Felix, J.
Statement of the Case
T.M. (“Mother”) is the mother of M.H. and Z.W.1 (collectively, the “Children”). After Mother was involved in a drunk driving accident that injured Z.W., a child in need of services (“CHINS”) petition was filed. The juvenile court set the factfinding hearing on that petition beyond the statutory 60-day deadline over Mother’s objection. Mother now appeals, raising two issues for our review, which we revise and restate as the following single dispositive issue: Whether the juvenile court erred by sua sponte setting the factfinding hearing beyond the 60-day deadline imposed by Indiana Code section 31-34-11-1(a).
Because we conclude the juvenile court erred when it set the factfinding hearing outside the statutory 60-day deadline, we reverse and remand with instructions to dismiss the CHINS petition without prejudice.
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Based on the holdings in K.W. and M.S., especially as they relate to Trial Rule 53.5, it is reasonable to conclude that a juvenile court may sua sponte extend the 60-day factfinding hearing deadline set forth in Indiana Code section 31-34- 11-1(a). Importantly, the requirement still remains that such a sua sponte continuance must be supported by good cause, see M.S., 140 N.E.3d at 284 (citing Ind. Trial Rule 53.5); K.W., 178 N.E.3d at 1210 (citing M.S., 140 N.E.3d at 284; T.R. 53.5).
We now must determine whether the juvenile court had good cause to sua sponte continue the factfinding hearing beyond the 60-day deadline. We review for an abuse of discretion a juvenile court’s determination of whether good cause existed for a continuance…
Here, the juvenile court’s good cause finding was based mainly on its desire for judicial economy. [Footnote omitted.] While it may be preferable to have one factfinding hearing for all parents involved in a CHINS proceeding, sometimes multiple hearings are unavoidable. See In re E.T., 152 N.E.3d 634, 641 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting In re S.A., 27 N.E.3d 287, 292–93 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015)) (recognizing that multiple factfinding hearings may be necessary when a CHINS adjudication involves both parents), trans. denied. Additionally, “the purpose of a CHINS adjudication is to protect children, not punish parents.” M.S., 140 N.E.3d at 284–85 (quoting In re Eq.W., 124 N.E.3d 1201, 1209 (Ind. 2019)). Indiana law “guards against unwarranted State interference in family life, reserving that intrusion for families ‘where parents lack the ability to provide for their children,’ not merely where they ‘encounter difficulty in meeting a child’s needs.’” In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d 574, 580 (Ind. 2017) (quoting In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014)). Our General Assembly has clearly determined that in order to protect children and guard against unnecessary State interference into family life, juvenile courts must hold factfinding hearings within 60 days after a CHINS petition is filed, unless the parties consent to an extension of or waive that deadline. See I.C. § 31-34-11-1(a)–(b); M.S., 140 N.E.3d at 283 (citing J.R., 98 N.E.3d at 655). The juvenile court’s desire for judicial economy, without more, does not outweigh these important interests, especially when the desired judicial economy is based upon less than concrete or known savings (e.g., anticipation that a parent will be served, or anticipating that a recently appointed attorney will request a continuance). Therefore, the juvenile court abused its discretion in continuing the factfinding hearing over Mother’s objection.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude the juvenile court erred by setting the factfinding hearing on the CHINS petition after the statutory 60-day period ended and also erred by denying Mother’s motion to dismiss the CHINS petition. Because this issue is dispositive, we need not address Mother’s argument that this error violated her constitutional rights. We thus reverse the juvenile court’s judgment and remand with instructions to dismiss DCS’s CHINS petition without prejudice.
Reversed and remanded with instructions.
Kenworthy, J., and Riley, Sr. J., concur.