Tavitas, J.
Case Summary
M.M. (“Father”) appeals the trial court’s grant of a protection order against him to protect his ex-wife, L.P. (“Mother”). Mother filed the petition for a protection order in the Clinton Circuit Court, and Father orally requested a transfer to the special judge who was handling Father’s and Mother’s post-dissolution matters. The trial court denied Father’s request and granted Mother’s petition for a protection order. On appeal, Father argues that the trial court erred by denying his request for a transfer to the special judge. We conclude that transfer to the special judge was not required and, even if the trial court should have granted the transfer, any error in this case was harmless. Accordingly, we affirm.
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Importantly, nothing was pending in the dissolution matter at the time Mother filed her petition for a protection order. Mother filed her petition in the Clinton Circuit Court—the same court where the dissolution proceedings were filed but heard by a special judge. These statutes, thus, did not require a transfer of Mother’s petition for a protection order because the petition was filed in the correct court. [Footnote omitted.] The real issue here is whether the trial court was required to transfer the matter to the special judge in the post-dissolution matter, in which no petitions were pending. Father argues on appeal that the special judge should have heard Mother’s petition for a protection order after the ex parte order was issued.
The continuation of “jurisdiction” of a special judge is governed by Indiana Trial Rule 79(L)…
We agree that the special judge has continuing “jurisdiction” in the post-dissolution matter. The post-dissolution matter and Mother’s petition for a protection order, however, are not one and the same.3 Petitions for protection orders are, by their nature, urgent and sometimes emergency matters. The urgency here was a breakdown in civil communications between the parties about their children. The substance of the request was a mere change to the manner of that communication. In her petition, Mother requested that the trial court order the use of a parenting application rather than Father texting or calling Mother. The petition for a protection order did not seek to modify in any way Father’s custody, parenting time, or support. In the final order, the trial court specifically noted that the protection order “does not prohibit reasonable and peaceful communications regarding the parties’ children and parenting time, with all such communications to be via CloseApp parenting application.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 33. Again, this order related only to the method of communication between Mother and Father and did not impact Father’s parenting time. We, therefore, conclude that this matter did not relate to pending post-dissolution proceedings and transfer to the special judge was not required under Trial Rule 79(L).
But even if the trial court should have transferred the matter to the special judge, “[n]o error or defect in any ruling or order . . . is ground for granting relief or reversal on appeal where its probable impact, in light of all the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor so as not to affect the substantial rights of the parties.” Ind. App. R. 66(A); see also Ind. Trial R. 61 (“[N]o error or defect in any ruling or order in anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the parties is ground for . . . reversal on appeal, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.”). There was no impact on Father’s substantial rights here. The protection order specifically does not prevent Mother and Father from communicating regarding their children and does not impact custody, parenting time, or support. Accordingly, we conclude that any error in the trial court’s failure to transfer the matter to the special judge was harmless. See, e.g., In re Adoption & Paternity of K.A.W., 99 N.E.3d 724, 727 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (holding that “any departure from statutory procedure . . . was harmless” where adoptive parents failed to submit an affidavit from the State Department of Health). We see no need for the parties to spend unnecessary time and expense for further proceedings in this matter when Father’s rights regarding the post-dissolution matters have not been affected.
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Conclusion
The trial court did not err when it denied Father’s request to transfer the matter to the special judge in the dissolution matter. Furthermore, even if the trial court erred, any error was harmless as Father’s custody, parenting time rights, and child support were not impacted. Accordingly, we affirm.
Affirmed.
Mathias, J., concurs.
Weissmann, J., dissents with separate opinion.
Weissmann, Judge, dissenting.
The governing statutes and court rules, as well as public policy, dictate one conclusion here: this protective order dispute was decided in the right court by the wrong judge. The majority reaches a contrary result by misconstruing the protective order statutes and the special judge’s continuing jurisdiction and by injecting a prejudice analysis into what is essentially a jurisdictional issue. The result is a novel conclusion that matches neither the facts nor the applicable law.
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The majority’s decision will have ramifications inconsistent with legislative intent, judicial economy, and our routine deference to judges in family law proceedings. I would reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for a new hearing before the special judge—the only judge authorized to conduct the final protective order hearing