Mathias, J.
Patrick Hinton appeals his convictions for Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. Hinton raises two issues for our review, but we need only address the following dispositive issue: whether the State’s seizure of evidence from Hinton’s backyard without a warrant violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We reverse Hinton’s convictions.
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There is no dispute in this appeal that Officer Eber entered into Hinton’s backyard, an area protected by the Fourth Amendment, without a warrant. The Fourth Amendment protects people against unreasonable searches and seizures and “generally requires warrants” for those searches and seizures. Id. at 991 (quotation marks omitted). A warrantless search or seizure is per se unreasonable, and in such circumstances the State bears the burden to show that one of the “well-delineated exceptions” to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement applies. Id. (quotation marks omitted).
The trial court concluded that exigent circumstances justified Officer Eber’s warrantless entry into Hinton’s backyard. The State does not defend that conclusion on appeal, and rightfully so.
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The trial court also concluded that Officer Eber’s entry onto the property was justified under the plain-view doctrine. The State likewise argues on appeal that the plain-view doctrine justified Officer Eber’s entry onto the property. The plain-view exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement allows an officer to seize an object without a warrant if (1) the officer is lawfully in a position from which to view the object, (2) the incriminating character of the object is immediately apparent, and (3) the officer has a lawful right of access to the object. Combs, 168 N.E.3d at 991 (quoting Warner v. State, 773 N.E.2d 239, 245 (Ind. 2002)). This exception “stands for the premise that objects which are in plain view of an officer who rightfully occupies a particular location can be seized without a warrant and are admissible as evidence.” Id. at 991-92 (quoting Sloane v. State, 686 N.E.2d 1287, 1291 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), trans. denied). Seizures under this exception are “scrupulously subjected to Fourth Amendment inquiry.” Id. at 992 (quoting Soldal v. Cook Cnty., 506 U.S. 56, 66, (1992)). We need not discuss the first or third prongs of the plain-view inquiry here.
The Indiana Supreme Court has stated that the second prong of the plain-view doctrine “requires that law enforcement officials have probable cause to believe the evidence will prove useful in solving a crime. As a plurality of the Supreme Court explained in Texas v. Brown, this does not mean that the officer must ‘know’ that the item is evidence of criminal behavior.” Taylor v. State, 659 N.E.2d 535, 538-39 (citing, inter alia, 460 U.S. 730, 741 (1983)). Probable cause, in turn, “requires only that the information available to the officer would lead a person of reasonable caution to believe the items could be useful as evidence of a crime.” Id. at 539.
The State asserts that Officer Eber had probable cause to believe that the incriminating nature of the object dropped by Hinton was immediately apparent because the officers had been called to the scene “due to a threat of gun violence”; because the dropped object had a “reflective nature”; and because Hinton initially appeared to be acting in an “erratic” or aggressive manner. Appellee’s Br. at 10-11. We cannot agree that, at the time Officer Eber was in the public alley, where he had a right to be when he observed Hinton drop the object, the circumstances before him demonstrated probable cause to believe the object would prove useful in solving a crime.
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In sum, nothing in the record demonstrates probable cause that Officer Eber had plainly viewed evidence of a crime prior to his entry onto Hinton’s property. And, by that time, the Fourth Amendment violation was established. As there is no dispute that Hinton’s convictions cannot be affirmed without the illegally seized evidence, we reverse his convictions.
Reversed.
Vaidik, J., and Pyle, J., concur.