Bailey, J.
Dallas Dale Hoback appeals his convictions and sentence, following a jury trial. He raises several issues on appeal, but we address only the dispositive issue of whether the trial court erred when it denied his Criminal Rule 4(C) motion for discharge.
We reverse.
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Here, it is clear from the record that Hoback was not brought to trial before the expiration of the one-year time limit, i.e., April 19, 2019. However, the trial court’s record regarding why the trial did not occur within the one-year time period is woefully inadequate. On March 20, 2019, a minute entry signed by both Hoback and the State reads: “New dates St: 6-5-19[.]” App. v. II at 57. The corresponding chronological case summary (“CCS”) entry states: “Status Conference held. Additional dates requested.” Id. at 7. This entry does not tell us which party requested the new dates or why the requests for new dates were made and/or granted. In an entry dated April 10, 2019, the CCS states: “Jury Trial scheduled for 4/16/2019 at 9:00 a.m. was cancelled. Reason: Other.[,]” and it notes, “Status Conference scheduled for 06/05/2019 at 9:00 a.m.” Id. “Other” is an inadequate description to explain why a jury trial is cancelled, as it does not tell us whether Hoback or the State requested that the trial be continued or whether the trial court continued the trial sua sponte.
We also note that this entry cancelling the jury trial did not reset Hoback’s trial date and thereby trigger his obligation to object on Rule 4(C) grounds if the new date was beyond the time limit. Although the trial court did, on that date, set a status hearing for a date beyond the time limit, neither Rule 4(C) nor relevant case law indicates that there is a requirement to object to the untimely setting of anything other than a trial; thus, Hoback did not waive his discharge claim by failing to object to the order setting a status conference outside the one-year time period.
Given the deficient trial court record and the State’s failure to request that the trial court make adequate docket entries, we cannot attribute any of the delays during the relevant one-year time period to Hoback. See Young, 765 N.E.2d at 678; Staples, 553 N.E.2d at 143. That is, there is no evidence that the one-year time limit imposed by Criminal Rule 4(C) was extended by Hoback’s requests or other actions, yet the State failed to bring Hoback to trial within that one year period. Therefore, the trial court erred when it denied Hoback’s Rule 4(C) motion for discharge.
Reversed.
May, J., concurs.
Felix, J., dissents with separate opinion.
Felix, J., dissenting.
I respectfully dissent for two reasons. Primarily, I believe Hoback acquiesced in, if not requested, the delay that causes my colleagues to find a violation of Indiana Criminal Rule 4(C) (“C.R. 4(C)”). Before I get to the merits of Hoback’s C.R. 4(C) claim, however, I also disagree with my colleagues regarding whether Hoback waived this issue for appeal. Hoback’s failure to comply with Indiana Appellate Rule 46 substantially impedes review of his C.R. 4(C) claim.
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In addition to Hoback’s multiple failures to comply with Appellate Rule 46 in his opening brief, Hoback also failed to provide cogent argument on multiple issues in his reply brief, including whether the delay until June 5, 2019, was attributable to the State. Hoback’s significant noncompliance with Appellate Rule 46, especially Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a), substantially impedes a review of his C.R. 4(C) claim. I would therefore hold that Hoback waived his C.R. 4(C) claim on appeal and refuse to address the merits of that claim.
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Nevertheless, the majority’s two-pronged argument is that the docket and record here are devoid of any reasons for the delay in Hoback’s trial, ante, at ¶ 18, and that Hoback did not have an obligation to object because the court did not reset a trial date, id. at ¶ 17. In support of this argument, the majority cites to Young v. State, in which a previous panel of this court held that when a delay occurs and the “docket entries are absent or missing regarding the reason for delay, the delay is not chargeable to the defendant.” 765 N.E.2d 673, 678 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (citing Morrison v. State, 555 N.E.2d 458, 461 (Ind. 1990), overruled on other grounds by Cook, 810 N.E.2d at 1067). That is, such unsupported delays are chargeable to the State. See id.
In Young, the defendant’s trial was initially set within the C.R. 4(C) one-year period but was later reset outside of that period. 765 N.E.2d at 677. The record did “not contain an order by the court explaining why [the defendant]’s trial did not commence on” the original trial date, and the CCS did not “provide any insight as to why the case was reset.” Id. There was also no evidence that either the State or the defendant filed a motion for continuance prior to the original trial date. Id. This court therefore reversed the defendant’s conviction based upon a complete and utter lack of any record explaining the delay in the defendant’s trial. Id. Here, by contrast, we have one minute entry sheet signed by both counsel and at least three docket entries from the court explaining, albeit not in great detail, why the trial was cancelled and a status conference reset. While I would strongly prefer for the trial court here to have at least provided more detail than “Other” in its CCS entry,12 the record is sufficient to satisfy the test set forth in Young.
In addition, the majority holds that a defendant does not have an obligation to object when the trial court does not reset a trial. Ante, at ¶ 17. The majority’s holding is quite similar to the repudiated reasoning in the following cases:
1. State v. Hurst, 688 N.E.2d 402 (Ind. 1997);
2. Morrison v. State, 555 N.E.2d 458 (Ind. 1990);
3. Carr v. State, 790 N.E.2d 599 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003);
4. Nance v. State, 630 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994);
5. Solomon v. State, 588 N.E.2d 1271 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992);
6. Harrington v. State, 588 N.E.2d 509 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992); and
7. Miller v. State, 570 N.E.2d 943 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
Cook, 810 N.E.2d at 1067 (overruling Hurst and Morrison to the extent inconsistent; disapproving of Carr, Nance, Solomon, Harrington, and Miller).
The holdings in Hurst, Morrison, Carr, Nance, Solomon, Harrington, and Miller stand in part for the proposition that “any delay, regardless of who requested it, cannot be charged to the defendant unless a trial date had already been set.”
Cook, 810 N.E.2d at 1066 (citing all seven cases). In Cook v. State, our Supreme Court specifically rejected that reasoning and held, as expressed above, that “delays caused by action taken by the defendant are chargeable to the defendant regardless of whether a trial date has been set.” Id. at 1067. I acknowledge that in Cook, the Indiana Supreme Court was addressing an issue related to delays when a case had not yet been set for its first trial setting, id. at 1065, 1068; however, the reasoning in Cook is fairly extended to the situation here. I think it is too strict of a reading of Young and its progeny to find a violation of C.R. 4(C) simply because the trial court here did what the parties asked it to do—set a status conference beyond the initial one-year period and not set a trial date.
Accordingly, I dissent.