Per Curiam
Indiana’s appellate courts have discretion to decide moot cases that present questions of great public importance likely to recur. For twenty years, the Court of Appeals has regularly applied this “public interest exception” to reach the merits of appeals from expired temporary civil commitment orders. But the panel here interpreted our decision in T.W. v. St. Vincent Hospital and Healthcare Center, Inc., 121 N.E.3d 1039, 1042 (Ind. 2019), reh’g denied, as disfavoring this practice except in “rare circumstances.” T.W. should not be read so broadly.
Temporary civil commitments can often fit within this public interest exception to mootness because they are transitory in nature and require the delicate balancing of a person’s fundamental liberty interest with the safety of individuals and the public. But this exception should be applied on a case-by-case basis. In other words, appellate courts are not required to issue an opinion in every moot temporary commitment appeal, but they may readily do so to address novel issues or close calls, or to build the instructive body of law to help trial courts make these urgent and difficult decisions.
Since we decided T.W. in 2019, Court of Appeals panels, including this one, have disagreed about its impact on the review of temporary commitment cases. We grant transfer here to clarify T.W.’s effect and affirm the appellate courts’ broad discretion to decide when the public interest exception to mootness applies.
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For several decades, the Court of Appeals has routinely considered the merits of these cases despite finding them moot. See, e.g., In re Commitment of M.Z., 829 N.E.2d 634, 637 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); M.L. v. Eskenazi Health/Midtown Mental Health CMHC, 80 N.E.3d 219, 222 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). This is especially appropriate in appeals that address novel issues, see In re J.B., 766 N.E.2d at 798 (addressing “when doctors may forcibly administer medication to a person who refuses to take them”), present a close case, see In re M.Z., 829 N.E.2d at 637 (“we choose to address this case on the merits because it is a close case”), or develop case law on a complicated topic, see M.L., 80 N.E.3d at 222 (addressing the proof necessary to impose special conditions upon attaining outpatient status because “Indiana case law is practically undeveloped” on the issue).
In the three cases cited above, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that it “may” consider moot cases under the public interest exception and chose to do so. See In re J.B., 766 N.E.2d at 798; In re M.Z., 829 N.E.2d at 637; M.L., 80 N.E.3d at 222. Inasmuch as the Court of Appeals has adopted a practice of considering many involuntary commitment appeals over the last 20 years, we do not disapprove of such practice. That is within its discretion. But because one of the hallmarks of a moot case is the court’s inability to provide effective relief, see T.W., 121 N.E.3d at 1042, appellate courts are not required to issue an opinion in every moot case. See Snyder v. King, 958 N.E.2d 764, 786 (Ind. 2011) (holding that courts should avoid issuing advisory opinions).
In an appeal from an expired temporary commitment order, the appellate court should thoughtfully and thoroughly consider whether the case is moot and whether the public-interest exception to mootness should apply. Parties appealing in those cases should avail themselves of the opportunity to raise relevant issues, including any reasonable challenge to mootness or argument that an exception to mootness applies. Here, finding that E.F. should have the opportunity to make these arguments before the Court of Appeals, we remand for the Court of Appeals to consider any arguments the parties may have about mootness and the public-interest exception.
Rush, C.J., and David, Massa, and Goff, JJ., concur.
Slaughter, J., dissents with separate opinion
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I respectfully dissent, believing we should either deny transfer or summarily affirm the court of appeals’ dismissal of E.F.’s appeal. The problem with our disposition today is that the Court applies a broader mootness exception than I believe is consistent with our constitution’s structural limits on judicial power….
Unlike the Court, I would adopt the bright-line rule that a court can decide an expired commitment case only if the patient shows an actual controversy remains—because, for instance, specific adverse consequences arising from the commitment are likely to affect the patient in the future. On this record, E.F. failed to make that case. Thus, I would either deny transfer or summarily affirm the panel opinion dismissing her appeal.