Goff, J.
A juvenile court must, by statute, accompany its dispositional decree with specific written findings and conclusions on the record. When the juvenile court fails to comply with this statutory mandate, an appellate court is left to speculate over the theory supporting the judge’s decision. Such speculation is especially improper when disposition results in the juvenile’s confinement in the Department of Corrections. What, then, is the proper appellate remedy for curing a deficient dispositional order?
When a juvenile court fails to enter the requisite findings of fact in its dispositional order, an appellate court should neither affirm nor reverse. Instead, the proper remedy is to remand the case under Indiana Appellate Rule 66(C)(8) while holding the appeal in abeyance. This process adheres to the applicable statutory requirements, preserves the distinct roles played by our trial courts and appellate courts, and (in some cases) justifies the cost of juvenile detention.
Because the juvenile here has been released from confinement, there’s no need for us to stay the appellate proceedings. Instead, to dispose of the case, we exercise our discretion under Appellate Rule 1 and remand to the juvenile court for entry of its amended dispositional order.
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Our decision today consists of two parts: In Part I, we consider the issue of justiciability—namely, whether G.W.’s release from the DOC renders this case moot. Concluding that the public-interest exception applies to this otherwise moot case, we proceed to the substantive issue before us, deciding on the proper appellate remedy for curing a deficient dispositional order.
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By statute, a “juvenile court shall accompany [its] dispositional decree with written findings and conclusions upon the record,” whether in approving, modifying, or rejecting the “dispositional recommendations submitted in the predispositional report.” I.C. § 31-37-18-9(a) (the Disposition Statute) (emphasis added). Specific findings include, among other things, (1) the care, treatment, rehabilitation, or placement needs of the child; (2) the need for participation by the parent, guardian, or custodian in the plan of care for the child; (3) any services provided to the child; and (4) the “court’s reasons for the disposition.” Id.
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When a juvenile court fails to enter the requisite findings of fact in its dispositional order, an appellate court should neither affirm nor reverse. Instead, the proper remedy is to remand the case under Appellate Rule 66(C)(8) while holding the appeal in abeyance. See Salk v. Weinraub, 271 Ind. 115, 121, 390 N.E.2d 995, 999 (1979). Appellate Rule 66(C)(8) expressly permits a reviewing court to issue an order directing the trial court to enter findings or to modify a judgment under Trial Rule 52(B). Trial Rule 52(B), in turn, applies when (among other circumstances) the required “special findings of fact” by the trial court “are lacking, incomplete,” or otherwise “inadequate in form or content.” T.R. 52(B)(2).
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Arguably, the juvenile court retained the authority to correct the record after jurisdiction had vested in the Court of Appeals. See Clark v. State, 727 N.E.2d 18, 21 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (setting forth limited circumstances in which the trial court retains jurisdiction after perfection of an appeal). But the amended dispositional order “was not merely a matter of correction of a scrivener’s error, nor was it independent of the matters presented” in the appeal. See Crider v. Crider, 15 N.E.3d 1042, 1065 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). Rather, the modified order directly implicated the issue raised on appeal—whether the juvenile court abused its discretion by committing G.W. to the DOC. Such action runs contrary to the policy underlying the jurisdictional rule—enabling the efficient presentation and disposition of the appeal and preventing the simultaneous review of a judgment by two courts. See Jernigan, 894 N.E.2d at 1046.
In short, the juvenile court acted prematurely, rendering its amended dispositional order void under our appellate rules. However, those same rules “permit deviation” from their strict application. App. R. 1. Given G.W.’s acknowledgment—and the State’s agreement—that the amended dispositional order would suffice to resolve the case before us, see OA at 12:20–12:35, 22:55–23:02, we exercise our discretion under Appellate Rule 1 and remand to the juvenile court for entry of that order, without holding this appeal in abeyance.
For the reasons above, we remand this case to the juvenile court for entry of its amended dispositional order.
Rush, C.J., and Massa and Molter, JJ., concur.
Slaughter, J., dissents with separate opinion.
Slaughter, J., dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the Court’s opinion for two reasons.
First, the Court rightly observes this case is moot, but it nevertheless decides the case’s merits under our public-interest exception to the mootness doctrine. Under our judge-made exception, we empower ourselves to adjudicate an otherwise moot case if the legal question is important and likely to recur.
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Today’s judgment exceeds the judicial power because it provides G.W. with no meaningful relief. After the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment, the department of correction released G.W. without supervision. G.W. thus “manage[d] to secure outside of litigation all the relief he might have won in it.” Ibid. Because he is no longer in the department’s custody, our award of relief is pointless and our opinion purely advisory—the antithesis of an actual case or controversy implicitly required by article 3, section 1. See Pence v. State, 652 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind. 1995) (observing that “our explicit separation of powers clause fulfills a similar function” to article III of the federal constitution). To avoid dismissal in our Court, G.W. needed to show that an actual controversy remains despite his release from the department of correction, but he failed to do so on this record. He did not show that he faces specific adverse consequences in the future due to his commitment to the department.
Second, on the merits, I disagree that the trial judge’s legal error demands our review at all, much less does it warrant the relief the Court prescribes today. Yes, the judge erred by ignoring the governing statute. By its terms, the statute says a juvenile court “shall accompany [its] dispositional decree with written findings and conclusions”. Ind. Code § 31-37-18-9(a). Yet, despite this requirement, the court made no such findings and conclusions. Thus, its omission amounts to error.
But that does not end our inquiry. Not all errors are prejudicial and thus reversible. If the error is harmless, the judgment below stands despite the error. The Court holds, though, that any violations of this statute will necessarily require remanding to the trial court and “holding the appeal in abeyance”, rather than allowing an appellate panel to resolve the merits of a juvenile’s placement. Ante, at 7. This conclusion goes too far. Requiring an automatic remand in these circumstances strikes me as busy work. It prevents an appellate court from reviewing the trial record independently to determine whether the juvenile court abused its discretion in placing a juvenile with the department of correction. Here, given G.W.’s extensive history of delinquent behavior and his failure to respond to prior attempts at rehabilitation, the appellate court was entitled to affirm the juvenile court’s judgment.
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Busy appellate judges can insist that juvenile courts do what the statute requires of them. But if an appellate panel opts to do the juvenile court’s legwork for it, I would not hold that the panel’s undertaking is necessarily inadequate.
I have serious concerns with the Court’s resolution of the merits. But because this case is moot, I would grant the State’s motion to dismiss and not reach the merits.