Rush, C.J.
Who and what to believe are matters of personal choice. These choices are deeply consequential in a jury trial, but they belong exclusively to each juror. Yet, our rules of evidence provide parties with several ways to influence a juror’s credibility assessment. Indiana Evidence Rule 608(a), for example, allows parties to cut to the credibility core by eliciting a witness’s opinion regarding another witness’s character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.
This case implicates an issue of first impression under Rule 608(a): what is required to establish the proper foundation for a witness’s opinion testimony? At trial, a defendant accused of molesting his minor daughter sought to admit opinions from three of his family members regarding the victim’s untruthful character. The trial court excluded the proffered testimony for lack of foundation, which the defendant contends was reversible error.
We first clarify that the evidentiary foundation required to admit opinion testimony is less demanding than that required to admit reputation testimony. To lay a proper foundation for opinion testimony under Rule 608(a), the proponent must establish that the witness’s opinion is both rationally based on their personal knowledge and would be helpful to the trier of fact. We hold the trial court erred in excluding the opinion testimony here, as the court relied on foundation considerations relevant only to reputation testimony. But we then hold the error was harmless and, thus, affirm.
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Hayko argues the trial court abused its discretion by admitting vouching testimony, by permitting the State to condition the jury on V1’s credibility during voir dire, and by excluding his proffered opinion testimony. Because we find the first two arguments lack merit, our review is limited to whether the trial court committed reversible error by excluding Hayko’s opinion testimony.
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Indiana Evidence Rule 608(a) allows a party to attack a witness’s credibility in two distinct ways: (1) through “testimony about the witness’s reputation for having a character for truthfulness or untruthfulness”; or (2) through “testimony in the form of an opinion about” the witness’s character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. Ind. Evidence Rule 608(a) (emphasis added). However, “evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the witness’s character for truthfulness has been attacked.” Id. Though this limitation does not apply when a party introduces evidence of a witness’s untruthful character, that evidence must be supported by a proper foundation before being admitted.
We have clarified the foundational requirements for admitting reputation testimony, Bowles v. State, 737 N.E.2d 1150, 1153 (Ind. 2000), but we have not done the same for admitting opinion testimony until now. To lay a proper foundation for the admission of opinion testimony under Rule 608(a), the proponent must establish that the witness’s opinion is rationally based on their personal knowledge and that the opinion would be helpful to the trier of fact. We hold that Hayko satisfied these requirements, and the trial court erred in excluding his proffered opinion testimony by relying on foundation considerations relevant only to reputation testimony. We then hold, considering all the evidence before the jury, that Hayko has not shown the court’s error would have impacted a reasonable, average jury to such an extent that it undermines our confidence in the verdict. We therefore affirm.
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While reputation testimony reflects the consensus of many close to and familiar with a witness’s character, see Norton v. State, 785 N.E.2d 625, 631–32 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), opinion testimony reflects the judgment of a single individual. To be sure, not just anyone can offer their opinion about a witness’s untruthful character. The question then is what a proponent must show to establish that a witness can reliably offer an opinion regarding another’s character for truthfulness under Rule 608(a).
In answering this question, we find two evidentiary rules instructive. The first is Rule 602, which provides that a “witness may testify to a matter only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter.” Evid. R. 602. And the second is Rule 701, which limits a lay witness’s testimony in the form of an opinion to one that is both “rationally based on the witness’s perception” and “helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’s testimony or to a determination of a fact in issue.” Evid. R. 701. Informed by these relevant constraints, an opinion on another’s character for truthfulness or untruthfulness under Rule 608(a) must stem from the testifying witness’s personal knowledge of that character. And because a witness offering such an opinion is not testifying as an expert, their personal knowledge must be the rational product of the witness’s own perception—such as interactions or observations—and also be helpful to the trier of fact. Cf. In re A.F., 69 N.E.3d 932, 949 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied; Dunn v. State, 919 N.E.2d 609, 612 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied; Tolliver v. State, 922 N.E.2d 1272, 1278 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied; Prewitt v. State, 819 N.E.2d 393, 413–14 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied.
Yet, the State argues more should be required, contending a proponent must also show the “opinion is based on sufficient and recent contact” with the witness whose credibility is being attacked. Hayko disagrees, noting the vast majority of jurisdictions do not impose these requirements and emphasizes that cross-examination allows parties to expose such deficiencies with the witness’s opinion. We share Hayko’s perspective.
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But, as the State observes, not all states embrace a minimal foundational standard for the admission of opinion testimony. For instance, Oregon and Maryland require a proponent to also establish frequent and recent contact between the character witness and the principal witness. Devincentz v. State, 460 Md. 518, 191 A.3d 373, 390–91 (2018); State v. Paniagua, 286 Or. App. 284, 341 P.3d 906, 910 (2014).
We decline to embrace this minority approach for several reasons, the first being that it fails to distinguish between the nature of reputation and opinion evidence, as each serves a distinct purpose. For reputation evidence, a showing of sufficient acquaintance makes sense “to ensure that the testimony adequately reflects the community’s assessment.” Watson, 669 F.2d at 1382. But opinion evidence is “a personal assessment of character,” and thus, the witness is not relating community feelings; they are simply providing their own “impression of an individual’s character for truthfulness.” Id.
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To reiterate—based on Rules 602 and 701 and informed by the approach taken in a majority of jurisdictions—we hold that, to lay a proper foundation for the admission of opinion testimony under Rule 608(a), the proponent must establish that the witness’s opinion is both rationally based on their personal knowledge and would be helpful to the trier of fact. Yet, even when foundation is established, the trial court retains discretion to exclude the evidence based on other rules of evidence. We now apply these principles to assess the court’s decision to exclude the opinion testimony here.
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The trial court erred because its decision was based exclusively on considerations related to establishing a foundation for reputation testimony. Indeed, the court concluded the witnesses were “too insular” and their contacts with V1 were “not sufficient to justify an opinion about the child’s reputation for truthfulness.” The court further reasoned the witnesses’ testimony was not sufficiently reliable “because it would be based off the same set of biases.” But whether the witnesses were too insular or lacked sufficient contacts with V1 does not negate that their opinions were rationally based on their personal knowledge or that they would have been helpful to the jury. Additionally, though the trial court suggested it addressed whether a foundation had been laid under Rule 608(a) in its entirety, the court did not distinguish between reputation and opinion testimony. And there is no basis in the record for us to conclude the court relied on a different evidentiary rule to exclude the evidence.
Simply put, the trial court’s conflation of reputation and opinion testimony—a misinterpretation of the law—resulted in the erroneous exclusion of Hayko’s opinion testimony for lack of foundation. We now determine whether that error requires reversal.
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Ultimately, we recognize that impeachment evidence can have a profound effect in child molestation cases, as they often turn on credibility determinations. But the erroneous exclusion of some impeachment evidence will not necessarily undermine our confidence in the jury’s verdict. This case is one such example. Hayko has not shown, considering all the evidence before the jury, that the excluded opinion testimony would have impacted a reasonable, average jury to such an extent that undermines our confidence in the verdict. The error is therefore harmless.
Hayko laid a proper foundation to admit his proffered opinion testimony, and the trial court erred in excluding that evidence for lack of foundation. But because we conclude the error was harmless, we affirm.
Massa, Slaughter, Goff, and Molter, JJ., concur.