Massa, J.
This case pits a municipality’s power to protect the health and safety of its residents against Duke Energy and the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission seek review of a Court of Appeals’ decision dismissing the Commission as a party on appeal and holding that ordinances adopted by the City of Carmel affecting the utility are neither unreasonable nor void. Having vacated the Court of Appeals by granting transfer, we now affirm the Commission.
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The Commission is responsible for assuring “public utilities provide constant, reliable, and efficient service” to all Hoosiers. NIPSCO, 907 N.E.2d at 1015 (citing Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 715 N.E.2d at 354 n.3). “The Commission can exercise only power conferred upon it by statute.” Id. (citing United Rural Elec. Membership Corp. v. Ind. & Mich. Elec. Co., 549 N.E.2d 1019, 1021 (Ind. 1990)). The General Assembly granted the Commission the authority to determine whether a municipality’s ordinance(s) that govern the placement of utilities are reasonable. I.C. § 8- 1-2-101. Through its ratemaking expertise, the Commission can determine how one municipality’s ordinances and projects can impose resulting costs to utility customers statewide. Because we find the Commission’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence and its conclusion of ultimate facts is reasonable, we affirm the Commission.
I. The Commission is a proper party on appeal.
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II. The Commission’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence.
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The Commission concluded the Underground Ordinance, “in conjunction with the Relocation Ordinance,” was unreasonable because it “impermissibly shifts these costs to Duke’s customers statewide, most of whom will never benefit from these municipal projects[.]” Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 15. The Commission concluded the Relocation Ordinance “unfairly burdens” Hoosier customers because “it shifts onto public utilities” the relocation of utility facilities costs “without considering the broader public interests of their customers. . . . To force Duke’s customers statewide to pay for utility relocations in Carmel is unfair and unreasonable.” Id. at 17.
Having so concluded, the Commission’s only statutory remedial power was to declare the ordinance “void.” I.C. § 8-1-2-101(a)(1). The concurrence makes a fair point that the Commission went farther than necessary in “envision[ing] circumstances where enforcing the ordinance might run afoul of Indiana Department of Transportation regulations, or where some terms in the ordinance could prove vague.” Post, 1 (Opinion of Molter, J.). The separate opinion also raises an intriguing question, in the parlance of constitutional law, asking whether the challenge is “facial” or “as applied.” See id. at 2–3. This could be important in a future case, though not decisive here. Is the ordinance void “as applied” to Duke in this case because of the unreasonable cost shifting? Or is it void on its face in its entirety because it would be unreasonable under any circumstances the Commission might imagine? We would surmise the former, in that Carmel could likely still enforce those portions of the ordinances requiring the burying of power lines, so long as Carmel pays for it. The problem for us at the moment is that the statute doesn’t contemplate any distinction between facial challenges and those as applied. The statute gives the Commission only one power if it finds an ordinance “unreasonable,” whether on its face or as applied, and that is to void it. I.C. § 8-1-2- 101(a)(1). That is what the Commission did here, and the record evidence on cost shifting alone supports it.
Conclusion
Based on Duke’s evidence that it would seek recovery of the underground project’s costs, the Commission, using its expertise and statutory authority, reasonably concluded the costs would be shifted to all Duke customers statewide because they would be included in Duke’s rates. See Town of Avon, 82 N.E.3d at 325. The evidence presented by Duke is substantial enough to support the Commission’s findings that costs would be shifted and its ultimately reasonable conclusion that the Ordinances are unreasonable. See Citizens Action Coal. of Ind., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Ind., 450 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983). We affirm the Commission’s order.
Rush, C.J., concur.
Slaughter, J., concurs with separate opinion.
Goff, J., concurs in result with separate opinion.
Molter, J., concurs in part, dissents in part with separate opinion
Slaughter, J., concurring.
I concur in the Court’s opinion based on my understanding that it is affirming only part of the utility regulatory commission’s order—namely, the part finding Carmel’s relocation ordinance unreasonable and thus void under Indiana Code section 8-1-2-101. I do not understand the Court to be affirming the part of the order voiding Carmel’s underground ordinance.
Goff, J., concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the Court’s conclusions that the IURC is a proper party on appeal, that substantial evidence supports the IURC’s finding that the Ordinances improperly shift the project costs to customers beyond the City, and that the IURC appropriately applied its expertise by concluding that the Ordinances are unreasonable and thus void. I write separately for two reasons: (1) to clarify when, in my view, the IURC is a proper party on appeal; and (2) to stress the IURC’s expertise and statutory authority to review and invalidate a municipal ordinance for its unreasonableness.
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Molter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part.
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While the record supports a decision to prohibit Carmel’s request to shift the costs of these two projects to Duke, the record does not support the Commission’s decision to invalidate the two ordinances on their face. I would therefore affirm the Commission’s order to the extent it precludes Carmel from enforcing its ordinances to shift the costs of these projects to Duke, reverse the order to the extent it invalidates the ordinances on their face, and remand for the Commission to amend its order accordingly.