Rush, C.J.
Depositions are central to the discovery process, often serving as the factual arena where a majority of litigation takes place. Our trial rules allow parties to depose anyone with information relevant to the lawsuit. But they also give trial courts discretion to issue a protective order to protect a deponent from annoyance, harassment, or embarrassment.
Here, the NCAA twice moved unsuccessfully for a protective order to prevent the plaintiffs from deposing three of its high-ranking executives. Following the court’s second denial order, the NCAA sought discretionary interlocutory review under Indiana Appellate Rule 14(B), asking whether Indiana should adopt the apex doctrine. This doctrine can prevent parties from deposing top-level corporate executives absent the requesting party making certain initial showings. The plaintiffs, citing existing protections under our trial rules, contend that adopting the apex doctrine is unnecessary. And as a threshold issue, the plaintiffs, characterizing the NCAA’s second motion as either a repetitive motion or a motion to reconsider, maintain the appeal is untimely.
Addressing these claims requires us to resolve two issues of first impression. We first hold that a trial court’s order on a repetitive motion or a motion to reconsider is an “other interlocutory order” under Rule 14(B) and, thus, this appeal is properly before us. Then, though we decline to adopt the apex doctrine, we establish a framework that harmonizes its underlying principles with our applicable trial rules to assist courts in determining whether good cause exists to limit or prohibit the deposition of a top-level official in a large organization. We ultimately remand for the trial court to evaluate the NCAA’s second motion for a protective order with the benefit of this guidance.
….
We first address a threshold issue: whether the trial court’s second order denying the NCAA’s motion for a protective order can be certified for discretionary interlocutory review under Appellate Rule 14(B). The Athletes argue that the NCAA’s second motion was nothing more than a reconsideration motion that cannot extend the time for seeking appellate review. The NCAA disagrees, contending that “no category of interlocutory orders is ineligible for Rule 14(B) certification.”
We hold that Appellate Rule 14(B) broadly permits review of “other interlocutory orders,” including an order on a repetitive motion or a motion to reconsider. Such an appeal is proper so long as the trial court timely certifies the order, and the Court of Appeals accepts jurisdiction. Because the NCAA satisfied both conditions, this appeal is properly before us.
We next consider whether to adopt the apex doctrine. In recognition that executives who are at the “apex” of a corporation’s hierarchy can be vulnerable to repetitive or harassing depositions, the apex doctrine—or apex-deposition rule—generally shields such officials from depositions unless the requesting party makes two showings. See, e.g., Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. v. Garcia, 904 S.W.2d 125, 128 (Tex. 1995). First, it must show the official possesses superior or unique information relevant to the litigated issues; and second, it must show the information cannot be obtained by less intrusive discovery methods. See id. The NCAA urges us to adopt the apex doctrine, while the Athletes maintain that our trial rules adequately address the doctrine’s concerns.
Though we ultimately decline to adopt the apex doctrine, we establish a legal framework that harmonizes its underlying principles with our existing discovery rules. When a party seeks to limit or prohibit the deposition of a high-ranking official, our trial courts should use this framework to determine whether good cause exists for issuing a protective order.
I. Appellate Rule 14(B) allows for discretionary appeals of a trial court’s order on a repetitive motion or a motion to reconsider.
….
In all, a trial court’s order on a repetitive motion or a motion to reconsider is an “other interlocutory order” under Appellate Rule 14(B).3 A discretionary interlocutory appeal is proper so long as the party timely and successfully moves (1) the trial court to certify the order and (2) the Court of Appeals to accept jurisdiction over the appeal. Because the NCAA cleared both discretionary hurdles, we now turn to the merits: whether Indiana should adopt the apex-deposition rule.
II. A deponent’s apex status is relevant in determining whether there is good cause to limit or prohibit a deposition.
….
A. The apex doctrine generally prevents high-ranking officials from being deposed unless the requesting party makes initial showings.
….
Though we decline to adopt the apex doctrine, we find its principles relevant in determining whether good cause exists for a protective order to limit or prevent the deposition of a high-ranking official.
B. We establish a legal framework for determining whether good cause exists to limit or prohibit the deposition of a high-ranking official.
Our discovery rules are designed to minimize court involvement in the discovery process. Chustak v. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 259 Ind. 390, 288 N.E.2d 149, 152–53 (1972). Nevertheless, when “good cause” is shown “to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense,” trial courts have discretion to limit or altogether quash a party’s discovery request. T.R. 26(C). Importantly, however, the burden of establishing good cause lies with the party opposing discovery—not the party seeking it. See id.
When, as here, a party seeks to depose a high-level official and that official moves for a protective order to limit or prohibit the deposition, trial courts should apply the framework outlined below. And we encourage courts to issue findings and conclusions when rendering their decisions.
1. The court must determine whether the deponent qualifies as an apex official before relying on that status in deciding whether good cause exists.
As a threshold matter, the party seeking a protective order must show that the deponent qualifies as an apex official. To do so, the party needs to establish by affidavit and specific factual support that the executive occupies a position at the corporation’s “apex.” Generally, apex officials serve in an organization’s highest supervisory roles—such as presidents, vice presidents, or other executive officers. But because corporate structures vary, it makes little sense to establish a bright-line test as to whether an official occupies an apex status. This fact-sensitive inquiry will instead turn on a variety of factors including the organization’s size; the official’s rank or title and supervisory power; the extent of the official’s authority to exercise judgment and discretion when making executive decisions; and the nature and scope of the official’s functions, responsibilities, and duties related to the matters involved in the litigation.
If the party seeking protection makes this apex showing, the trial court must then determine whether there is “good cause” to protect the official from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, undue burden, or expense. T.R. 26(C). We recognize that high-ranking officials can be uniquely vulnerable to numerous, repetitive depositions and that parties may seek to depose these individuals for non-truth-seeking purposes, such as to annoy, harass, or coerce settlement. We also acknowledge that, by virtue of their status, those at the apex of a corporation’s hierarchy may often be only peripherally—rather than personally—familiar with the subject matter of pending litigation. Accordingly, in evaluating good cause, the court must take into account circumstances relevant to the high-ranking official’s status.
Consistent with Trial Rule 26, good cause exists if the apex official establishes, with specific factual support such as through affidavits, that (1) the executive lacks personal knowledge of relevant information greater in quality to that available elsewhere; (2) the information sought is obtainable through another, less burdensome method; (3) the deposition would be unreasonably cumulative or duplicative; or (4) the hardship accompanying the deposition outweighs its likely benefit. Importantly, general and conclusory statements will fall short of establishing good cause—the official must offer more than “[b]ald assertions of ignorance.” In re Amend. to Fla. Rule of Civ. Pro. 1.280, 324 So. 3d at 463; see also Crest Infiniti, 174 P.3d at 1004– 05. Rather, the official must convey how any accompanying responsibilities increase “the burden . . . imposed by the distraction of a deposition.” Buchanan, 2022 WL 1750716, at *8 n.5.
If the trial court finds good cause and the party seeking the deposition did not file a responsive motion, the court should issue a protective order either prohibiting the deposition or otherwise limiting it under Trial Rule 26(C). But when the requesting party submits a responsive motion, the trial court must determine whether either the executive’s apex status or the good cause showing has been negated or rebutted.
2. The court must determine whether the requesting party has negated or rebutted either the official’s apex status or the good cause showing.
When a party purports to establish the requisite showing for a protective order, our trial rules are silent as to whether, or how, a party can refute that showing. But nothing in our trial rules prohibits the party opposing the protective order from filing its own responsive motion. See T.R. 7(B). Thus, a party seeking to depose a high-ranking official may file a responsive motion to negate or rebut either the official’s apex status or the good cause showing. Whether the motion negates or rebuts the basis for a protective order will dictate how a trial court should proceed.
A showing is “negated” when it is nullified or proven false through particularized factual support. See Negate, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). If the court determines the official’s apex status is negated, then it must next consider whether the party requesting the protective order has established good cause without any consideration of circumstances relevant to high-ranking officials as identified above. And if the good cause showing is negated—with or without a consideration of the circumstances—the court should let the deposition proceed.
In contrast, a showing is “rebutted” when it is disputed or opposed through particularized factual support. See Rebut, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). For example, if the apex official asserts a lack of knowledge related to the litigation’s subject matter, the party seeking the deposition may counter this allegation with specific facts demonstrating that the official has relevant, personal knowledge. Or if an apex official alleges that the information sought is available through less intrusive discovery methods, the party seeking the deposition could show that alternative methods are unavailable, inadequate, or already exhausted.
When confronted with a responsive motion that rebuts—rather than negates—the apex official’s good cause showing, the court must use its discretionary authority to balance the parties’ needs and impose a protective order that (1) restricts the topical scope of the deposition or (2) requires the exhaustion of less intrusive discovery methods. See T.R. 26(B)(1), (C). Less intrusive methods may include deposing lower-level employees, deposing a corporate designee, or submitting to the corporation interrogatories and requests for production of documents. See T.R. 30, 33, 34. If the party seeking the deposition exhausts alternative methods to no avail, the court should modify the protective order upon the party establishing a specific, outstanding need for the deposition.
Turning to this case, the trial court did not have the benefit of this framework when it denied the NCAA’s second motion for a protective order. Further, in that second order—the appealed order before us—the court summarily denied the NCAA’s motion, leaving us unable to determine whether its reasoning comported with our guidance. We therefore remand to the trial court to evaluate the NCAA’s motion in light of our guidance and encourage it to enter findings and conclusions supporting its decision.
Conclusion
For interlocutory orders that do not fall under the other sections of Appellate Rule 14, Rule 14(B) neither limits the type of order a trial court may certify for discretionary review nor restricts the appellate court’s discretion to accept jurisdiction over the appeal. Thus, even if the appealed order before us is on a repetitive motion or a motion to reconsider, the NCAA did not forfeit its opportunity to obtain discretionary review. In conducting that review, we decline to adopt the apex doctrine and instead harmonize its principles with our trial rules in establishing a framework for trial courts to use to determine whether good cause exists to limit or prohibit the deposition of a high-ranking official. We remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. [Footnote omitted.]
David, Massa, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur.