Mathias, J.
Shianne Brooks-Brown alleges that she is a victim of human sexual trafficking. When one of her alleged traffickers set her up with a John near Flora, Indiana, the trafficker robbed and murdered the John. The State does not believe that Brooks-Brown is the victim of human sexual trafficking and has charged her as an accomplice to that robbery and murder. She has been incarcerated on those charges since June 2021.
Brooks-Brown filed a witness list that made it clear that she intended to argue that she did not have the mens rea required to commit the alleged offenses due to the circumstances and associated trauma of being the alleged victim of human sexual trafficking. The State responded with a motion in limine to exclude any such evidence on the ground that a defendant’s challenge to her mens rea may only be made under Indiana’s insanity defense. The trial court denied the State’s request to exclude the evidence, but the court certified its order for interlocutory appeal, which we accepted.
We affirm the trial court’s judgment. Brooks-Brown is not asserting that she engaged in otherwise proscribed conduct because of a mental disease or defect. Nor is she asserting that her alleged victimization by human traffickers is an effect of battery, which in some circumstances also requires, by statute, alleging an insanity defense. Rather, Brooks-Brown is alleging that her actions were not done knowingly or intentionally but only out of acquiescence to her traffickers.
There is no statute on point for this scenario, and, indeed, related statutes reflect conflicting legislative intents. Accordingly, we turn to our common law to resolve this appeal. And Indiana law is unambiguous that the mens rea for a criminal offense requires the fact-finder to determine the defendant’s subjective state of mind at the time of the alleged offense. As Brooks-Brown’s proffered evidence is relevant to her subjective state of mind, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the State’s pretrial motion to exclude Brooks-Brown’s evidence.
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The State has charged Brooks-Brown under a theory of accomplice liability for the offenses of robbery and felony murder. A defendant may be found guilty as an accomplice if the defendant “knowingly or intentionally” aided, induced, or caused another person to commit an alleged offense. I.C. § 35-41-2-4. “A person engages in conduct ‘knowingly’ if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so.” I.C. § 35-41-2-2(b). And “[a] person engages in conduct ‘intentionally’ if, when he engages in the conduct, it is his conscious objective to do so.” I.C. § 35-41-2-2(a).
The central question in this appeal is whether Brooks-Brown may present evidence at trial that challenges the State’s allegations that she acted knowingly or intentionally as an accomplice to the robbery and felony murder of Smith. According to the State, any such argument by Brooks-Brown must be made in accordance with Indiana’s insanity defense. Brooks-Brown, on the other hand, asserts that the insanity defense is limited to specific types of mental diseases or defects, which is not her putative defense. Rather, her putative defense is that she did not act knowingly or intentionally, not that she acted pursuant to a mental disease or defect.
Brooks-Brown’s putative defense does not fit neatly into any statutory defense. But it is plainly not an insanity defense. We therefore conclude, in the absence of clear legislative direction to the contrary, that Brooks-Brown’s proffered evidence is relevant to the fact-finder’s determination of her subjective state of mind underlying the alleged offenses.
Brooks-Brown’s putative defense is not an insanity defense.
We initially consider the State’s contention that Brooks-Brown’s evidence is inadmissible except through an insanity defense. Addressing this issue requires an understanding of Indiana’s defense of insanity and the related defense of effects of battery.
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When the defendant in a felony criminal case intends to interpose the defense of insanity, he or she must file a notice of that intent with the trial court no later than twenty days before the omnibus date. I.C. § 35-36-2-1. However, the court may permit the notice to be filed “at any time before the commencement of the trial” when doing so is “in the interest of justice” and supported by “a showing of good cause.” Id. There is no dispute that Brooks-Brown neither filed a timely notice of an intent to interpose an insanity defense nor has she requested the trial court to permit her to file that notice belatedly.
Our Supreme Court has long cautioned against attempts by the State to pigeonhole all challenges to a defendant’s mens rea into the defense of insanity.
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That background brings us to the instant case. Relying on Marley and Green, the State argues that the trial court here erred in not excluding Brooks-Brown’s evidence challenging her mens rea. According to the State, Marley requires any “evidence relating to mental disease or defect” to be raised only “through an insanity defense.” See id. As the State puts it, that means:
A defendant who wants to claim that she could not form the requisite mens rea due to a trauma-induced abnormal mental condition may only do so through an insanity defense. She may not claim that a trauma-induced mental condition not rising to the level of insanity excuses her from criminal culpability.
Appellant’s Br. at 11. The State also asserts that Brooks-Brown’s circumstances “cannot be meaningfully distinguished from the facts of Green.” Id.
The State’s position on the relevant law is incorrect for several reasons. First, the State’s reliance on Marley and Green is misplaced. Our Supreme Court’s analysis in Marley is expressly and exclusively focused on claims where the effects of battery suffered by the defendant are alleged to have resulted in a mental disease or defect that made the defendant unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of her conduct. 747 N.E.2d at 1128. Further, that analysis was in accordance with clear legislative direction. See id. But Brooks-Brown has not alleged that she suffers from the effects of battery, let alone that any such effects have resulted in a mental disease or defect of any kind. Nor has our General Assembly defined being the victim of human trafficking as a species of insanity. And the facts of Green are not reasonably comparable to the facts before us in this case.
Second, the State’s assertion that Indiana law demands that all “trauma-induced mental condition[s]” being used to challenge the mens rea of a criminal allegation must be brought solely by way of an insanity defense is extremely overbroad. The effects-of-battery statute itself does not demand as much, allowing defendants to either assert that the effects of battery resulted in a mental disease or defect or that the effects of battery placed the defendant in a circumstance where she believed the use of justified reasonable force to have been necessary. I.C. § 35-41-3-11(b).
Moreover, the State’s expansive understanding of when the insanity defense should apply is expressly contrary to our Supreme Court’s caution in both Marley and McClain. As our Supreme Court made clear in Marley, “the definition of insanity if read broadly could embrace a wide variety of mental conditions that are not properly held subject to the insanity statute.” 747 N.E.2d at 1128. Like the circumstances in McClain that our Supreme Court held to not be an appropriate use of the insanity defense, here Brooks-Brown is relying on an “induced condition,” not a “mental disease or defect.” 678 N.E.2d at 109. And, unlike the effects-of-battery circumstances in Marley, our General Assembly has not expressly defined the induced condition here to be one that must proceed by way of the insanity defense. See 747 N.E.2d at 1128. Accordingly, the insanity defense is not applicable here.
The State’s argument, if adopted, would fundamentally and improperly transform a wide range of evidentiary challenges into “insanity.” See id. Indeed, like the argument rejected by our Supreme Court in McClain, adopting the State’s argument here would require that a “successful” defense result in a “not responsible by reason of insanity” judgment. 678 N.E.2d at 109. That, in turn, would leave a sane human trafficking victim in custody pending commitment proceedings, which is absurd and antithetical to the purpose of the insanity defense. See id. The State’s argument is thus contrary to law and amounts to concluding that trafficking victims are mentally diseased or defective. We reject the State’s argument accordingly.
Brooks-Brown’s proffered evidence is relevant to her subjective state of mind.
Brooks-Brown’s putative defense seeks to challenge the State’s assertion that she knowingly or intentionally aided others in the robbery and felony murder of Smith. She intends to argue that she did not act knowingly or intentionally but, rather, merely out of acquiescence toward her alleged traffickers. Thus, she seeks to present evidence at trial to counter the State’s evidence regarding the statutory element of her state of mind.
As long as Brooks-Brown’s proffered evidence is admissible under the Indiana Rules of Evidence, her evidence is entirely consistent with Indiana law. As our Supreme Court has long made clear, whether a defendant acts knowingly or intentionally is a question directed to the defendant’s subjective state of mind. Armour, 479 N.E.2d at 1297. And, as we made clear in Barrett, “[p]roof of this subjective awareness requires resort to inferential reasoning to ascertain the accused’s mental state.” 675 N.E.2d at 1116. “Therefore, evidence or testimony regarding the accused’s mental state is relevant to determine whether the accused [acted] knowingly or intentionally . . . .” Id.
Further, we are not persuaded by the State’s reliance on Indiana Code section 35-38-10-2. That statute provides a limited post-conviction remedy for inmates who have been convicted of an offense that did not result in bodily injury to another person where the inmate was “a trafficked person at the time” of the offense and “coerced” or “under the control of” another person at the time of the offense. I.C. § 35-38-10-2. We think that statute demonstrates a legislative intent commensurate with the language used: to provide a limited opportunity for post-conviction relief to certain inmates.
Indeed, the limited legislative intent underlying Indiana Code section 35-38-102 is made clear by another statute. In particular, Indiana Code section 35-45-42(a) states in relevant part that a person who knowingly or intentionally offers or agrees to perform sexual intercourse with another person for money commits prostitution, which is either a Class A misdemeanor or a Level 6 felony. However, subsection (b) of that statute states that “[i]t is a defense” to an allegation of prostitution “that the [defendant] was a victim or an alleged victim of an offense” of human trafficking. I.C. § 35-45-4-2(b) (citing I.C. §§ 35-42-3.51 to -1.4). Thus, when prostitution has been alleged, our General Assembly has provided a complete trial defense for alleged victims of human trafficking. See also Anderson v. State, 237 N.E.3d 714, 717-18 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), trans. not sought. That is plainly more comprehensive than the relief available by way of the post-conviction process.
Although not addressed by the parties in this appeal, we also acknowledge that the statutory defense of human trafficking provided for under Indiana Code 3545-4-2(b) is not Brooks-Brown’s putative defense. As we have explained, the statutory defense of human trafficking admits to the elements of prostitution— including the mens rea—but excuses culpability for the offense notwithstanding that admission. Id. Brooks-Brown’s defense, in contrast, is not that she knowingly or intentionally engaged in robbery and felony murder but should be excused from those acts; her defense is that she did not have the state of mind required to commit those acts in the first instance.
For all of these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the State’s pretrial request to exclude Brooks-Brown’s proffered evidence with respect to her subjective state of mind at the time of the alleged offenses. We express no opinion on the admissibility of any such evidence at trial under the Indiana Rules of Evidence.
Affirmed.
Bailey, J., concurs with separate opinion.
Altice, C.J., dissents with separate opinion.
Bailey, Judge, concurring.
The central issue in this case is whether Brooks-Brown may present evidence to rebut the State’s claim that she had acted with the requisite intent to commit the offenses. I fully agree with the lead opinion that Brooks-Brown’s putative defense is “plainly not an insanity defense.” Slip op. at 11. And I agree that her proffered evidence is relevant to her subjective state of mind.
However, I write separately because I believe that the statutory defense of human trafficking is relevant to our analysis. Indiana Code section 35-45-4-2(a) states in pertinent part that a person who knowingly or intentionally offers or agrees to perform sexual intercourse with another person for money commits prostitution, which is either a Class A misdemeanor or a Level 6 felony. However, subsection (b) of that statute states that “[i]t is a defense” to an allegation of prostitution “that the [defendant] was a victim or an alleged victim of an offense” of human trafficking. I.C. § 35-45-4-2(b) (citing I.C. §§ 35-42-3.51 to -1.4).
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It is of no moment whether the act of prostitution is the focus of the prosecutor’s discretion or whether, as here, it is the link the prosecutor uses to support the charges. Under either scenario, a successful defense will excuse liability. Because the statute provides a human trafficking defense to counter any prostitution allegation that is the basis for criminal charges, it is immaterial whether the State actually charged her with prostitution or whether the alleged act is a component of another charge. I would therefore hold that Brooks-Brown’s proffered evidence is admissible to support a statutory defense to human trafficking.
While I agree with the lead opinion, I believe the foregoing establishes an additional rationale for the admission of her proffered evidence. Therefore, I concur.
Altice, Chief Judge, dissenting.
I agree with the State that Brooks-Brown may not – outside the confines of an insanity defense – present expert testimony on the effects of human trafficking for her stated purpose of establishing that she did not knowingly or intentionally act as an accomplice to the robbery and murder. Our Supreme Court has stated several times that we do not recognize degrees of insanity in Indiana. E.g., Marley v. State, 747 N.E.2d 1123, 1128 (Ind. 2001). The effect of the majority’s decision here, however, creates a middle ground between sanity and insanity, opening the floodgates of evidence bearing on a defendant’s mental condition – short of insanity – to show their “subjective state of mind” at the time of the crime.
It is true that our Supreme Court has recognized that “the definition of insanity if read broadly could embrace a wide variety of mental conditions that are not properly held subject to the insanity statute.” Id. (citing McClain v. State, 678 N.E.2d 104, 108 (Ind. 2001)). But I cannot agree with the majority’s reading of McClain and Marley as somehow cautioning against “attempts by the State to pigeonhole all challenges to a defendant’s mens rea into the defense of insanity.” Slip op. at 12 (emphasis supplied). In my view, the Court was speaking in terms of voluntariness, not mens rea. That is, in limited situations where evidence of a mental condition (or mental state affected by a medical condition) is used to establish unconscious, involuntary behavior committed by a person of sound mind, the defendant need not proceed under an insanity defense. See id. (“McClain staked out a small area of mental states, e.g., sleepwalking, epilepsy, and metabolic disorders, that are not attributable to any mental disease or defect but nevertheless negate the voluntariness requirement.”) (emphases supplied); McClain, 678 N.E.2d at 108-09 (holding that automatism is not a species of the insanity defense and that evidence of such may be presented to dispute whether the defendant engaged in voluntary conduct, as required by Ind. Code § 35-41-2-1(a)); Reed v. State, 693 N.E.2d 988, 992 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (“[B]ecause the State must prove that a defendant engages in criminal conduct, voluntarily or by act of choice, in a conscious state of mind, automatism is relevant to determine whether a defendant voluntarily commits an offense.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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The above language applies just as strongly here, where Brooks-Brown seeks to present evidence that she lacked criminal intent due to the circumstances and trauma of being a victim of human trafficking. To pursue this defense, I believe she must proceed under the insanity defense. See Marley, 747 N.E.2d at 1128 (“Marley’s claim of a ‘dissociative state’ as a result of battered women’s syndrome … is a claim that an abnormal condition has impaired the defendant’s perception of the action taken.”); Green v. State, 65 N.E.3d 620, 633 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
Accordingly, I would reverse and remand with directions that Brooks-Brown is not permitted to offer expert testimony on the effects of human trafficking to challenge her mens rea except through an insanity defense.