Mathias, J.
In 2019, our Supreme Court held that a consolidated appeal of two temporary-commitment orders was moot where the terms of those commitments had expired before the appeal of those orders was ripe for appellate review. In re Commitment of T.W., 121 N.E.3d 1039, 1042 (Ind. 2019). However, because the parties before the Court had not developed a record on possible “harmful collateral consequences” from the commitment orders aside from the terms of those commitments, the Court “left open the possibility that respondents in [temporary-commitment appeals] could seek relief” from allegedly invalid orders due to any such consequences. Id. at 1044 n.5; E.F. v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 188 N.E.3d 464, 466 (Ind. 2022) (per curiam).
Today, on a properly presented record, we reach the question left open by our Supreme Court. On these facts, we hold that the collateral consequences that accompany C.P.’s order of involuntary civil commitment make his appeal from that order not moot even though the term of his commitment has expired. Because meaningful effects of C.P.’s commitment will remain long after his appeal period has passed, and because there is still meaningful relief that can be had from our review of his commitment, his appeal is properly before us on its merits. On the merits, we conclude that the St. Vincent Stress Center presented sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s order that C.P. be involuntarily committed for not more than ninety days. We therefore affirm the trial court’s judgment.
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1. Where, as here, commitment orders carry consequences beyond the terms of the commitments and appellate review can provide meaningful relief from those collateral consequences, appeals from expired involuntary civil commitment orders are not moot, and they are properly before us on their merits.
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However, our Supreme Court’s opinions in this area have made it a point to leave open the possibility of an alternative analytical framework in which to reach the merits of expired involuntary civil commitment orders on appeal. In particular, because the parties before our Supreme Court had not developed a record on possible “harmful collateral consequences” from those commitment orders aside from the terms of those commitments, our Supreme Court “left open the possibility that respondents in [temporary-commitment appeals] could seek relief” from allegedly invalid orders due to any such consequences. E.F., 188 N.E.3d at 466; T.W., 121 N.E.3d at 1044 n.5. Here, C.P. properly raises for our review the question left open by our Supreme Court. And, on this record, we agree with C.P. that the collateral consequences that accompany his involuntary civil commitment order make his appeal from that order not moot even though the term of his commitment has expired.
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We agree with C.P. that the order for his involuntary civil commitment carries significant negative collateral consequences from which appellate review may afford him meaningful relief. In particular, federal law prohibits a person who has been committed to a mental institution from knowingly possessing a firearm, the violation of which may result in a fifteen-year sentence. 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(4), 924(a)(8) (2022). Likewise, Indiana law generally prohibits a person who has been involuntarily committed from knowingly or intentionally carrying a handgun, the violation of which can be a Class A misdemeanor or a Level 5 felony. I.C. § 35-47-2-1.5(a)(3)(B), (b)(7)(C), (e) (2022). Here, the record is clear that C.P. has long exercised his right to possess a handgun, having owned at least one since he was eighteen and having spent time shooting it at gun ranges with his father. Thus, the collateral consequence of C.P.’s loss of his right to lawfully possess a handgun makes his appeal worthy of appellate review. [Footnote omitted.]
For all of these reasons, we reach the question that our Supreme Court left open in T.W. and E.F., we decline to follow the sua sponte analysis of J.B. here, and we hold that C.P.’s appeal from his expired involuntary civil commitment order is not moot but, rather, is properly before us on its merits based on the negative collateral consequences that accompany that order. We therefore turn to the merits of this appeal.
2. The Stress Center presented sufficient evidence to support C.P.’s temporary commitment.
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Conclusion
In sum, we hold that C.P.’s appeal of his temporary-commitment order is not moot, even though the term of his commitment has expired, based on the collateral consequences that accompany his order of involuntary civil commitment. On the merits of this appeal, we hold that the Stress Center presented sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s order that C.P. be committed for not more than ninety days. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Affirmed.
Vaidik, J., and Pyle, J., concur.