Slaughter, J.
Religious freedom protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution encompasses the right of religious institutions “to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine.” Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2055 (2020) (quoting Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952)). This principle, known as the church-autonomy doctrine, see, e.g., Brazauskas v. Fort Wayne-South Bend Diocese, Inc., 796 N.E.2d 286, 293 (Ind. 2003), applies in this case and requires its dismissal under Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6).
Joshua Payne-Elliott sued the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Indianapolis, Inc., in the Marion Superior Court. His complaint, which included attachments as exhibits, asserts claims against the archdiocese for intentional interference with his contract and employment with Cathedral High School, a Catholic school in Indianapolis. He claims the interference was “not justified”.
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To begin, we agree with Payne-Elliott that the trial court erred by dismissing under Rule 12(B)(1), which allows dismissal for “[l]ack of jurisdiction over the subject matter”. Ind. Trial Rule 12(B)(1). In determining whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction, we ask whether the action or claim falls within the general scope of authority conferred upon the court by the constitution or by statute. State v. Reinhart, 112 N.E.3d 705, 711‒12 (Ind. 2018) (citing State ex rel. Young v. Noble Cir. Ct., 263 Ind. 353, 356, 332 N.E.2d 99, 101 (1975)). A court with general authority to hear matters like employment disputes is not ousted of subject-matter jurisdiction just because the defendant asserts a religious defense. Brazauskas, 796 N.E.2d at 290.
Thus, we turn to consider Trial Rule 12(B)(6) as the trial court’s alternative basis for dismissal. A 12(B)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s claim, not the facts supporting it. …
Here, as grounds for dismissal, the archdiocese asserted three affirmative defenses: church autonomy, freedom of expressive association, and the ministerial exception. Based on the complaint and its attachments, we hold that Payne-Elliott has pleaded all elements of the archdiocese’s church-autonomy defense. Because the archdiocese is entitled to dismissal on this ground, we need not pass on its other two defenses.
Brazauskas guides our church-autonomy analysis. Brazauskas sued a diocese and a priest for blacklisting and for tortiously interfering with a business relationship. Brazauskas, 796 N.E.2d at 288. She alleged the defendants prevented her from obtaining a job at the University of Notre Dame, a Catholic university, by truthfully informing its president (a Catholic priest) about her pre-existing employment lawsuit against the defendants. Brazauskas, 796 N.E.2d at 288, 291‒92. The defendants asserted a defense under the church-autonomy doctrine…hTe question is purely one of church government and discipline, and must be determined by the proper ecclesiastical authorities.”). Thus, we rejected Brazauskas’s claim because to allow it to proceed would violate the church-autonomy doctrine. Brazauskas, 796 N.E.2d at 294.
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In sum, Brazauskas teaches that under the church-autonomy doctrine a civil court may not (1) penalize via tort law (2) a communication or coordination among church officials or members (3) on a matter of internal church policy or administration that (4) does not culminate in a criminal act. Id. at 294, 294 n.6. Here, based on the complaint’s allegations, the church-autonomy doctrine bars the case. First, the complaint alleges tort claims, i.e., intentional interference with contract and employment.
Second, the complaint rests on communications between church officials and members, here the archbishop and Cathedral…
Third, the archdiocese’s decision whether a school maintains its Catholic identity is an internal matter that concerns both church policy and administration….
Fourth, the complaint does not allege the archdiocese’s tortious conduct ended in a criminal act. Thus, Payne-Elliott’s complaint establishes the church-autonomy defense and requires dismissal for much the same reason Brazauskas lost.
Payne-Elliott also argues the trial court had no basis for reversing its original ruling that denied the motion to dismiss….
Finally, we note that when a motion to dismiss is sustained under Rule 12(B)(6), “the pleading may be amended once as of right pursuant to [Trial] Rule 15(A) within ten [10] days after service of notice of the court’s order sustaining the motion[.]” T.R. 12(B). The archdiocese observes correctly that Payne-Elliott did not amend within ten days. But this omission is not fatal here because, on this record, it would have been futile for the plaintiff to have amended his complaint. This is so because the trial court dismissed Payne-Elliott’s claims under Rules 12(B)(6) and 12(B)(1), which means that an amended complaint that actually stated a claim would have still failed on jurisdictional grounds, under the trial court’s judgment. Thus, we modify the trial court’s dismissal under Rule 12(B)(6) to allow leave to amend.
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For these reasons, we hold that dismissal under Rule 12(B)(1) was improper. But because the complaint shows the church-autonomy doctrine bars Payne-Elliott’s claims, we affirm the judgment of dismissal under Rule 12(B)(6) but modify it to reflect the dismissal is without prejudice.
Massa, J., concurs.
David and Goff, JJ., concur in the judgment.
Rush, C.J., not participating.