Rush, C.J.
A jury found Cohen Hancz-Barron guilty of murdering a young mother and her three children and recommended a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The trial court accepted the jury’s recommendation and imposed four consecutive life sentences. In this direct appeal, Hancz-Barron challenges the sufficiency of evidence to sustain his convictions and the trial court’s decision allowing the State to recall a witness. He also challenges his sentence on both statutory and constitutional grounds. We ultimately reject each challenge and affirm.
Hancz-Barron raises two issues related to the guilt phase of his trial. He argues his convictions are not supported by sufficient evidence, and the trial court committed reversible error in allowing the State to recall one of its witnesses. We address each argument in turn.
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All in all, the State presented both circumstantial and direct evidence from which a reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Hancz-Barron was the person responsible for murdering Sarah and her three children. His arguments to the contrary are simply a request for us to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. We thus hold the State presented sufficient evidence to support his convictions.
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In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the State to recall Luther. But even if we concluded otherwise, Hancz-Barron has not shown that the court’s decision warrants reversal. Having found that Hancz-Barron’s challenges related to the guilt phase fail, we now turn to his challenges related to the penalty phase.
Hancz-Barron raises three issues related to the penalty phase of his trial. He argues the jury erred in determining that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances, his sentence is inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B), and his sentence is unconstitutional. We address each argument in turn.
The jury’s weighing of aggravators and mitigators in recommending Hancz-Barron’s LWOP sentence is not subject to appellate review.
As noted previously, a jury that finds a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt must also find “any mitigating circumstances that exist are outweighed by the aggravating circumstance or circumstances” to recommend LWOP. I.C. § 35-50-2-9(l)(2). Hancz-Barron does not challenge the jury’s finding of the statutory aggravators. And he does not argue the jury received improper instructions, erred by not specifically identifying which mitigating circumstances it considered, or failed to state that it found the statutory aggravators outweighed those mitigating circumstances. Rather, he argues the jury erred in determining “that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances.” The State correctly characterizes this argument as “non-cognizable.”
Once a statutory aggravator is found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, Indiana law places within the jury’s purview the process of balancing aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Helsley v. State, 43 N.E.3d 225, 230 (Ind. 2015). This balancing “is essentially a discretionary function as to which the jury has considerable leeway.” Pittman v. State, 885 N.E.2d 1246, 1253 (Ind. 2008). And because juries are “traditionally not required to provide reasons for their determinations,” id. at 1254, which the jury did not do here, there is simply no basis for us to evaluate its “weighing of the evidence and balancing of the mitigating circumstances against the aggravating circumstance,” Helsley, 43 N.E.3d at 230. Thus, claims such as Hancz-Barron’s are “nonjusticiable.” Id.; see also Ward v. State, 903 N.E.2d 946, 960–61 (Ind. 2009).
Hancz-Barron has not shown his sentence is inappropriate.
Hancz-Barron next seeks revision of his sentence under Appellate Rule 7(B), which allows us to revise a sentence if it is “inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.”
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The nature of Hancz-Barron’s offenses was extraordinarily brutal. He violently killed Sarah and her three young children in their home and in the presence of each other, causing each victim extreme suffering. Though he concedes the offenses “were senseless and reprehensible,” he argues “his culpability must also be assessed given that it appears” he “‘snapped’ and four innocents were killed.” But even if he “snapped,” evidence shows these murders were drawn-out, intensely physical, and far from instantaneous. He suffocated Sarah, strangled her with both hands and an extension cord, and stabbed her more than twenty times in the neck and abdomen. As for the children, he stabbed C.Z. approximately nineteen times in the neck, head, arm, and abdomen; he stabbed As.Z. about eleven times in his neck and abdomen; and he stabbed Au.Z. four times in her neck. Additionally, as the State points out, “no matter how the violence unfolded, at least three of the victims, at some point in time, had to watch as Hancz-Barron killed someone they loved.” Then, after the murders, Hancz-Barron stole a neighbor’s truck, lied to family members about what happened, and drove over one-hundred miles away despite telling the neighbor that he was on his way back to Sarah’s house. See Oberhansley v. State, 208 N.E.3d 1261, 1271 (Ind. 2023) (finding that a defendant’s deceptive and devious behavior “aggravate[s] the nature of an offense”). There is absolutely no evidence, let alone compelling evidence, portraying the nature of these offenses in a positive light.
And to the extent Hancz-Barron contends that his four consecutive LWOP sentences are inappropriate because “the jury and the trial judge chose vindictive justice over reformation” as if he “had more than one life to live,” it is well-settled that “[c]onsecutive sentences reflect the significance of multiple victims,” Pittman, 885 N.E.2d at 1259. The trial court’s decision to impose consecutive LWOP sentences for the murder of a mother and her three children does not render Hancz-Barron’s sentence inappropriate. Cf., e.g., Clippinger v. State, 54 N.E.3d 986, 992 (Ind. 2016) (affirming two consecutive LWOP sentences for the murder of two individuals).
The same is true for Hancz-Barron’s character.
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Because Hancz-Barron has failed to produce compelling evidence portraying either the nature of his offense or his character in a positive light, he has failed to show that his sentence is inappropriate.
Hancz-Barron’s sentence is not unconstitutional.
We finally address Hancz-Barron’s claims that his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment and Article 1, Section 16.
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Article 1, Section 16 is violated “only when the criminal penalty is not graduated and proportioned to the nature of the offense.” Id. In arguing his sentence violates Section 16, Hancz-Barron points to “his young age and stunted brain development” as well as “his difficult youth and mental health history.” His argument is therefore based on only personal characteristics. And “there is no authority for the proposition that such an offender-based argument is cognizable pursuant to Article 1, Section 16.” Kedrowitz v. State, 199 N.E.3d 386, 409 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied. In any event, we hold that Hancz-Barron’s sentence is graduated and proportioned to the nature of his heinous offenses. He massacred a family of four, including three young children, and inflicted horrific injuries on each victim. Receiving four consecutive LWOP sentences for these murders does not violate Article 1, Section 16. Cf. Ramirez v. State, 174 N.E.3d 181, 201 (Ind. 2021) (finding a defendant’s LWOP sentence proportionate considering he brutally murdered a toddler who was entrusted to his care); Shoun v. State, 67 N.E.3d 635, 641–42 (Ind. 2017) (finding a defendant’s LWOP sentence proportionate considering he mutilated and murdered his girlfriend).
Hancz-Barron’s Eighth Amendment claim fails for similar reasons. Though he concedes “the imposition of four consecutive life sentences without parole might be seen as proportional to the number of people who lost their lives,” he argues “the symbolic retribution of such a sentence seems disproportional given the number of lives Hancz-Barron has to live.” But the United States Supreme Court has only rarely found a non-capital sentence in violation of the Eighth Amendment, when the sentence “is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime.” Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 271 (1980); see Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983). And a defendant who commits murder is categorically more deserving of “the most serious forms of punishment” than a defendant who does “not kill, intend to kill, or foresee that life will be taken.” Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 69 (2010). Indeed, as we recognized a decade ago, the Supreme Court has never found an LWOP sentence unconstitutional when imposed on an adult who committed murder. Knapp, 9 N.E.3d at 1291. This remains true today, and Hancz-Barron presents no reason to conclude otherwise. Because he committed the four murders as an adult, his reliance on Supreme Court cases involving juveniles is unavailing. And so too is his reliance on a case from a foreign jurisdiction interpreting its constitution. Ultimately, the number of Hancz-Barron’s victims, the ages of the three children he killed, and the extreme violence that characterized each murder establish that his sentence is not grossly disproportionate.
For the reasons articulated above, we affirm Hancz-Barron’s convictions and sentence.
Massa, Slaughter, Goff, and Molter, JJ., concur.