Weissmann, J.
The legislature has created two opportunities for the use of home detention orders following sentencing. The court may: 1) enter a home detention order as a condition of probation under Indiana Code § 35-38-2.5; or 2) impose home detention as a direct commitment to Community Corrections. See Ind. Code § 35-38-2.6. Option one applies to both felonies and misdemeanors. Option two is limited to certain felony convictions.
After Sara Russell pled guilty to a misdemeanor, the trial court sentenced her to one year imprisonment in the Indiana Department of Correction and purported to order her sentence to be served on home detention as a direct commitment through Community Corrections. App. Vol. II, p. 139. But Russell had been convicted only of a misdemeanor and not any of the felonies that trigger availability of sentencing under Indiana Code § 35-38-2.6.
After Sara Russell allowed her home detention ankle bracelet to die, the State filed a Level 6 felony escape charge under Indiana Code § 35-44.1-3-4(b), claiming Russell violated a home detention order. Russell moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that the trial court never entered a “home detention order” and she thus never violated one. The trial court denied the motion, and this interlocutory appeal ensued. We reverse, agreeing with Russell that no “home detention order” was entered and that Russell cannot be prosecuted for the charged escape without such an order.
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Russell argues that the trial court erroneously denied her motion to dismiss because she cannot be prosecuted for escape.
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The State charged Russell with level 6 felony escape, which requires proof that she “knowingly or intentionally violate[d] a home detention order.” Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-4(b). The legislature has specified the parameters of a “home detention order” in Indiana Code § 35-38-2.5-6 (home detention order statute). A “home detention order” must include various details about the defendant’s responsibilities on home detention and bar the defendant’s violation of the terms of probation or commission of a new crime. Ind. Code § 35-38-2.5-6(1), (3)-(9). The order also must warn that violation of the home detention order may result in a prosecution for felony escape. Ind. Code § 35-38-2.5-6(2).
By its express terms, the home detention order statute applies to home detention entered as a condition of probation. Ind. Code § 35-38-2.5-6 (“An order for home detention of an offender under section 5 of this chapter must include . . . .”; Ind. Code § 35-38-2.5-5(a) (providing that, absent express exceptions, “as a condition of probation a court may order an offender confined to the offender’s home for a period of home detention”); Brown v. State, 894 N.E.2d 598, 600 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (“Ind. Code § 35-38-2.5-5 . . . provides for home detention as a condition of probation.”). But because the Record contains no probation order or probation conditions, it is clear the trial court did not sentence Russell to home detention as a condition of probation. Thus, Russell’s home detention order did not conform to the requirements of Indiana Code § 35-38-2.5-6.
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Given that Russell was convicted of a misdemeanor, she was not eligible for home detention as a direct commitment under Indiana Code § 35-38-2.6. See id. The trial court therefore could only impose home detention as a condition of probation under Indiana Code § 35-38-2.5-5, which it did not do. Instead, the court appears to have sentenced Russell to home detention as a direct commitment to Community Corrections. Notably, in its order certifying this interlocutory appeal, the court specified that it “sentenced [Russell] to home detention”; “Russell was given no terms of home detention at that time but was ordered to report[] to Community Corrections”; and “Community Corrections was to impose the conditions of GPS monitoring pursuant to I.C. 35-38-2.6-3(a) . . . .”
Although the propriety of Russell’s underlying sentence to home detention is not before us, this background informs our analysis of the issue on appeal: whether the trial court properly refused to dismiss the escape charge. Because the trial court did not enter home detention as a condition of probation—the only means available for a misdemeanant like Russell—it did not issue any “home detention order.” Because no “home detention order” exists, the State had no grounds for charging Russell with Level 6 felony escape based on her alleged violation of a “home detention order.” Russell therefore is entitled to dismissal of that charge. See Ind. Code § 35-34-1-4 (permitting dismissal of indictment or information where “[t]he facts stated do not constitute an offense.”); State v. Sturman, 56 N.E.3d 1187, 1196 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (ruling that dismissal is warranted where “the information is facially deficient in stating an alleged crime”).
We reverse the trial court’s denial of Russell’s motion to dismiss and remand for entry of an order of dismissal on the charge of Level 6 felony escape.
Najam, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.