Altice, J.
Case Summary
Eight years after being convicted of a sex offense in Illinois, where he was required to register as a sex offender for ten years, Gage Peters visited Florida for a week. While there, he registered as a sex offender as required by Florida law, which imposes a lifetime registration requirement on sex offenders. Peters later moved to Indiana, where he was informed that, due to his Florida obligation, he was subject to a lifetime registration requirement pursuant to Ind. Code § 11-8-8-19(f), often called the other-jurisdiction provision.
Peters filed a complaint for declaratory judgment against Hamilton County Sheriff Dennis J. Quakenbush, II (the Sheriff) and Christina Reagle, in her official capacity as the Commissioner of the Indiana Department of Correction (the DOC), seeking a declaration that, under Indiana law, he is required to register only for a period of ten years. The DOC filed a motion to dismiss, in which the Sheriff joined. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the Sheriff and the DOC. Peters appeals, claiming that he is not subject to a lifetime registration requirement.
We affirm.
….
The parties agree that an offender who visits Florida and stays for more than three days in a calendar year must register in Florida and that all offenders are required to register for life. See generally Fla. Stat. § 943.0435. Applying the other-jurisdiction provision to Peters, the trial court found that Peters was required to register for life in Indiana. Peters asserts, for a couple of reasons, that his “temporary requirement to register in Florida while he was on vacation did not follow him home to Indiana.” Appellant’s Brief at 20.
A. “Independent Requirement” to Register
Peters’s primary claim is that the other-jurisdiction provision “does not apply to him because he has no independent requirement to register” in Florida. Id. at 9. He maintains that because Florida imposed the lifetime registration obligation based on the Illinois conviction – and not due to a Florida conviction, which would have provided an “independent” basis for that state to require registration – the other-jurisdiction provision does not apply. Peters’s argument in this regard is based on our court’s recent decision in Marroquin v. Reagle, 228 N.E.3d 1149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), transfer pending, where Marroquin was convicted in Indiana of an offense that did not trigger a requirement to register as a sex offender in Indiana. Marroquin moved to Virginia, where he was required to register for life due to his Indiana conviction. Upon relocating back to Indiana, Marroquin was informed that he was subject to a lifetime registration requirement. Marroquin sought a declaratory judgment that he need not register in Indiana, which the trial court denied.
….
We respectfully disagree with our colleagues in Marroquin and decline to follow it. In concluding that the other-jurisdiction provision did not apply to Marroquin, the court reasoned, “[T]he purpose of [the provision] is to ensure that a person who is required to register in another jurisdiction because of a sex offense in that jurisdiction cannot avoid registration by moving to Indiana.” Id. at 1151 (italics added). However, the plain language of the other-jurisdiction provision does not require that the obligation to register in the other state be “because of a sex offense in that jurisdiction.” Indeed, it makes no reference to the state where the crime was committed. Rather, the statute states only that “[a] person who is required to register as a sex or violent offender in any jurisdiction shall register for the period required by the other jurisdiction[.]” I.C. § 11-8-8-19(f). The Marroquin decision thus reads words into the statute that are not there. Finding, as we do, that the other-jurisdiction provision is unambiguous, we will not wade into attempting to discern the statute’s intended purpose. And we decline to adopt the Marroquin panel’s position that, in order for the other-jurisdiction provision to apply, the other state’s obligation must be based on an “independent requirement” to register “because of a sex offense in that jurisdiction.” 228 N.E.3d at 1151.
Rather, we are guided by Ammons v. State, 50 N.E.3d 143 (Ind. 2016). There, our Supreme Court upheld the Indiana registration requirement of an offender who was required to register in Iowa as a sex offender based on a prior Indiana conviction, and, upon moving back to Indiana, was notified that he was required to register as a serious violent felon…
….
….Here, Florida imposed a lawful lifetime registration requirement, and Peters was subject to it, pursuant to the other-jurisdiction provision, when he moved to Indiana.
B. Public Notification versus Offender Registration
In challenging application of the other-jurisdiction provision, Peters also suggests that his visit to Florida triggered only “a temporary obligation” for him to register while he was in the state but, once he left, “he no longer has a duty to register in Florida.” Appellant’s Brief at 9, 14-15. Peters concedes that his profile remains on Florida’s FDLE online sex offender registry but argues that the inclusion of an individual’s profile on a registry “serves to notify the community of the person’s presence in the state but does not impose an independent duty on the person to register, nor does it alter or extend one’s duty to register.” Id. at 14. Peters’s argument appears to be that because he is not currently required to report in person to Florida law enforcement or update his registration, there was no current registration requirement in Florida to transfer to Indiana under the other-jurisdiction provision. We are unpersuaded.
At the time he moved to Indiana in 2022, Peters was under a lifetime obligation in Florida to register as a sex offender. The fact that he currently does not need to report in person to Florida police is not dispositive. Peters’s information remains on Florida’s public website, and if he were to re-enter Florida, he would indeed have a duty to report to authorities and, if he remained there, a duty to update his registration. His obligation to register as a sex offender in Florida is a lifetime requirement.
C. Conclusion
As our Supreme Court has observed, “[O]ur General Assembly has quite clearly determined who is required to register: [SORA] directs us to defer to other states’ sex offender designations, apparently in an effort to protect our own residents.” State v. Zerbe, 50 N.E.3d 368, 370 n.2 (Ind. 2016). We find that the plain language of the other-jurisdiction provision compels registration for individuals with out-of-state registration obligations regardless of the source of those obligations. Because Peters is subject to a lifetime registration obligation in Florida, he is required, pursuant to Indiana’s other-jurisdiction provision, to register as a sex offender for life in Indiana. [Footnote omitted.] Accordingly, the trial court properly entered judgment in favor of the Sheriff and the DOC on Peters’s declaratory judgment complaint.
Judgment affirmed.
Judge Bailey concurs in result with separate opinion.
Judge Mathias dissents with separate opinion.
Bailey, Judge, concurring in result
The statutory provision at issue, the “other jurisdiction provision” employs plain language…I agree with the majority that we cannot simply add words to a statute “that are not there” in order to restrict application….
….
It is uncontested that Florida imposed upon Peters a lifetime reporting requirement. But I am troubled by the lack of any constraint upon blanket enforcement in this State regardless of where the crime originated and how onerous the subsequent reporting requirements are. We are placed in the position of imposing a lifetime requirement of registration for conduct that is twice removed from this jurisdiction. The offense was committed in Illinois and the lifetime registration requirement was imposed by Florida. Application of the “other jurisdiction provision” with no questions asked borders upon the absurd. Indeed, even if Peters – in Florida for a week of vacation – was provided with notice that he would be subject to a lifetime reporting requirement if he lingered three days, it is illogical that Peters was transformed into a Florida resident upon the third day. Florida is simply wrong. For these reasons, I concur in result.
Mathias, Judge, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I would adopt the reasoning set out in Marroquin and hold that Indiana Code section 11-8-8-19(f) “doesn’t apply when . . . there is no ‘independent requirement’ to register” in Florida. 228 N.E.3d at 1151. As Judge Bailey aptly points out, “[w]e are placed in the position of imposing a lifetime requirement of registration for conduct that is twice removed from this jurisdiction.” Supra, at 14. To apply the statute in that manner, when Peters visited Florida for only one week, is simply absurd.
Under the absurdity doctrine, we “give a statute ‘its obvious intended effect despite its plain text.’” Estabrook v. Mazak Corp., 140 N.E.3d 830, 836 (Ind. 2020) (quoting R.R. v. State, 106 N.E.3d 1037, 1042 (Ind. 2018)). “The doctrine is ‘strong medicine’ because it ‘defeats even the plain meaning of statutes.’” Id. (quoting Calvin v. State, 87 N.E.3d 474, 477 (Ind. 2017)). Our legislature cannot have intended to impose a lifetime registry requirement based on a one-week vacation, and I would grant the relief Peters requests in his complaint for declaratory judgment.