Weissmann, J.
Police obtained a search warrant for Kristopher Wainscott’s phone based on his 11-year-old niece’s accusation that Wainscott molested her. After police seized Wainscott’s phone—but before they analyzed its contents—the victim partially recanted her allegations against Wainscott. Doubting the veracity of the recantation, the investigating detective and local prosecutor proceeded with analyzing Wainscott’s phone without informing the magistrate who issued the warrant of the new development.
Wainscott moved to suppress all evidence derived from the search warrant, arguing that the State’s failure to inform the magistrate of the victim’s recantation constituted an omission of material facts that rendered the warrant invalid. The trial court denied Wainscott’s motion, and he filed this interlocutory appeal. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. Because the warrant had already been executed by the seizure of the phone, the State had no obligation to inform the magistrate of the partial recantation.
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In Franks v. Delaware, the United States Supreme Court held that when the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that the supporting affidavit for a search warrant knowingly or intentionally contains a false statement, or reflects a “reckless disregard for the truth,” the trial court must hold a hearing. 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978). If, at the hearing, the court determines that “the rest of the affidavit is insufficient to establish probable cause, ‘the search warrant must be voided’ and any evidence obtained from its fruits excluded.” Keeylen, 14 N.E.3d at 872 (quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 156). A defendant makes a ‘reverse’ Franks claim when alleging that the State omitted information material to the probable cause analysis. Keeylen, 14 N.E.3d at 872.
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Wainscott seeks relief under this version of a reverse Franks claim. He argues that Victim’s recantation happened before the search warrant had been fully executed because the contents of the phone seized through the warrant had not yet been analyzed. Assuming that Victim’s recantation is a material fact, this would have required the State to inform the magistrate judge of this development. But Indiana law contradicts this interpretation of a search warrant’s execution. “[A] warrant authorizing a search, testing, or other analysis of an item, tangible or intangible, is deemed executed when the item is seized by a law enforcement officer.” Ind. Code § 35-33-5-7(f) (2020) (emphasis added); see also Brown v. Eaton, 164 N.E.3d 153, 163-66 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (interpreting and applying Ind. Code § 35-33-5-7(f)). Thus, police fully executed the search warrant by seizing Wainscott’s phone. Victim’s partial recantation occurred nearly a month after the phone’s seizure and consequently cannot affect the search warrant’s validity.
Besides Victim’s partial recantation, Wainscott also argues that Detective Preston’s affidavit supporting the search warrant omitted material information about Victim’s credibility. Wainscott alleges that the affidavit “cherry pick[ed]” favorable facts and otherwise omitted facts that might have worked against a finding of probable cause. Appellant’s Br., p. 15. While Wainscott admits that the affidavit described Victim as “worried that things weren’t true” and “worried about getting in trouble,” he still contends the affidavit misled the magistrate. Exhs., p. 14. We disagree. The affidavit reflects a fair and accurate rendition of the events prompting Detective Preston’s request for a search warrant and supports a finding of probable cause. Wainscott has not met the high bar of proving that the State “engaged in a deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth.” Keeylen, 14 N.E.3d at 877.
As the State had no duty to inform the magistrate about Victim’s partial recantation occurring after execution of the warrant and because probable cause otherwise supported the search warrant, we affirm.
Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.