Mathias, J.
Toni Knowles appeals the Noble Circuit Court’s declaration at the close of her sentencing hearing that twenty-eight days she had spent in jail would not be attributable to her seven-year sentence but instead would be counted as days spent in contempt of court. Knowles raises a single issue for our review, namely, whether the trial court committed fundamental error when it found her to be in contempt without notice and an opportunity to be heard and when the court attributed those twenty-eight days to that contempt finding rather than to her sentence. We reverse the court’s finding of contempt and remand with instructions for the court to award Knowles the twenty-eight days, along with any good-time credit to which she may be entitled for those days, as credit toward her seven-year sentence.
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Knowles appeals the court’s declaration that she was in contempt and its failure to credit the twenty-eight days of incarceration against her seven-year sentence.
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Although the State argues otherwise, we have no hesitation concluding that the trial court could not have found Knowles in direct contempt. The alleged act of disobedience—her failure to participate in the completion of the PSI report— was not an act of which the judge had personal knowledge. Therefore, the trial court’s finding of contempt is not sustainable under a theory of direct contempt.
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For two reasons, the trial court’s finding of contempt against Knowles is not sustainable under the theory of indirect contempt. First, the trial court did not comply with, or even appear to consider, Indiana Code section 34-47-3-5. Again, that statute codifies the due-process requirements for notice and opportunity to be heard on an indirect-contempt allegation. Id. at 833. As there was no compliance, let alone “strict compliance,” with that statute, the trial court’s finding of indirect contempt was contrary to Knowles’s fundamental due-process rights. See id.
Second, neither is the court’s failure to comply with Indiana Code section 34- 47-3-5 excusable under the “clear notice exception.” See id. (quotation marks omitted). The trial court provided Knowles with no notice whatsoever that she might be found to be in indirect contempt. At the April 25 hearing, the State suggested that contempt might be an avenue the court should consider, but at no point prior to pronouncing Knowles’s sentence at the May 23 hearing did the court state or even suggest that it agreed with that proposition, and at no point did the court provide Knowles with any notice that it was considering that proposition. Therefore, the court’s finding that Knowles was in indirect contempt was not permitted under the clear-notice exception.
There is no dispute that Knowles spent twenty-eight days in jail between the April 25 hearing and the May 23 sentencing hearing. We agree with Knowles that those twenty-eight days, along with any good-time credit to which she may be entitled for those days, are to be credited toward her seven-year sentence. We therefore reverse the trial court’s finding of contempt and remand with instructions for the court to award Knowles the twenty-eight days, along any earned good-time credit for those days, against her seven-year sentence.
Reversed and remanded with instructions.
May, J., and Bradford, J., concur.