Rush, C.J.
Among the many issues trial courts must resolve in dissolution cases is ensuring each party receives a fair and equitable distribution of the marital estate. But divorces can run the gamut from amicable to acrimonious. When a divorce falls toward the latter end of that spectrum, as is the case here, Indiana law provides courts with useful tools to secure each party’s share.
The trial court here used one such tool to secure a wife’s portion of her husband’s police pension—the bulk of the marital estate. Throughout the case, the husband defiantly claimed his wife was not entitled to any of his pension and that he would likely ignore any court order to that effect. In response, the court ordered the husband to obtain and subsidize a life insurance policy to ensure the wife received her share. The husband now challenges the trial court’s authority to do so and argues the court erred by not considering the tax consequences of his future pension payments.
We affirm. Trial courts have broad statutory authority to order a security or other guarantee, when necessary, to secure the division of property. And here, we hold the court’s evidence-based findings support its judgment requiring the husband to obtain and subsidize a life insurance policy. We then hold the husband has waived his tax-consequences challenge.
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This case turns on the application of these statutes to Husband’s government pension—the bulk of the marital estate. Often, pension benefits can be assigned through a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO), which streamlines the division of marital property in dissolution actions by requiring plan administrators to pay the benefits directly to a former spouse. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d); Pond v. Pond, 700 N.E.2d 1130, 1134 n.8 (Ind. 1998). But governmental plans, such as Husband’s police pension, cannot be divided through a QDRO. Kendrick v. Kendrick, 44 N.E.3d 721, 725–26 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied; see also I.C. § 36-8-10-19(a). When faced with these plans, courts have several options, including distributing the pension to the earning spouse and requiring that spouse to pay the other in installments until they receive their share of the marital estate. Kendrick, 44 N.E.3d at 726–27; I.C. § 31-15-7-4(b)(2). The trial court here did just that by awarding the pension to Husband and ordering him to make an equalization payment in installments to Wife. And to ensure Wife received that payment, the court ordered Husband to obtain and subsidize a life insurance policy naming her as the owner and beneficiary.
Husband claims that the court erred in two ways. He first alleges the court lacked the authority to order him to obtain life insurance and subsidize the policy. And he also contends the court erred by not considering the tax consequences of the monthly payments he will be required to make to Wife once he begins collecting his pension. We disagree on both points.
I. The trial court had the authority to require Husband to obtain life insurance to secure the division of property.
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Because Section 31-15-7-8 does not define “security, bond, or other guarantee,” we construe these terms “in their plain, or ordinary and usual, sense.” I.C. § 1-1-4-1(1). Doing so, we hold that ordering a party to obtain life insurance is a “security” or “guarantee” since it ensures the other party will receive their share of the marital estate…
And here, the trial court’s evidence-based findings support its judgment requiring Husband to obtain and subsidize a life insurance policy for Wife’s benefit. Husband’s consistent defiance necessitated this security or guarantee. Indeed, the court found that Husband “disagrees with . . . any equalization payment” and that he “may not even follow” a court order requiring him to direct his pension benefits to Wife. The evidence thoroughly supports these findings. Text messages introduced at the dissolution hearing revealed Husband told Wife, “I’m not paying another guys [sic] way through life,” and he suggested “neither of us will get it.” Wife also testified that Husband told her several times that she “was not entitled to any of his retirement” and that he might disavow the benefits entirely to keep her from receiving them. Consistent with those statements, Husband testified he did not believe Wife was entitled to half of the pension, as it was not his job to provide for Wife “for the rest of her life.” Husband also responded “I don’t know” when asked whether he would comply with a court order requiring him to tell Wife when he retires. And when questioned further if he would “actually ignore” a court order, Husband stated, “It’s possible.”
Based on this evidence, the trial court required Husband to name Wife as the owner and beneficiary of the life insurance policy and make her responsible for the premiums, which would then be added to the equalization payment. Without these conditions, Husband could unilaterally change the policy or cause it to lapse by not timely paying the premiums. And it was Husband’s concerning statements and conduct that required the court to secure Wife’s share through the policy that Husband would subsidize. Thus, the life insurance arrangement is not alimony as Husband alleges but rather reflects the court’s broad authority under Section 31-15-7-8 to secure Wife’s share of the marital estate. And contrary to Husband’s claim, requiring him to subsidize the policy does not increase the value of the marital estate. Indeed, debts incurred by one party after the petition for dissolution is filed are generally not included in the marital estate. Johnson v. Johnson, 181 N.E.3d 364, 374 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021).
Overall, Section 31-15-7-8 provides our trial courts with a range of tools to ensure that each party in a divorce receives their share of the marital estate. Included in these tools is requiring a spouse to obtain and subsidize a life insurance policy as a security or guarantee to secure the distribution. The trial court here used this tool, and its evidence-based findings amply support its decision. We now consider Husband’s argument that the court erred by not considering the tax consequences of his monthly pension payments to Wife once he retires.
II. Husband waived his argument that the trial court erred by failing to consider his tax consequences.
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Conclusion
Indiana Code section 31-15-7-8 provides trial courts with the authority to order a party to obtain life insurance—a form of security or guarantee— when necessary to ensure the other party receives their share of the marital estate. Here, the trial court’s findings support its judgment ordering Husband to obtain and subsidize a life insurance policy to secure Wife’s distribution. And Husband waived his argument that the court erred by not considering his tax consequences. Accordingly, we affirm.
Massa, Slaughter, Goff, and Molter, JJ., concur.