Mathias, J.
Tyson Eminger appeals the trial court’s order granting the State’s motion for relief from judgment under Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(8). Eminger raises a single issue for our review, namely, whether the trial court abused its discretion when it granted the State’s motion, which the State filed after the court had previously granted Eminger’s own Rule 60(B) motion. We reverse and remand with instructions.
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On appeal, Eminger contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it considered the State’s Trial Rule 60(B)(8) motion for relief from judgment. According to Eminger, the proper procedure for the State to challenge the trial court’s order granting his Rule 60(B) motion was to timely appeal the trial court’s judgment, not to wait more than three months before filing its own Rule 60(B) motion. On these facts, we agree with Eminger.
Successive Trial Rule 60(B) motions are not per se contrary to law. However, “[i]t is well-established that a motion under T.R. 60 may not serve as a substitute for a direct appeal.” Magnuson v. Blickenstaff, 508 N.E.2d 814, 816 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987); see also In re Paternity of P.S.S., 934 N.E.2d 737, 740 (Ind. 2010). “Trial Rule 60(B) motions address only the procedural, equitable grounds justifying relief from the legal finality of a final judgment, not the legal merits of the judgment.” P.S.S., 934 N.E.2d at 740 (quoting Mid-West Fed. Sav. Bank v. Epperson, 579 N.E.2d 124, 129 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991)).
Thus, “[Trial Rule] 60(B) is meant to afford relief from circumstances which could not have been discovered during the period a motion to correct error could have been filed.” Bello v. Bello, 102 N.E.3d 891, 894 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). “[A]ny issue which was raised by[,] or could have been raised by[,] timely motion to correct error[] and timely direct appeal may not be subject of motion for relief from judgment.” Cullison v. Medley, 619 N.E.2d 937, 945 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), trans. denied.
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The State did not appeal the trial court’s order on Eminger’s Trial Rule 60(B) motion. Instead, some three-and-one-half months later, the State filed its own Trial Rule 60(B) motion. The only new argument presented by the State in its Trial Rule 60(B) motion was the assertion that the United States had afforded Eminger the process to which he was due prior to its forfeiture of the currency. But that assertion was of no force or effect; whether the United States afforded Eminger his due process protections in the forfeiture proceeding does not speak to whether the trial court afforded him his due process protections in the transfer proceeding. Thus, this “new” argument by the State was not a sufficient basis from which the trial court could have revisited its order granting Eminger’s Trial Rule 60(B) motion.
As for the remainder of the issues raised by the State in its Trial Rule 60(B) motion, those issues merely rehashed the State’s original arguments against Eminger’s Rule 60(B) motion. That is, the State again sought to challenge the legal merits of Eminger’s motion; the State’s Rule 60(B) motion did not present a previously unknown or unknowable procedural or equitable basis for relief from the trial court’s judgment on Eminger’s motion.
But Indiana Trial Rule 60(C) is clear: “A ruling or order of the court denying or granting relief, in whole or in part, by motion under subdivision (B) of this rule shall be deemed a final judgment, and an appeal may be taken therefrom as in the case of a judgment.” Although the State argues otherwise, we conclude that Rule 60(C) means what it says. The trial court’s order granting—even if only in part—Eminger’s request for relief under Rule 60(B) was as a matter of law a final judgment. See also Ind. Appellate Rule 2(H)(3) (“A judgment is a final judgment if . . . it is deemed final under Trial Rule 60(C)[.]”); Front Row Motors, LLC v. Jones, 5 N.E.3d 753, 757-58 (Ind. 2014). Therefore, if the State believed the trial court’s order on Eminger’s Rule 60(B) motion were legally erroneous— as the thrust of the State’s Rule 60(B) motion made clear—the State was required to seek appellate review of that order.
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred when it granted the State’s Trial Rule 60(B) motion and when the court vacated its decision on Eminger’s Trial Rule 60(B) motion. The trial court’s decision on the State’s motion is reversed, and the court’s decision on Eminger’s motion is reinstated on its merits.
However, we revise the relief ordered by the court on Eminger’s motion. Eminger was entitled to challenge the State’s motion to transfer, but the State failed to serve that motion on Eminger, and the trial court erroneously granted the State’s transfer motion without permitting Eminger to challenge it. We conclude that the proper remedy on Eminger’s motion for relief from that judgment is to afford Eminger a hearing at which he may challenge the lawfulness of the State’s seizure of the currency. Of course, the State has already transferred the currency to the United States; in such circumstances, should the trial court on remand determine that the State’s seizure of the currency was unlawful, the State shall “reimburse” Eminger “instanter,” and the State may then “choose to try to recoup that money from the federal government.” Lewis, 125 N.E.3d. at 660.
Reversed and remanded with instructions.
May, J., and Bradford, J., concur.