Goff, J.
Before 2021, our Juvenile Code defined a “delinquent act” only as an act committed by a child “that would be an offense if committed by an adult.” In K.C.G. v. State, [156 N.E.3d 1281 (Ind. 2020)] decided in 2020, this Court held that, because the dangerous-possession-of-a-firearm statute expressly applied “only to children,” the offense could never be “committed by an adult.” Thus, we concluded, the juvenile court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the juvenile for violating the statute.
Today, we’re asked to decide, as an issue of first impression, whether the jurisdictional rule we announced in K.C.G. may apply retroactively to collaterally attack a final delinquency adjudication as void. Because the rule in K.C.G. does not affect the reliability or fairness of juvenile proceedings, policies of finality and efficient administration of justice compel us to hold that our decision in that case does not apply retroactively. We thus affirm the juvenile court’s decision to deny the appellant’s requested relief under Trial Rule 60(B)(6).
…
The State contends that our decision in K.C.G. does not apply retroactively to Martin’s delinquency adjudication. In support of its argument, the State relies on the analytical framework announced by the United States Supreme Court in Teague v. Lane—a framework expressly adopted by this Court in Daniels v. State, 561 N.E.2d 487, 489 (Ind. 1990). Pet. to Trans. at 8 (citing 489 U.S. 288 (1989)). Martin rejects the State’s theory, insisting instead that the juvenile court never had subject-matter jurisdiction to begin with, rendering its judgment void ab initio. Br. in Opp. to Trans. at 4–5.
…
We agree with the State on the need for retroactivity analysis. Martin’s position rests on an obsolete theory that views our decision in K.C.G. “not [as] new law but [as] an application of what is, and theretofore had been, the true law.” See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 623 (1965) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). To be sure, when a trial court lacks jurisdiction, we often speak of its actions as “void ab initio,” i.e., void from the very beginning. Troxel v. Troxel, 737 N.E.2d 745, 749 (Ind. 2000). But because of a final judgment’s “de facto existence,” and because of the parties’ “reliance upon its validity,” a new rule declaring that judgment void “has practical consequences which cannot be justly ignored.” Martin v. Ben Davis Conservancy Dist., 238 Ind. 502, 510, 153 N.E.2d 125, 129 (1958). And, so, our modern jurisprudence, absent extenuating circumstances, views a trial court’s final judgment as “as an existing juridical fact until overruled, and intermediate cases finally decided under it are not to be disturbed.” Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 624. This approach to the law is no less true when a party seeks to vindicate his claim through the procedural mechanism of Trial Rule 60(B)—a rule, we’ve emphasized, that “respects the presumptive finality” of a trial court’s judgment. J.W. v. State, 113 N.E.3d 1202, 1206 (Ind. 2019).
When “defining the limits of adherence to precedent,” this Court, like the United States Supreme Court, has long exercised discretion in applying “the principle of forward operation” or “that of relation backward.” See Great N. Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364 (1932). The methods and policies we’ve relied on to exercise that discretion, and the types of collateral proceedings in which we’ve considered the retroactive effect of a legal decision, provide a starting point for resolution of the issue here.
…
As a threshold issue on remand, the Daniels Court considered whether the Gathers rule applied retroactively to the defendant’s collateral proceeding. Id. In analyzing this issue, the Court elected to follow Teague, citing the similarity in objectives between the remedy of post-conviction relief in Indiana and the federal writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 489. Under Teague’s analytical framework, “new rules of criminal procedure” generally “do not apply retroactively to cases that became final before the new rule was announced.” State v. Mohler, 694 N.E.2d 1129, 1133 (Ind. 1998) (articulating the “principle [that] Daniels extracted from Teague”). Exceptions apply (1) to substantive rules and (2) to procedural rules that “implicate the fundamental fairness of criminal proceedings and are central to an accurate determination of innocence or guilt.” Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Applying this framework, the Daniels Court rejected the retroactive application of Gathers, reasoning that its exclusion presented no serious threat to “the likelihood of an accurate death penalty determination” under Indiana’s capital-sentencing scheme. 561 N.E.2d at 490.
By adopting Teague, our decision in Daniels marked a shift in the framework we use for analyzing the retroactive effect—if any—of a legal decision. Id. at 489. Rather than balancing several factors, a presumption of non-retroactivity applies. And while recognizing certain limited exceptions, our modern jurisprudence elevates “finality and efficient administration of justice” as the primary “rationale for nonretroactivity.” Mohler, 694 N.E.2d at 1137. See also Gutermuth v. State, 868 N.E.2d 427, 434 (Ind. 2007) (recognizing the “importance of finality without sacrificing fairness”).
Because our modern retroactivity analysis implicates “new rules of criminal procedure,” Mohler, 694 N.E.2d at 1133 (emphasis added), our appellate courts have traditionally applied Teague to claims raised either on direct appeal or in post-conviction proceedings. This case, of course, involves a collateral attack on a juvenile-delinquency proceeding, which Indiana courts deem civil or “quasi-criminal” in nature. A.S. v. State, 929 N.E.2d 881, 891 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). While “parallels exist between Indiana’s criminal and juvenile systems,” we’ve long recognized “significant differences separating the two.” A.M. v. State, 134 N.E.3d 361, 366 (Ind. 2019). Juveniles “generally enjoy the same constitutional guarantees against governmental deprivation as adults,” but the parens patriae doctrine permits the state to “adjust its legal system to account for children’s vulnerability and their needs for concern, sympathy, and paternal attention.” Id. (cleaned up). Because of these differences, the standards to evaluate claims in one context may not apply in the same way to the other. See, e.g., id. at 362–63 (holding that a modified due process standard, rather than the Strickland standard, governs a juvenile’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim in a disposition-modification hearing).
While no Indiana cases have applied Teague to collateral attacks in the juvenile realm, we find sufficient reasons to view the retroactivity question in that context through the same lens we apply to postconviction proceedings.
First, this Court has relied on Teague in analyzing whether a new civil/quasi-criminal rule applies retroactively. In Mohler v. State, for example, we held that our previous decision in Bryant v. State—that double jeopardy bars criminal prosecution for a drug offense after the state has imposed a controlled-substance excise tax (or CSET) for the same offense—did not apply retroactively. 694 N.E.2d at 1131, 1137 (citing 660 N.E.2d 290 (Ind. 1995)). While acknowledging that a CSET assessment imposed a “civil penalty,” the Court in Bryant concluded that it amounted to criminal punishment by creating a risk of guilt upon which jeopardy attaches. 660 N.E.2d at 297, 299 (emphasis added).
Second, and perhaps more important, the same underlying policy concerns that animate retroactivity analysis in the context of criminal postconviction claims—finality and efficient administration of justice—apply equally to collateral attacks in the juvenile realm. Compare Mohler, 694 N.E.2d at 1137 (citing “finality and efficient administration of justice”), with J.W., 113 N.E.3d at 1206 (concluding that the “same concerns of finality and freedom of the parties to settle their disputes” that mark the civil and criminal realms apply to the juvenile-delinquency context).
…
To summarize, the analytical framework we adopted in Daniels applies a presumption of non-retroactivity while recognizing certain limited exceptions. And the same policy concerns that warrant this presumption in post-conviction proceedings—finality and efficient administration of justice—apply to collateral attacks in the juvenile realm. Our analysis here begins by deciding whether this case fits the limited exceptions to the general rule.
As noted above “new rules of criminal procedure” generally “do not apply retroactively to cases that became final before the new rule was announced.” Mohler, 694 N.E.2d at 1133. This framework requires us to decide whether the rule announced in K.C.G. was “new” and, if so, whether that rule was procedural.
A case announces a “new” rule when it “breaks new ground,” when it “imposes a new obligation” on the government, if its result “was not dictated by precedent” at the time of the conviction, or if the result is “susceptible [of] debate among reasonable minds.” Id. at 1132–33 (cleaned up).
…
In sum, by breaking new ground and by recognizing the result it came to was susceptible of reasonable debate, our decision in K.C.G. clearly created a new rule. We must now decide whether that rule was substantive or procedural.
The principle of nonretroactivity generally “applies only to procedural rules.” Jacobs v. State, 835 N.E.2d 485, 488 (Ind. 2005) (internal citation omitted). Substantive rules, on the other hand, do “generally apply retroactively to cases on collateral review.” Id. “Whether a law is procedural, or substantive is rarely straightforward.” Church v. State, 189 N.E.3d 580, 598 (Ind. 2022) (Goff, J., concurring in part and in the judgment). There are, however, certain qualities that help set them apart. Generally, a procedural rule “control[s] the means by which a court is to determine a defendant’s guilt or innocence.” Jacobs, 835 N.E.2d at 489. A substantive rule, on the other hand, “declares what conduct is criminal and prescribes the punishment to be imposed for such conduct.” Id. (citing Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 1.2 (2d ed. 2003)).
…
While we agree that K.C.G. created no new substantive rule, we reject the State’s argument that our decision created a new procedural rule.
To begin with, the State’s theory improperly conflates venue and jurisdiction. See Green v. State, 230 Ind. 400, 402, 103 N.E.2d 429, 430 (1952) (emphasizing that “jurisdiction is one thing and venue is another”). Jurisdiction (over the subject matter) refers to a court’s “power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which any particular proceeding belongs.” K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 540 (Ind. 2006). Venue, by contrast, does “not confer jurisdiction but rather prescribe[s] the location at which trial proceedings are to occur from among the courts empowered to exercise jurisdiction.” Benham v. State, 637 N.E.2d 133, 137 (Ind. 1994).
Second, and more importantly, the State mischaracterizes our holding in K.C.G.. Our decision in that case focused not on whether the juvenile court exercised jurisdiction “exclusive” of or “concurrent” with the circuit courts, as the State contends. Appellee’s Br. at 25 (citing I.C. § 33-28-1-2). To the contrary, we expressly held that, because a misdemeanor offense under the Dangerous-Possession Statute could never be “an act that would be an offense if committed by an adult,” the “juvenile court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction” completely. 156 N.E.3d at 1285 (emphasis added). And because the Dangerous-Possession Statute “applies only to children,” the circuit courts likewise lacked jurisdiction over the offense. See State v. Neukam, 189 N.E.3d 152, 157 (Ind. 2022) (deciding that, because “criminal and delinquent acts are distinct classes of conduct determined by age, the circuit court does not have jurisdiction over the acts [a person] allegedly committed before turning eighteen”).
In sum, while our decision in K.C.G. created a new rule, that rule— implicating a court’s authority to hear and try a case—is neither procedural nor substantive. Where this conclusion leaves us is an issue we turn to next.
…
In the absence of clearly applicable precedent, we opt for charting a new path to resolve the issue before us. “State courts hearing claims for collateral review” may, after all, “set their own retroactivity rules independent of Teague.” Mohler, 694 N.E.2d at 1132. In Membres, for example, we departed from precedent in holding that the new rule announced in Litchfield v. State did not apply retroactively to cases pending on direct review. 889 N.E.2d at 271, 272. Teague and Daniels, we acknowledged, generally required the retroactive application of new rules to cases “not yet final.” Id. at 271, 273. But the rule announced in Litchfield, we concluded, was “qualitatively different” from the new rules considered in those cases. Id. at 273. In reaching this conclusion, we distinguished two types of new rules: (1) those that “go to the fairness of the trial itself and are designed to eliminate a previously existing danger of convicting the innocent” and (2) those that “enforce other constitutional rights not necessarily connected with the fact-finding function.” Id. at 272 (quoting Enlow, 261 Ind. at 351, 303 N.E.2d at 660) (brackets omitted). The former types require retroactive application whereas the latter do not. Id. Within this framework, we concluded, the rule announced in Litchfield— designed to “deter random intrusions into the privacy of all citizens” rather than to exclude unlawfully seized evidence due to its potential for prejudice—fell into the second category, thus precluding the need for retroactive application. Id. at 272, 274.
Like the new rule announced in Litchfield, the new rule we announced in K.C.G. is “qualitatively different” from the new rule we considered in Daniels. Indeed, the new jurisdictional rule announced in K.C.G. “speaks to the power of the court rather than to the rights or obligations of the parties,” see In re Adoption of O.R., 16 N.E.3d 965, 971 (Ind. 2014) (cleaned up), or to any “previously existing danger of convicting the innocent,” see Membres, 889 N.E.2d at 272.
Because the jurisdictional rule at issue here doesn’t quite fit the Teague analysis, we offer a modified rule to guide us in similar cases going forward: When a decision implicates a new jurisdictional rule, as in K.C.G., we apply the principle of non-retroactivity, rather than vacate a final judgment for voidness, unless the jurisdictional error compromised the reliability or fairness of the proceedings. This approach, we believe, aligns with the policy concerns that have long informed our retroactivity analysis of cases on collateral review—finality and efficient administration of justice. See Daniels, 561 N.E.2d at 489; Mohler, 694 N.E.2d at 1132.
…
Retroactive application of K.C.G. would also open to collateral attack virtually all adjudications under the Dangerous-Possession Statute, creating a potential threat to public safety, undermining the good-faith efforts of law enforcement, and visiting hardship on victims and witnesses who justifiably relied on the original judgments. The State, of course, could still refile delinquency allegations. See B.D.T. v. State, 738 N.E.2d 1066, 1068 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (reaching this conclusion because “jeopardy does not attach to a judgment void for lack of jurisdiction”). But in addition to the enormous cost that would impose on the state, many of those adjudicated delinquent—for dangerous possession along with any number of other offenses, both violent and nonviolent—have likely aged out of the juvenile system, effectively preventing further prosecution. See D.P. v. State, 151 N.E.3d 1210 (Ind. 2020) (holding that juvenile courts lack jurisdiction over delinquency petitions once the accused turns twenty-one). And even if it were possible to refile delinquency petitions, other factors—the passage of time, the fading of memories, and the potential loss of evidence—may render adjudication a practical impossibility.
In contrast to these weighty factors, Martin’s interests in post adjudication relief are minimal. He raises no claim that the juvenile court’s lack of subject matter-jurisdiction undermined the accuracy of his adjudication or otherwise compromised the fairness of the proceedings. Indeed, despite the court’s latent violation of the juvenile jurisdiction statute, the record reveals no diminution in the procedural protections Martin enjoyed at his delinquency proceedings. In reaching its decision, the juvenile court considered several factors: the statements and recommendations of the parties involved, the pre-dispositional report, the results of an IYAS risk-assessment tool, the best interests of Martin and the community, various alternatives for his treatment and rehabilitation, his family’s income and other assets, and his family’s ability to participate in services. App. Vol. 2, p. 7. After the court advised him of his rights, Martin voluntarily admitted to the dangerous-possession allegation. Id. And, based on efforts by the probation department to prevent Martin’s removal and placement in detention, the court ordered him to remain at home on electronic monitoring. Id. at 8, 11. While a reversal of his adjudication would certainly mark a victory for Martin, others would no doubt consider it a travesty of justice.
In short, the “interest in leaving concluded litigation in a state of repose” far outweighs “the competing interest in readjudicating” a delinquency ruling under a new jurisdictional rule that never called into question the basic fairness of the process. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 306 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
Because our decision in K.C.G. does not affect the reliability or fairness of juvenile proceedings, policies of finality and efficient administration of justice compel us to hold that the new jurisdictional rule announced in that case does not apply retroactively in a collateral attack to render a final delinquency adjudication void. We thus affirm the juvenile court’s decision to deny the appellant’s requested relief under Trial Rule 60(B)(6).
Rush, C.J., concurs.
Molter, J., concurs with separate opinion.
Slaughter, J., concurs in the judgment with separate opinion in which Massa, J., joins.
Molter, J., concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion, which holds that our decision in K.C.G. v. State, 156 N.E.3d 1281 (Ind. 2020), does not apply retroactively for a collateral attack on a final delinquency adjudication, and explains that concerns for finality and the efficient administration of justice generally compel applying jurisdictional rules prospectively unless a new decision calls into question the reliability or fairness of the prior proceedings. I write separately to note two points.
First, I read State v. Arkansas Construction Company, 201 Ind. 259, 167 N.E. 526 (1929), as supporting our holding today. In that case, we held that a decision declaring a jurisdictional statute unconstitutional did not have retroactive effect. Id. at 527. If our conclusion that our Constitution precludes jurisdiction is generally applied prospectively, then the same must be true for our conclusion that a statute precludes jurisdiction. We reaffirmed that holding in Martin v. Ben Davis Conservancy District, 238 Ind. 502, 509, 153 N.E.2d 125, 128 (1958).
Second, the Court’s opinion explains how it is generally consistent with federal retroactivity principles. It is also consistent with federal caselaw in the more specific context of Rule 60(B) motions collaterally attacking judgments on jurisdictional grounds. M.H. raises his claim through Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(6). The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has explained that Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(6) tracks Rule 60(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and both rules allow a court to relieve a party from a final judgment that is void. In re Lodholtz, 769 F.3d 531, 534 (7th Cir. 2014). But “the court that issued the judgment in excess of its jurisdiction had jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction, and its jurisdictional finding, even if erroneous, is therefore good against collateral attack, like any other erroneous but final judgment.” Id. (quotations omitted). “Only when the jurisdictional error is ‘egregious’ will [federal] courts treat the judgment as void.” United States v. Tittjung, 235 F.3d 330, 335 (7th Cir. 2000).
…
Here, the prior court had jurisdiction to consider its own jurisdiction, and its jurisdictional error cannot be considered egregious because, as the Court’s opinion explains, there was binding Court of Appeals precedent at the time concluding there was jurisdiction.
Slaughter, J., concurring in the judgment.
In K.C.G. v. State, 156 N.E.3d 1281 (Ind. 2020), we held that juvenile courts lack jurisdiction to adjudicate violations of the so-called dangerous possession-of-a-firearm statute, see Ind. Code §§ 31-37-1-2, 35-47-10-5(a) (2020). Today, the Court holds that K.C.G.’s new jurisdictional rule does not apply retroactively and thus is unavailable to M.H., a juvenile, who sought relief under Trial Rule 60(B)(6) to void an adverse final judgment entered against him in 2019. Though I agree with the Court’s disposition today, I reach that result for different reasons. The Court believes it needs to “chart[] a new path to resolve the issue before us.” Ante, at 16. In contrast, I prefer our existing, long-trodden path—one that, in my view, is neither broken nor needs fixing but leads directly to today’s result.
A noteworthy case on that path dating back nearly a hundred years is State ex rel. Piel v. Arkansas Construction Co., 201 Ind. 259, 167 N.E. 526 (1929). Arkansas addressed whether a final, never-appealed judgment was void after a later case held that the statute conferring jurisdiction for that judgment was unconstitutional. We held no—that the prior judgment in Arkansas was not void but still binding—because such jurisdictional decisions are not retroactive: “Where a statute conferring jurisdiction is held unconstitutional, such decision will have no retroactive effect … and where proceedings have been regularly had under the law as it existed before such decision they will not be disturbed.” Id. at 527 (quoting 15 C.J. Courts § 174 (1918)).
The Court today acknowledges Arkansas but believes it is not “clearly applicable precedent”. Ante, at 16. I respectfully disagree.
…
This conclusion is consistent with case law from the Supreme Court and other federal courts. See, e.g., N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 88 (1982) (holding that jurisdictional rule for bankruptcy courts should not apply retroactively). As Judge Posner explained in In re Edwards, 962 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1992), a court that issued a judgment outside its jurisdiction still had jurisdiction to decide its own jurisdiction; and that jurisdictional determination, even if later shown to be wrong, survives collateral review like any other erroneous but final judgment. Id. at 644. Here, M.H. had the opportunity to challenge the juvenile court’s jurisdiction but failed to do so. And binding appellate precedent at the time in Indiana held that the juvenile court had jurisdiction. See, e.g., C.C. v. State, 907 N.E.2d 556, 558 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
Our Court eventually arrives at the right result today, but it does so by applying the criminal-law retroactivity standard announced in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), and adopted in Daniels v. State, 561 N.E.2d 487 (Ind. 1990), to this civil case. We have repeatedly held that juvenile cases are civil proceedings subject to civil procedures. See, e.g., J.W. v. State, 113 N.E.3d 1202, 1206 (Ind. 2019). Juvenile adjudications are not subject to post-conviction relief afforded for criminal convictions. Jordan v. State, 512 N.E.2d 407, 408 (Ind. 1987). And neither should post-judgment relief for juvenile adjudications be subject to the retroactivity rules that apply to collateral criminal proceedings. That is especially true when our longstanding civil retroactivity precedent already supplies a proper rule of decision here.
For these reasons, I do not join the Court’s opinion, but I concur in its judgment not to apply K.C.G. retroactively to void the adverse judgment against M.H.
Massa, J., joins.