Slaughter, J.
Our traditional “fireman’s rule” limited a firefighter’s tort recovery for injuries sustained when responding to a fire. The rule’s origin is a premises-liability case that held a landowner’s only duty to a firefighter who enters the premises to combat a fire is to refrain from positive wrongful acts. Woodruff v. Bowen, 34 N.E. 1113 (Ind. 1893). After Woodruff, the rule expanded and evolved over more than a hundred years into our most recent iteration in Babes Showclub, Jaba, Inc. v. Lair, 918 N.E.2d 308 (Ind. 2009). There, we held that first responders—firefighters and others— cannot recover damages based on the negligence that caused the emergency to which they responded. Today, we hold that the firefighter’s rule from Woodruff and the expanded first-responder’s rule from Babes are two separate doctrines: the former applies only to firefighters and prescribes the duty owed for a premises-liability claim arising when a firefighter enters premises to extinguish a fire; the latter limits the duty owed to all first responders during an emergency.
This case implicates both doctrines because the plaintiff, Richard Dolsen, Jr., is a professional firefighter who was injured when responding to a fire. The first-responder’s rule from Babes does not bar his claim: Dolsen does not allege that the negligence that caused his injuries also caused the fire to which he was responding. As for the firefighter’s rule from Woodruff, disputed factual issues remain on whether defendant VeoRide, Inc., breached its duty to Dolsen, a licensee on its premises. We grant transfer and reverse and remand.
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Indiana caselaw often conflates our firefighter’s rule from Woodruff, 34 N.E. 1113, with our first-responder’s rule from Babes, 918 N.E.2d 308, into one umbrella “fireman’s rule”. But the history of each rule shows the firefighter’s and first-responder’s rules are separate doctrines. Our first-responder’s rule limits liability to all first responders—firefighters and others—who respond to emergencies. Babes, 918 N.E.2d at 309. In contrast, the original rule from Woodruff treats firefighters—and only firefighters— as licensees owed certain duties when they enter property to fight fires. 34 N.E. at 1116. We hold that these rules apply separately because they serve distinct functions.
To win at trial on his premises-liability claim, Dolsen must prove a duty, a breach of that duty, and resulting harm. Pfenning v. Lineman, 947 N.E.2d 392, 398 (Ind. 2011). The Babes first-responder’s rule does not bar Dolsen’s claim. His claim is that VeoRide was negligent both in not fixing and in not notifying Dolsen of the wall opening on its premises, which he alleges caused his injury. But the cause of his injury (the fall) is unrelated to the cause of the fire (the battery), which is why Dolsen went to the premises in the first place. Under Woodruff, VeoRide owed Dolsen a duty as a licensee, but issues of fact remain on whether VeoRide breached this duty. Thus, we reverse the trial court’s entry of summary judgment for VeoRide and remand for further proceedings.
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This history shows two distinct doctrines: one applying premises-liability principles to firefighters; the other applying rescue-doctrine principles to first responders. One derives from the other, but the two remain distinct in purpose and function. The Woodruff firefighter’s rule defines the duty owed to firefighters in premises-liability claims when they enter premises to fight fires. 34 N.E. at 1116–17. The Babes first-responder’s rule limits the duty owed to all emergency professionals responding to emergencies. 918 N.E.2d at 313–14. For reasons of public policy, these professionals should not recover tort damages for injuries they sustain while performing their public duties, including injuries from “knowingly combat[ting] the effects of others’ negligence.” Id. at 313.
When, as here, both rules are implicated, we ask first whether the plaintiff seeks to recover for the negligence that caused the emergency— for the negligence, in other words, that brought the plaintiff to the emergency. If so, the first-responder’s rule bars the plaintiff’s claim, and we stop there. But if that is not the basis for the plaintiff’s claim, we assess the claim under Woodruff, treating the firefighter as a licensee. Having defined these two rules, we next apply them to Dolsen’s claim.
As we held in Babes, the first-responder’s rule “bars recovery by a professional emergency responder for the negligence that created the situation requiring the response.” Id. at 309. Only negligence “separate from and independent of the negligence that caused the situation necessitating the officer’s presence” can be the basis for liability. Id. at 314. Dolsen’s claim survives because the alleged negligence concerning the wall opening above the stairwell is distinct from the negligence that caused the emergency to which Dolsen was responding, namely, the negligent handling of a scooter battery.
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For these reasons, we reverse the trial court’s entry of summary judgment for VeoRide and remand for further proceedings consistent with our opinion.
Rush, C.J., and Massa, Goff, and Molter, JJ., concur