Mathias, J.
James Emslander (“Father”) appeals the Kosciusko Superior Court’s order granting Jaclyn Baine’s (“Mother’s”) petition to relocate her residence with the parties’ two minor children (“Children”). Father presents a single issue for our review, namely, whether the trial court abused its discretion when it granted Mother’s relocation petition.
We reverse.
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Father contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted Mother’s petition to relocate based solely on the fact that his objection did not comply with Indiana Code section 31-17-2.2-5(a). Notably, Mother does not dispute that that is the sole basis for the court’s judgment.
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Indiana Code chapter 31-17-2.2 governs a parent’s relocation in the context of child custody. After Mother filed her notice of relocation, Father was required to file a response within twenty days, which he did. Father submitted a handwritten response stating as follows: “I[,] James Emslander[,] am responding to the petitioner’s Notice of Relocation. I object to this relocation of my minor children.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p. 16. Pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-17-2.2-5(a)(3), in addition to stating his objection, Father was required to request a hearing and: (i) a temporary or permanent order to prevent the relocation of the children; and (ii) the modification of a custody, parenting time, grandparent visitation, or child support order as a result of the relocation. Father did not make those additional requests.
Indiana Code section 31-17-2.2-5(g) states that, “[i]f the nonrelocating parent fails to file a response under subsection (a), the relocating individual may relocate to the new residence.” In her motion to strike Father’s response, Mother argued that because Father had “failed to file a response under subsection (a) of Indiana Code section 31-17-2.2-5, [Mother] should be allowed to relocate to her intended new residence.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p. 18. At the conclusion of the ensuing hearing, while the trial court denied Mother’s motion to strike, the court agreed that Mother was entitled to relocate because of Father’s noncompliance with the statute.
But we agree with Father that, under the facts and circumstances of this case, his technical noncompliance with the statute is insufficient to support the relocation order. It is a fundamental tenet of family law that all matters of child custody, including relocation, turn on the best interests of the children. See, e.g., Pilkington v. Pilkington, 227 N.E.3d 885, 895 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (stating that “the resolution of a relocation request should ultimately turn on a judicial determination of the best interests of the child involved”); see also T.L. v. J.L., 950 N.E.2d 779, 788 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (observing that “the resolution of relocation disputes ultimately turns on a judicial determination of the best interests of the child”).
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We reject Mother’s contention that she was entitled to relocate under Indiana Code section 31-17-2.2-5(g) merely because Father’s objection did not strictly comply with subsection (a) of that statute. Father objected, albeit without the additional required motions, and the trial court modified his parenting time without considering evidence of each of the statutory factors under Indiana Code section 31-17-2.2-1(c). And while the court was not required to make specific findings on each factor, “at a minimum, there must be evidence in the record on each of the factors listed” in the statute. Wolljung v. Sidell, 891 N.E.2d 1109, 1113 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Because Father filed an objection to relocation and the trial court only heard evidence on some, but not all of the factors, we reverse the trial court’s grant of Mother’s relocation petition.
Reversed.
Brown, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.