Massa, J.
Terrance Miller was pulled over by the police, who discovered drugs on his person and a firearm in his vehicle. A jury found him guilty of several offenses. Miller appealed, and an appellate panel reversed. It found a jury instruction indicated he had a previous conviction, which, even if invited by Miller, was fundamental error that required reversal. We now reject Miller’s arguments and affirm his convictions.
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The parties also agreed on Preliminary Instruction 18, which defined the crime as: “A person who knowingly or intentionally possesses a firearm after having been convicted of and sentenced for an offense under I.C. 35-47-4-5 commits possession of a firearm in violation of I.C. 35-47-4-5, a Level 4 felony.”
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I. Miller invited any error that arose from Preliminary Instruction 18, which precludes relief on direct appeal.
Assuming Preliminary Instruction 18 was fundamental error, Miller invited it. The instruction was part of his counsel’s explicit “strategic decision” to partially bifurcate the unlawful possession charge, Supp. Tr., p.6, which was certainly permissible, see Russell v. State, 997 N.E.2d 351, 353–55 (Ind. 2013) (upholding partial bifurcation). Miller’s counsel not only affirmed the instruction “looks correct,” he also stated that “we are including the statute but not referring to the actual offence, which would be prejudicial.” Supp. Tr., p.6. He was very much aware of the potential for prejudice if the jury knew Miller’s criminal history. Indeed, he had even filed a motion in limine—which was discussed and granted right after the instruction was discussed and approved—to exclude references during the trial’s first phase to Miller’s previous convictions and incarcerations and the pending habitual offender enhancement. Yet he still requested the instruction as part of his strategy. He “did far more than simply fail to object.” Durden v. State, 99 N.E.3d 645, 656 (Ind. 2018).
If he wishes, Miller can challenge his counsel’s strategy through a postconviction relief petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.
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II. Detective Strong lawfully stopped Miller.
There were two infractions that caused Detective Strong to stop Miller: turning without properly signaling, Ind. Code § 9-21-8-25 (2019), and not maintaining a license plate “free from foreign materials and in a condition to be clearly legible,” I.C. § 9-18.1-4-4(b)(2). Because Detective Strong could have stopped Miller only for the first infraction, we do not analyze the second.
Under the collective-knowledge doctrine, an officer’s personal knowledge of facts that establish the necessary suspicion may be imputed to another officer. See Baker v. State, 485 N.E.2d 122, 124 (Ind. 1985) (addressing reasonable suspicion); Benton v. State, 273 Ind. 34, 38, 401 N.E.2d 697, 699 (1980) (addressing probable cause). This means an officer without personal knowledge can initiate a stop if he acts upon information from an officer with personal knowledge. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 232–33 (1985).
Here, Sergeant Campbell, an experienced officer who spent several years as “a road trooper,” Tr. Vol. II, p.68, saw Miller turn without properly signaling, which provided him with at least reasonable suspicion for a stop. He then radioed the infraction to other officers, including Detective Strong, who heard him and subsequently stopped Miller. Sergeant Campbell’s reasonable suspicion was imputed to Detective Strong. The trial court properly admitted the drugs.
III. Miller did not comply with the exhaustion rule, which precludes review of the trial court’s refusal to strike T.M. for cause.
Under the exhaustion rule, a party can only appeal a trial court’s denial of a for-cause challenge if he used a peremptory challenge against the juror or had already exhausted his challenges. Whiting v. State, 969 N.E.2d 24, 29–30 (Ind. 2012). If he does not comply with the rule, he has waived the issue. Id. An objection standing alone is insufficient, because, unlike with other issues, a party can “cure the alleged error at the outset” through a peremptory challenge. Id. at 31. And, like the trial court, a party is better positioned than us to evaluate a juror’s suitability, so his decision not to use a peremptory challenge strongly indicates he “did not consider the juror sufficiently biased to warrant removal.” Id.
Here, Miller had ten peremptory challenges. I.C. § 35-37-1-3(b); Ind. Jury Rule 18(a)(2). He never attempted to use one against T.M., even though he had not exhausted them when the court denied his for-cause challenge. He now asserts that he did not have any available peremptory challenges, because T.M. was in the first round of prospective jurors, and he did not request that the court strike T.M. until after questioning had moved past that round. In other words, he had “passed over” T.M., so his only recourse was a for-cause challenge.
Even if the court would have deemed Miller’s peremptory challenge late and denied it, Miller still had to try. The use of peremptory challenges is subject to the trial court’s “reasonable regulation.” Nagy v. State, 505 N.E.2d 434, 437 (Ind. 1987). Certainly, the court can refuse a belated peremptory challenge, and such refusal might be upheld on appeal. See, e.g., id. However, an anticipated refusal does not excuse compliance with the exhaustion rule. A party must still try to use a peremptory challenge even if he believes it will be unsuccessful.
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Miller had not exhausted his peremptory challenges when the court refused to strike T.M. for cause. Because he did not try to use a peremptory challenge against T.M., he has waived this issue.
We reject Miller’s arguments and affirm the trial court.
David, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur.
Rush, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part with separate opinion.
Rush, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Miller argues that Preliminary Instruction 18 resulted in fundamental error because it “unnecessarily poison[ed] the jury with the knowledge that [he] had a prior unrelated felony conviction.” The majority holds that, even if fundamental error occurred, “Miller invited it.” Ante, at 5. On this record, I respectfully disagree and, for reasons provided below, would review Miller’s claim for fundamental error. I fully concur with the majority’s decision in all other respects.
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In light of counsel’s partial-bifurcation decision, he agreed to Preliminary Instruction 18: “A person who knowingly or intentionally possesses a firearm after having been convicted of and sentenced for an offense enumerated under I.C. 35-47-4-5 commits possession of a firearm in violation of I.C. 35-47-4-5, a Level 4 felony.” Counsel confirmed the instruction “looks correct to me,” noting that while it included the serious-violent-felon statute, it did not specifically mention what offense Miller had been convicted of and sentenced for, which counsel maintained would have been “prejudicial.”
But the instruction explicitly informed the jury that Miller had a prior qualifying conviction. Now, at first glance, it may appear that counsel invited this error. As the majority observes, he “did far more than simply fail to object” and seemed “very much aware” of the prejudicial impact of exposing the jury to Miller’s criminal history. Ante, at 5 (citations omitted). But, as noted above, for the invited-error doctrine to apply, we must also conclude that counsel’s assent to the preliminary instruction derived from a reasonable basis.
Neither party can discern any reasonable basis for counsel to agree to Preliminary Instruction 18. The record shows that his strategy in bifurcating the charge was to separate—that is, entirely sever—the possession element from the prior-conviction element. But the instruction informed the jury that Miller had a prior conviction. So, although counsel may have wanted the instruction as part of the strategic partial-bifurcation, see ante, at 5, providing it to the jury conflicts with that “strategic” decision.
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Further demonstrating a lack of a reasonable strategy is the fact that, as Miller prudently observes, the preliminary instruction was “useless.” The State also charged Miller with dealing in a narcotic drug which was elevated to a Level 3 felony based in part on him committing the crime while in possession of a firearm. See Ind. Code §§ 35-48-4-1(d)(2), -1-16.5. So, to secure a conviction, the State had to prove that Miller possessed a firearm. The jury, therefore, was already going to decide the gun-possession issue as part of the dealing charge. And thus, Preliminary Instruction 18 did nothing more than inform the jury that it needed to make the same determination twice.
We have previously recognized that in cases where “either the source of the error or counsel’s motives at trial are less than clear,” it is imperative that we “resolve any doubts against a finding of invited error.” Batchelor v. State, 119 N.E.3d 550, 558 (Ind. 2019). Indeed, such a finding “typically forecloses appellate review altogether,” even if the error allegedly “made a fair trial impossible.” Id. at 556, 559. Given the gravity of this consequence, we must exercise caution when reviewing for invited error. And if any doubt arises upon review—as it does here—we should proceed with a fundamental-error analysis.
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Our invited-error doctrine serves an important purpose. But we must be careful not to let it transform into a “rigid and undeviating judicially declared practice,” serving only to defeat—not promote—the ends of justice. Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 557 (1941). Here, with a record lacking any indicia of a reasonable basis for counsel’s assent to Preliminary Instruction 18, we should carefully review Miller’s claim for fundamental error.