Mathias, J.
Converging Capital, LLC appeals the trial court’s order dismissing proceedings supplemental that Converging Capital had initiated against its judgment debtor, Kevin B. Steglich. Converging Capital raises a single issue for our review, namely, whether the trial court erred when it dismissed the proceedings supplemental on the ground that the proceedings were untimely.
Our case law is clear that there is no limitations period for the initiation of proceedings supplemental. We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings.
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On appeal, we affirmed because Indiana law does not impose any limitations period on the initiation of proceedings supplemental. Id. at 816-21. As we explained: “Because proceedings supplemental are a continuation of the original action, rather than an ‘action’ on a judgment of a court of record, they are not subject to the ten-year statute of limitations within Indiana Code Section 34-11- 2-11.” Id. at 821 (footnote omitted). [Footnote omitted.]… Because proceedings supplemental are neither an “action” nor an “execution,” the judgment creditor “need not have obtained leave via Indiana Code Section 34-55-1-2 for an action beyond ten years” in order to initiate proceedings supplemental. Id. at 821.
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Accordingly, the trial court’s dismissal of Converging Capital’s proceedings supplemental as untimely is contrary to law. We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
Tavitas, J., and Weissmann, J., concur