Weissmann, J.
Accused of dealing drugs that caused a fatal overdose, Martez Sevion Jr. requested a reduction of his $100,000 bond. The trial court denied this request, and Sevion missed the deadline to appeal the decision. So, Sevion attempted to resurrect his forfeited appeal via Post-Conviction Rule 2 (PCR 2). But PCR 2 does not apply to the denial of a bond reduction motion, and finding an insufficient basis to restore Sevion’s forfeited appeal, we dismiss.
…
Post-Conviction Rule 2 provides a path to an appeal for some defendants who have missed the procedural filing deadline. The rule applies only to defendants “who, but for the defendant’s failure to do so timely, would have the right to challenge on direct appeal a conviction or sentence after a trial or plea of guilty by filing a notice of appeal, filing a motion to correct error, or pursuing an appeal.” Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 2. In other words, PCR 2 is a “vehicle for belated direct appeals alone.” Howard v. State, 653 N.E.2d 1389, 1390 (Ind. 1995).
…
Of course, a defendant must still avail himself of this relief to receive its benefit. Sevion did not. Sevion never asserted O.R.’s standard of extraordinarily compelling reasons in his present appeal or during his time as a pro se petitioner. The most that can be said is that Sevion asked this Court to exercise its inherent authority to consider an otherwise waived appeal. Ind. Appellate Rule 1 (“The Court may, upon the motion of a party or the Court’s own motion, permit deviation from these Rules.”). But the only basis for Sevion’s argument is that his appellate counsel was appointed after the filing deadline had passed. This claim alone is not enough.
First, it does not excuse Sevion’s failure to file the notice of appeal prior to obtaining counsel. See Shawa v. Gillette, 209 N.E.3d 1196, 1200 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (holding pro se litigant to the same standard as a licensed attorney). And second, it does not by itself represent an extraordinarily compelling reason to consider an otherwise waived appeal. In O.R., the late appointment of appellate counsel was considered just one fact among several that justified the restoration of the waived appeal. 16 N.E.3d at 971-72. More importantly, O.R. involved the alleged deprivation of a “fundamental liberty interest.” Id. at 972. Sevion nowhere alleges the existence of such an interest, nor any similarly compelling reason to consider his appeal, and we decline to make these showings on his behalf.
Dismissed.
Altice, C.J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.