Slaughter, J.
Sean Gardner asked Hoosier Contractors, LLC, to inspect the roof of his home. But before Hoosier did the inspection, it made Gardner sign a contract for Hoosier to perform any needed work. Despite their contract, Gardner refused to let Hoosier repair his roof. Hoosier sued for breach of contract, prompting Gardner to file a counterclaim in which he alleged that (1) the contract contained many violations of the Indiana Home Improvement Contractors Act and (2) these violations were deceptive acts under the Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act. Gardner made these allegations on behalf of a class of Hoosier’s similarly situated customers. Gardner alleged further that his reliance on these deceptive acts entitled him and the class members to statutory damages. We hold that Gardner did not prove he sustained any injury that would afford him standing to pursue his counterclaim. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
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The trial court ruled on three separate motions below: (1) it denied Hoosier’s motion for summary judgment, which argued (among other things) that Gardner and some class members lacked standing; (2) it denied Gardner’s motion for partial summary judgment, which argued that the contract was null and void and its liquidated-damages clause was unenforceable; and (3) it issued an order amending Gardner’s class-action notice and denying Hoosier’s motion to decertify the class. The aggrieved parties appealed each of these three orders. We hold that Gardner, on behalf of himself and as class representative, lacked standing to bring his counterclaim against Hoosier—a disposition that moots the class-action issues—and we summarily affirm sections 3 and 4 of the court of appeals’ opinion, 190 N.E.3d at 370–72, which affirmed the denial of Gardner’s motion for partial summary judgment as to Hoosier’s breach-of-contract claim. App. R. 58(A)(2).
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Because standing under the Indiana Constitution is jurisdictional, it must exist at all stages of litigation—not merely at the outset. In Solarize, for example, we dismissed one of the parties for lack of standing, although no one had objected to that party’s standing at any prior stage of the litigation before other tribunals. Solarize, 182 N.E.3d at 216. It follows that a party must likewise establish standing at each stage of litigation within a given tribunal. It is not enough, in other words, for a claimant to establish injury in its pleadings; it must do so at each successive stage of the litigation. Standing, after all, is and remains an essential element of a claimant’s case: “[E]ach element must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). Parties asserting a counterclaim must likewise comport with these standing requirements. See Madison Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs v. Town of Ingalls, 905 N.E.2d 1022, 1025–26 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (dismissing counterclaim for lack of standing), trans. denied.
At the pleading stage, a claimant’s general factual allegations of injury arising from the defendant’s conduct may suffice to satisfy standing. For example, “[m]otions to dismiss for lack of standing may be brought under Trial Rule 12(B)(6) for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.”…
But such general factual allegations do not suffice at the summary-judgment stage. Under Indiana’s prevailing summary-judgment standard, the “initial burden is on the summary-judgment movant to ‘demonstrate[] the absence of any genuine issue of fact as to a determinative issue,’ at which point the burden shifts to the non-movant to ‘come forward with contrary evidence’ showing an issue for the trier of fact.” Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014) (brackets in original) (quoting Williams v. Tharp, 914 N.E.2d 756, 761–62 (Ind. 2009)). The non-movant cannot “rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading” but must “set forth” by affidavit or other evidence “specific facts”, Ind. Trial Rule 56(E), that for summary-judgment purposes will be taken as true. Scripture v. Roberts, 51 N.E.3d 248, 254 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (non-movant’s restatement of denial in pleadings and failure to raise specific facts were insufficient to raise genuine factual issue precluding summary judgment under Hughley).
Hoosier’s summary-judgment motion proved the absence of a genuine factual dispute on a determinative issue—that Gardner suffered no injury. Hoosier attached deposition testimony and supporting affidavits showing that it never performed the agreed-upon repairs, and that Gardner hired another company to do the repairs for a fraction of the price. Once Hoosier made this showing, the burden shifted to Gardner to set forth specific evidence creating an issue of fact that he was injured by Hoosier’s deceptive acts. See Hughley, 15 N.E.3d at 1003 (describing summary-judgment burden shifting).
For Gardner to show injury under the deceptive consumer sales act, he needed to show that he relied to his detriment on a deceptive act by Hoosier: “A person relying upon an uncured or incurable deceptive act may bring an action for the damages actually suffered as a consumer as a result of the deceptive act or five hundred dollars ($500), whichever is greater.” I.C. § 24-5-0.5-4(a) (emphasis added). We have previously explained that “[a] prerequisite for obtaining damages [under this statute] is that the claimant relied on the deception.” Rainbow Realty Grp., Inc. v. Carter, 131 N.E.3d 168, 178 (Ind. 2019) (emphasis added). Consumers who relied on a deceptive act may bring an action “for the damages actually suffered . . . as a result”. I.C. § 24-5-0.5-4(a). A claimant’s “damages actually suffered” is defined as “[a]n amount awarded to a complainant to compensate for a proven injury or loss; damages that repay actual losses.” Actual Damages, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Relevant here, subsection 4(b), which governs class actions, requires the named class representative—Gardner—to be “damaged” by the deceptive act… Thus, the Act requires that every class member must suffer damages derived from actual injuries.
Elsewhere, the Act confirms that the consumer must suffer an actual injury due to his reliance on a deceptive act. Subsection 2(a)(6) says that an “‘offer to cure’ as applied to a deceptive act” must be “reasonably calculated to remedy a loss claimed by the consumer”. I.C. § 24-5-0.5- 2(a)(6)(A)…
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At oral argument, Gardner underscored that his claimed injury—the “detriment” he allegedly suffered—was indistinct from Hoosier’s procedural violations of the Act: “the detriment, I think, is the deceptive act itself.” Oral Argument at 25:31. But as we have emphasized, any such violations are insufficient by themselves to confer standing. On this record, Hoosier’s deceptive acts did not hoodwink Gardner. He paid Hoosier nothing and hired a different company to repair his roof for less than Hoosier would have charged him. A deceptive act that deceives no one injures no one. If Hoosier’s deception had succeeded, the outcome here would likely be different. For example, if Hoosier had duped Gardner into completing the roof repairs for $60,000, that would have amounted to detrimental reliance and damages of $42,000. But that is not the record before us.
Based on the evidence presented at summary judgment, Gardner did not meet his burden to create a genuine factual issue that he was injured. See Scripture, 51 N.E.3d at 252 (citing T.R. 56(E)). Because he failed to prove injury consonant with our summary-judgment standard, Gardner and the class members did not satisfy the injury requirement for standing. I.C. § 24-5-0.5-4. Thus, dismissal of Gardner’s amended counterclaim against Hoosier is warranted here. This holding moots any issue concerning the class-action notice.
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For these reasons, we reverse the trial court’s denial of Hoosier’s motion for summary judgment and remand with instructions to dismiss Gardner’s counterclaim for lack of standing. And we affirm the trial court’s denial of Gardner’s motion for partial summary judgment.
Massa and Molter, JJ., concur.
Goff, J., concurs in the judgment with separate opinion in which Rush, C.J., joins.
Goff, J., concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the Court that the Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act requires a plaintiff class to show actual damages were suffered in reliance on a deceptive act. Based on my interpretation of the Act alone, I concur in today’s judgment. I write separately, however, to express my concern that the majority’s reliance on recent developments in federal standing doctrine could do injury to Indiana law.
I. Statutory interpretation resolves this appeal.
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II. We should hesitate before following restrictive federal standing doctrine too far.
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Further reliance on cases like Spokeo could lead this Court down the road of reviewing whether rights the General Assembly has decided to protect are sufficiently “concrete” to confer standing. This would be an interference with the power of the legislature to define Hoosiers’ rights and to provide remedies, including nominal or statutory damages, when those rights are violated. For this reason, I concur only in today’s judgment.
Rush, C.J., joins.