Slaughter, J.
In 2020, we held juvenile courts lose jurisdiction once an alleged delinquent child reaches twenty-one years of age. But we left open the question whether the State can file criminal charges against a person who committed the charged conduct before turning eighteen but is no longer a child under the juvenile code. Under the governing statutes, a child’s delinquent act does not ripen into a crime when the child ages out of the juvenile system. The result is that neither the juvenile court nor the circuit court has jurisdiction here. In short, this case falls within a jurisdictional gap only the legislature can close. We thus affirm the trial court’s judgment for Neukam and against the State.
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We recently discussed the jurisdictional limits of juvenile courts in the consolidated case of D.P. v. State. There, the State filed delinquency petitions against D.P. and N.B. for acts that would have been felony child molesting had an adult committed them. Id. at 1212. Both D.P. and N.B. acted before they were eighteen, but they were older than twenty-one when the State filed the delinquency petitions. Id. Applying the governing statutes, Indiana Code sections 31-30-1-1 and 31-9-2-13, we held juvenile courts lose jurisdiction once the alleged offender reaches twenty-one years of age. Id. at 1213–14, 1216. But we left unaddressed the question before us today: whether the State can file charges in a criminal court against a person no longer a child but who committed the charged conduct while still a child. Id. at 1217 n.2.
As a general matter, circuit courts have jurisdiction over criminal cases, and juvenile courts have jurisdiction over delinquency cases. Under Indiana Code section 33-28-1-2(a)(1), circuit courts have “original and concurrent jurisdiction . . . in all criminal cases.” But the legislature carved out a portion of this general jurisdiction to grant juvenile courts exclusive original jurisdiction over “[p]roceedings in which a child . . . is alleged to be a delinquent child under IC 31-37.” Ind. Code § 31-30-1-1(1). Today’s jurisdictional question turns on whether Neukam’s alleged conduct was a criminal or delinquent act—or whether the same act could be both, i.e., whether a delinquent act committed before the age of eighteen could ripen into a crime once Neukam became an adult.
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While acknowledging our interpretation of the statutory text is “reasonable”, our dissenting colleagues would nonetheless supplant the delinquent-act statute’s text in favor of other “evidence of legislative intent.” Post, at 2 (Goff, J., dissenting); id. at 1 (Massa, J., dissenting) (agreeing with part I of Justice Goff’s dissent). Our reliance on the delinquent-act statute’s text, they say, leads to results they find “unjust” and “absurd”. Post, at 3 (Goff, J., dissenting). We respectfully disagree. First, that the dissents consider the outcome here unjust ignores that such value judgments are in the eye of the beholder. It also ignores our modest judicial role. If a statute’s text compels a particular result, judges must not second-guess the outcome, even if it offends our own sensibilities. Policymakers often must make difficult judgment calls about when an alleged offender’s needs should outweigh an alleged victim’s. But it is legislators, not judges, who bear that responsibility.
Second, the policy underlying our juvenile-justice system is that juvenile offenders should be rehabilitated instead of punished and stigmatized. See, e.g., In re K.G., 808 N.E.2d 631, 637 (Ind. 2004). We find it plausible—not absurd—the legislature would prioritize this policy for juvenile offenders who have matured into adulthood—in hopes they would leave behind their delinquent past. Justice Massa, writing separately, argues our view is flawed because it “rewrites the statute of limitations”. Post, at 1 n.2 (Massa, J., dissenting). Respectfully, he ignores the statute of limitations is a general statute located under title 35, article 41, which addresses substantive criminal provisions under the criminal code. As a matter of interpretation, general statutes yield to more specific statutes. Grether v. Indiana State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 239 Ind. 619, 623, 159 N.E.2d 131, 134 (1959). Justice Massa would read subsection 35-41-42(e) to apply to alleged offenders like Neukam regardless of their age when they molested the child. But here, the more specific statute is the delinquent-act statute, which deals explicitly with the age of an offender. In contrast, the statute of limitations deals only with the age of the victim. See I.C. § 35-41-4-2(e) (extending the limitations period until “the alleged victim of the offense reaches thirty-one . . . years of age”).
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Moreover, Justice Goff’s belief that practical considerations based on policy trump statutory text runs afoul not only of separation of powers, but of our entire constitutional scheme. “The intent of the Legislature is best gleaned from the statutory text itself.” See, e.g., George v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 945 N.E.2d 150, 154 (Ind. 2011). Despite this clear precedent, his dissent decries our textual approach because we subordinate “practical interpretive canons” to textual fidelity. Post, at 8 (Goff, J., dissenting). But this is what the constitution requires of us. What counts as law, after all, is a statute’s enacted text—text forged by the dual constitutional requirements of bicameralism and presentment—and not what we wish or suppose the legislature intended to enact. The statutory text here simply does not support prosecuting offenders like Neukam criminally for their conduct as juveniles. To the contrary, the delinquent act statute requires the opposite.
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To be clear, we agree with the dissents’ premise that section 31-30-1-1 vests jurisdiction in the juvenile court “only when the offender is currently a child”. Post, at 2 (Goff, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). But they believe that if a juvenile court lacks jurisdiction, the circuit court necessarily must have it. Id. at 2–3. Respectfully, that does not follow. The question is whether the statutes confer the circuit court with jurisdiction over this class of cases. On the issue of criminal-versus-juvenile jurisdiction, a circuit court has jurisdiction over only “criminal cases”. And a delinquent act by a juvenile cannot “be” a crime because it “would be” a crime only if committed by an adult. Thus, under the relevant statutes, circuit courts lack jurisdiction over conduct by juveniles.
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Because these statutes—sections 33-23-1-4 and 31-37-1-2—show that criminal and delinquent acts are distinct classes of conduct determined by age, the circuit court does not have jurisdiction over the acts Neukam allegedly committed before turning eighteen. And, as we held in D.P., 151 N.E.3d at 1216, the juvenile court lacks jurisdiction because Neukam is older than twenty-one. Thus, these statutes compel us to hold that no court has jurisdiction over the charges arising from Neukam’s alleged conduct before his eighteenth birthday. We recognize this jurisdictional gap means certain delinquent acts will not be prosecuted—for no other reason than the delinquent act was not reported until the alleged offender turned twenty-one.
We also recognize our decision today raises questions about circuit court jurisdiction vis-à-vis the juvenile court’s waiver statutes and the criminal court’s transfer statute. For instance, the waiver statutes allow a juvenile court to waive its exercise of jurisdiction. See, e.g., I.C. § 31-30-3-1. The effect of this waiver is a criminal court may then exercise its own jurisdiction. But it cannot do so without jurisdiction over the alleged conduct in the first place. By the same token, the transfer statute—which permits a criminal court to transfer a criminal case to a juvenile court— presupposes the criminal court has jurisdiction. See id. § 31-30-1-11 (beginning with the phrase “if a court having criminal jurisdiction”). The dissents would allow these statutes to control here. Post, at 4 n.3 (Goff, J., dissenting). But to do so, they bypass the import of the key phrase in the delinquent-act statute: “would be an offense if committed by an adult”. And the delinquent-act statute, unlike the transfer and waiver statutes (or the statute of limitations for child molesting), is dispositive here on its plain terms.
But even were it not, our harmonious-reading canon applies only to related statutes on the same subject. Clippinger, 54 N.E.3d at 989. Here, the key subject is jurisdiction over Neukam’s alleged sexual conduct with a minor. In contrast, neither waiver nor transfer is a dispositive subject here. D.P. holds a juvenile court lacks jurisdiction to waive offenders like Neukam to criminal court. And whether a criminal court could transfer Neukam’s case to juvenile court turns on the antecedent question whether the criminal court has jurisdiction. Ultimately, like the dissents, we are not blind to the weighty and far-reaching policy concerns implicated by today’s decision. But separation of powers requires that we echo our words from D.P.: If this “result was not the intent of the legislature, then it—not we—must make the necessary statutory changes.” 151 N.E.3d at 1217.
For these reasons, we hold the circuit court lacks jurisdiction over the criminal charges the State sought to add against Neukam for conduct occurring before he turned eighteen. Thus, we affirm the court’s denial of the State’s motion to amend the charging information.
Rush, C.J., and David, J., concur.
Massa and Goff, JJ., dissent with separate opinions.
Massa, J., dissenting.
I agree with Justice Goff’s statutory analysis in Part I of his dissent. However, I conclude the procedural approach suggested in Part II is unnecessary and thus write separately.
As Justice Goff explains in Part I, the circuit court has jurisdiction over Anthony Neukam and his alleged criminal acts. A majority of the Court disagrees, leaving it to the legislature to clarify. But even if the General Assembly finally acts to eliminate the jurisdictional Catch-22 announced by the Court today and allows courts to try certain adult offenders for sex crimes committed while juveniles, the penological, jurisprudential, and moral blameworthiness questions will persist. Chief among them: how to hold an adult accountable for a crime committed while still a child, when the adult system is more punitive and the juvenile system more therapeutic. Clearing the jurisdictional roadblock cannot solve that riddle, it can only provide a forum. These cases must go somewhere. The General Assembly never contemplated safe harbor for alleged sex offenders who turn twenty-one before their victims reveal.
The best we can do is adjudicate these matters in a court of general jurisdiction and take age into account as a mitigating factor at sentencing. While I might assume the General Assembly will explicitly allow it next year, Justice Goff provides an analysis that would make new legislation unnecessary and immediately close an unintended loophole that will remain open until the legislature can act. I join him in respectfully dissenting.
Goff, J., dissenting.
In D.P. v. State, we held that juvenile courts lose jurisdiction once the alleged delinquent child reaches twenty-one years of age. 151 N.E.3d 1210, 1217 (Ind. 2020). Today, the Court holds that the “plain text” of the relevant statutes show that criminal and delinquent acts are distinct conduct. Ante, at 4, 5. And because the “legislature has not said a delinquent act ripens into a crime when a juvenile offender ages out of the juvenile system,” the Court holds that a criminal court has no jurisdiction over acts allegedly committed by that offender before turning eighteen. Id. at 8. The result is, when taken with our decision in D.P., that “no court has jurisdiction” under the circumstances presented here. Id. (emphasis added).
Because the Court’s reading of the relevant jurisdictional statutes permits Neukam’s alleged acts of child molestation “to go unpunished,” id., because it judicially repeals the juvenile waiver and transfer statutes, and because the legislature would never have intended these results, I respectfully dissent.
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When the State petitions the juvenile court to waive jurisdiction to an adult criminal court under facts similar to these, the relevant Waiver Statute requires the State to show (1) that the child was alleged to have committed a delinquent act that, if committed by an adult, would be a Level 1 through Level 4 felony; (2) that probable cause supported a finding that the child committed that act; and (3) that the child was at least sixteen years of age when he allegedly committed the act. I.C. § 31-30-3-5. After the State makes this showing, the child must rebut the presumption of waiver by showing that “it would be in the best interests of the child and of the safety and welfare of the community for the child to remain within the juvenile justice system.” Id. If the juvenile fails to rebut the presumption of waiver, the juvenile court shall waive jurisdiction. Id.
By enacting the Waiver Statutes, the legislative branch has already called for judges to balance the policy interests involved in the juvenile- and criminal-justice systems. And this makes sense. The analysis required in a waiver determination is necessarily a fact-sensitive inquiry, one typically left to the discretion of a judicial officer on a case-by-case basis. In my view, trial judges should be authorized to make the same type of inquiry in cases like Neukam’s. Because, while I do not accept the proposition that the General Assembly intended no court to have jurisdiction, neither do I accept that the circuit court should always exercise jurisdiction. If, for example, a circuit court were to apply the waiver standard in this case, the outcome is far from guaranteed.
Neukam’s alleged offenses are serious, but they are not among those offenses enumerated in our Direct File Statute, so the State would carry the burden of showing that Neukam should be waived to adult court. See I.C. § 31-30-3-5. And while Neukam had not yet turned eighteen at the time of the alleged offenses, he was seventeen and nearing the point of aging out of the juvenile system. Given the severity of the alleged offenses, Neukam’s age at the time, the victim’s fear of Neukam, and his request that she remain silent, it may well be that the State’s charging amendment is appropriate. In other words, under the facts of this case, the important policies underlying the statute of limitations for child molesting may outweigh the equally important rehabilitative goals of our juvenile-justice system. On the other hand, the State waited an extraordinarily long time to file the delinquency charge. The adult charges were filed on November 28, 2017, but the State didn’t seek to amend the charging information until September 18, 2020—almost two years later. Still, we may not have all the information, and, even if we did, different circumstances may produce a different outcome in the next case. In my view, a judicial officer, entrusted by their community to balance safety and fairness, should be empowered to make this difficult call.
The solution in this hypothetical is, I admit, an imperfect one. But it addresses the jurisdictional gap created by the Court’s opinion, a jurisdictional gap that I do not believe the legislature could have intended. In D.P. we invited the General Assembly to clarify the jurisdictional reach of the juvenile court if the results of the case didn’t reflect the legislative intent. 151 N.E.3d at 1217. I believe that this case creates an even more compelling call for the legislature to create a statutory fix. Until then, my hypothetical above offers an alternative to allowing “certain delinquent acts to go unpunished,” one that also leaves intact the important rehabilitative goals of our juvenile-justice system.
This Court’s decision in D.P., in which I concurred, relied on the “plain language” of the Juvenile Jurisdiction Statute. 151 N.E.3d at 1216. I assented to the D.P. Court’s textualist approach because I found no ambiguity in the statutory scope of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. What’s more, our interpretation of the statute there, unlike here, presented no clear conflict with the policy goals of our legislature and did not invalidate multiple other statutes. With today’s decision, however, the net effect is that “no court has jurisdiction” over acts committed by a defendant before turning eighteen.
The “jurisdictional gap” created here emerges from a narrow view of statutory interpretation that ignores other reasonable interpretations of a statute to find it unambiguous and then ignores practical interpretive canons. To be sure, I find great value in the use of textualism as a tool of statutory construction. But my concern, as is evident in this case, centers on the extremes to which the Court chooses to apply textualism to the exclusion of other evidence of legislative intent. This approach, in my view, places “unrealistic demands” on our colleagues in the General Assembly “to address the range of possible applications” presented in a given statutory scheme. See Amanda L. Tyler, Continuity, Coherence, and the Canons, 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1389, 1423 (2005). Cf. Fix v. State, 186 N.E.3d 1134, 1140 (Ind. 2022) (avoiding a strict, “impracticable” approach to statutory interpretation by concluding “that burglary—even if ‘complete’ for purposes of establishing culpability—is an ongoing crime that encompasses a defendant’s conduct after the breaking and entering, not just at the threshold of the premises”).
For the reasons above, I respectfully dissent.