Weissmann, J.
Charged with three alcohol-related driving offenses, Christopher Wellman repeatedly asked the trial court to continue his case because the State had not yet provided the results of a blood test to which Wellman submitted on the night of his arrest. After 13 months of waiting, Wellman moved for discharge under Indiana Criminal Rule 4(C).
The trial court denied Wellman discharge, attributing the 13-month delay to his “trial strategy” of waiting for the test results rather than forcing the State to proceed to trial without them. In so doing, the court effectively faulted Wellman for having to choose between his right to prepare a defense and his right to a speedy trial. But it was not Wellman’s action that placed him in that untenable position. We therefore reverse and remand for the trial court to discharge Wellman under Criminal Rule 4(C).
….
There is no dispute that Wellman requested the continuances that pushed his case past Criminal Rule 4(C)’s one-year deadline. The State asks to end the analysis there, faulting Wellman for the delay even though the continuances were based on the State’s failure to produce his blood test results. Wellman points to the State’s failure and claims his actions did not cause the delay.
….
Despite an abundance of case law recognizing and applying the discovery exception, the State argues that the delay caused by the State’s failure to produce Wellman’s blood test results should be attributed to Wellman because he requested the continuances that effected the delay. The State directs us to two cases in support of its argument: Sturgeon v. State, 683 N.E.2d 612 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), and Hillenburg v. State, 777 N.E.2d 99 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
….
Nonetheless, the State seemingly insists that the discovery exception only applies when the State is negligent in its failure to comply with discovery. Appellant’s Br. p. 13-14. Though some panels of this Court have distinguished Biggs and its progeny on such grounds, none has relied on this distinction in denying discharge under Criminal Rule 4(C). See C.L.Y. v. State, 816 N.E.2d 894 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (analyzing discovery delay under Indiana Juvenile Code provisions); Paul v. State, 799 N.E.2d 1194 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (analyzing discovery delay under Criminal Rule 4(B)).
….
To the extent the State asks us to adopt a negligence requirement, we decline. A defendant should not be forced to either waive the right to a speedy trial or proceed to trial unprepared. Biggs v. State, 546 N.E.2d 1271, 1275 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989). And that “untenable situation” can arise with even the most innocent of State discovery delays. Id.
….
When Wellman filed his motion for discharge under Criminal Rule 4(C), the State failed to utilize Criminal Rule 4(D). Had the State used this tool, the trial court could have determined whether the State engaged in “reasonable efforts” to obtain Wellman’s blood test results. Although the record does not reveal the reason behind the 13-month delay in obtaining the blood test results, Wellman’s request for discharge finally spurred action from the State. The prosecutor emailed a coworker who regularly corresponds with the laboratory, and the State had the results back within a week. Tr. Vol. II, p. 60. The trial court noted this same pattern “has been going on for years.” Id. at 64. This begs the question of whether due diligence by the State could have produced Wellman’s results within the timeframe established by Criminal Rule 4(C).
Conclusion
Because Wellman’s continuances were based on the State’s failure to produce his blood test results, the 396-day delay effected by those continuances was not attributable to Wellman. In the end, the State failed to bring Wellman to trial within the one-year deadline established by Criminal Rule 4(C). We therefore reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand with instructions for the court to grant Wellman’s motion for discharge under that rule.
Reversed and remanded.
Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.