Mathias, J.
Kenneth Bardonner (“Father”) appeals the trial court’s order modifying his parenting time with his child, K.V.B. (“Child”). Father presents two issues for our review:
1. Whether the trial court’s order prohibiting Father from taking Child to church services or church-related events violates his rights under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution or is otherwise erroneous.
2. Whether the trial court clearly erred when it modified his parenting time with Child.
We affirm.
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Father first contends that the trial court’s order prohibiting Child’s attendance at Father’s church or at any church-related activity violates his “Federal and State First Amendment constitutional rights.”4 Appellant’s Br. at 31. In particular, he asserts that his “religious freedom and freedom of association is infringed when he is forced by the trial court to choose between involving his child in his church community or face having his access to his son stripped.” Id. We do not agree.
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Father’s reliance on Israel is misplaced. In Israel, the First Amendment violation was based on a prohibition of the father’s freedom of speech. Here, in contrast, the trial court has not restricted Father’s First Amendment freedom of religion in any way.
Moreover, as Father acknowledges, Indiana Code section 31-17-2-17 grants a custodial parent the right to “determine [a] child’s upbringing, including the child’s education, health care, and religious training.” (Emphasis added.) The statute further provides that a court may only limit the custodian’s authority upon a determination that, “in the absence of a specific limitation” of that authority, the child’s physical health would be endangered or his emotional development would be significantly impaired. Id. Here, Father has made no such showing, and Mother’s right to determine Child’s religious training is therefore without limit, which includes her right to exclude Father’s religious preferences.
Still, in addition to the alleged First Amendment violation, Father contends that the court’s order unfairly restricts Child’s extra-curricular activities and that Mother should not be “permitted to use religion as a weapon in order to dictate where Father and [Child] can go and with whom they can associate, when there is both no demonstrated interference with Mother’s religious training and no demonstrated harm to [Child].” Appellant’s Br. at 29. But Father’s arguments amount to a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we will not do on appeal. The bottom line is that Mother has the exclusive authority to dictate Child’s religious training, and she has decided that Child shall not participate in Father’s church. Mother does not need to explain her reasons or justify her decision in any way.
Finally, we note that it was Father’s own violations of previous court orders, which were less restrictive on this issue, that led the trial court to impose the current prohibition against taking Child to even private functions hosted by members of Father’s church. Given the trial court’s broad discretion in family matters, we decline Father’s invitation to find an abuse of that discretion here.
In sum, the trial court’s order does not violate Father’s First Amendment rights; nor is it erroneous for other reasons.
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Conclusion
The trial court’s order prohibiting Child’s involvement in certain activities related to Father’s church does not violate Father’s First Amendment rights. Nor is it otherwise erroneous. Further, the trial court’s order modifying Father’s parenting time is supported by the evidence and is not clearly erroneous.
Affirmed.
Tavitas, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.