 being raped.”
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Notwithstanding this significant and disturbing evidence of incompetency, the State insists that, at trial, Payne “demonstrated that he understood the nature of the charges against him and was able to assist in his defense.” Appellee’s Br. p. 18. But the handful of transcript pages the State cites actually bolsters the conclusion that Payne was incompetent.
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These facts and the others detailed above lead inexorably to the conclusion that Payne was not competent to stand trial. Although he sometimes demonstrated understanding of legal concepts, his persecutory thought and one-track mind greatly limited his ability to work with counsel and aid in his defense. As a result, his trial and conviction were a denial of federal due process and a violation of Indiana Code section 35-36-3-1. See McManus, 814 N.E.2d at 260. We must therefore reverse the conviction and habitual-offender finding in F52862 and the revocation of probation in F6-4879 and remand for further proceedings in both cases. We caution all involved in those proceedings to closely monitor Payne’s mental state and to ensure he is competent before any re-trial or probation-revocation hearing.
Reversed and remanded.
Kenworthy, J., concurs.
Felix, J., dissents with separate opinion.
Felix, J., dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Payne has not shown that the trial court clearly erred by denying his motion to set aside the verdict. Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court’s decision.
On appeal, Payne claims his motion to set aside the verdict was brought pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 50(A). Such motions challenge only the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the judgment or verdict. See Ind. Trial Rule 50(A). Here, Payne challenged his convictions based on his alleged incompetence to stand trial, so his motion was in substance a motion for relief from judgment under Trial Rule 60(B) and should be treated as such.
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The trial court denied Payne’s motion to set aside the verdict because it determined Payne had been competent to stand trial. Payne argues this determination was error. To determine whether a defendant is competent to stand trial, the trial court must decide “whether the defendant has sufficient present ability to consult with defense counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, and whether the defendant has a rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” State v. Davis, 898 N.E.2d 281, 284 (Ind. 2008) (quoting Adams v. State, 509 N.E.2d 812, 814 (Ind. 1987)).
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It would be a fool’s errand to attempt to suggest that Payne was coherent and logical throughout the entire proceedings. This dissent will not attempt such a feat. Payne said certain things that can only be described as bizarre and unintelligible as the majority recorded and is rightfully concerned with.
However, the record also contains evidence that Payne was competent. There is no indication in the record that Payne or his public defender raised any concerns to the trial court about Payne’s competency before filing the motion to set aside the verdict. At a pre-trial hearing on September 16, 2022, Payne’s public defender indicated to the trial court that she had no concerns about Payne’s competency: she did “not believe that he is incompetent under the legal standard of incompetency. He understands that I’m his lawyer. He clearly understands that you’re the Judge. He understands the prosecutor’s role. He has documents in a file folder that he keeps with him.” Supp. Tr. Vol. II at 9. Plus, this public defender had represented Payne in at least one prior criminal case. Therefore, she had more experience with Payne than simply in this case.
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Furthermore, because mental competency is determined at the time of trial, Edwards, 902 N.E.2d at 826, Dr. Culley’s conclusion in November 2022 and Dr. Hurley’s conclusion in December 2022 that Payne was not competent to stand trial in the misdemeanor causes are not determinative of whether Payne was competent to stand trial on January 9 and 10, 2023, in this case. In the absence of evidence tending to show that Payne’s mental state either improved or diminished between the dates he was evaluated and the date of his trial, it is imperative that we rely on the trial court’s observations of Payne during that time as much, if not more so, than the cold record.
Moreover, it was within the trial court’s discretion to discredit or disregard Dr. Hurley’s and Dr. Culley’s conclusions, and it was also within the trial court’s discretion to weigh its own observations of Payne before, during, and after trial against the doctors’ conclusions and determine that its observations outweighed those conclusions. See Isom, 170 N.E.3d at 653 (quoting Cotton, 753 N.E.2d at 591); Barcroft, 111 N.E.3d at 1003 (citing Galloway, 938 N.E.2d at 709); Galloway, 938 N.E.2d at 709 (citing Cate, 644 N.E.2d at 547; Thompson, 804 N.E.2d at 1149). This court cannot reassess Dr. Hurley’s and Dr. Culley’s credibility, nor can it reweigh the evidence. See Tibbs, 59 N.E.3d at 1019 (citing Stonger, 776 N.E.2d at 358).
Most importantly, and the reason for this dissent, when there is conflicting evidence concerning a defendant’s competency, this court must look to the evidence supporting the trial court’s decision; it is only when that decision is wholly unsupported that we may reverse. McManus, 814 N.E.2d at 260–61 (quoting Brewer, 646 N.E.2d at 1384). Instead of focusing on the evidence that the trial court could have used to make a decision regarding Payne’s alleged incompetency, we should be determining whether there was evidence of his competency. See id. Based on my review of the record, I conclude there is evidence in this record supporting the trial court’s determination that Payne was competent to stand trial on January 9 and 10, 2023. Therefore, the trial court did not clearly err in making this decision and thus did not clearly err in denying Payne’s motion to set aside the verdict. I would affirm the trial court’s denial of that motion.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.