Rush, C.J.
This case presents a dispute between the executive and the legislative branches of our state government over the scope of their respective constitutional authority. The General Assembly enacted a law that allows it to call itself into emergency session, which the Governor challenges as unconstitutionally co-opting a purely executive function.
The question before us is not whether it is sensible for the General Assembly to be able to set an emergency session. We decide only whether the Legislature’s chosen mechanism is permissible under the relevant constitutional text, which requires the length and frequency of legislative sessions to be “fixed by law.” That is, each session must be specifically set by a bill enacted by the full General Assembly when it is in session. Yet, the challenged law purports to delegate this authority to a small group of legislators and allows them to wield that power outside of session. Under our Constitution, the General Assembly simply cannot do what the challenged law permits absent a constitutional amendment.
Finding that the Governor has satisfied the high burden required to establish that the law is unconstitutional and rejecting the Legislative Parties’ arguments that the suit is procedurally barred, we reverse in part and affirm in part.
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Here, HEA-1123 permits the sixteen-member Legislative Council to set an emergency session after adopting a resolution at a time when the General Assembly is not in session. The Governor, finding no distinction between an emergency session and a special session and believing the authority to call a special session is vested solely in the executive branch, seeks a declaratory judgment that HEA-1123 is unconstitutional on several grounds. The Legislative Parties dispute those claims and also present several procedural reasons why the Governor should not be permitted to bring them in the first place.
We hold that HEA-1123 violates Article 4, Section 9’s fixed-by-law requirement by authorizing an emergency session to be set through a simple resolution, rather than a properly enacted bill as our Constitution requires. We also hold that HEA-1123 violates Article 3, Section 1’s distribution-of-powers mandate by allowing the setting of an emergency session to occur at a time when the General Assembly is not in session— authority conferred only upon the Governor. For these reasons, HEA-1123 is constitutionally infirm absent an amendment under Article 16. [Footnote omitted.] We note, however, that despite HEA-1123’s deficiencies, the General Assembly is not prohibited from setting additional sessions so long as it complies with Article 4, Section 9’s fixed-by-law requirements.
Although we begin our discussion with an analysis of the constitutional challenges to HEA-1123, we first carefully considered the Legislative Parties’ threshold procedural arguments for why we should not reach the merits of the Governor’s claims. And while several of the procedural arguments are novel, we ultimately find none of them persuasive. In the end, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
I. Under our Constitution, the General Assembly must set the length and frequency of sessions in a properly enacted law, and a law can be properly enacted only during session.
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A. History shows that the framers and ratifiers of our Constitution have conferred upon the General Assembly increasing control and flexibility over legislative sessions.
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B. The General Assembly has unique constitutional authority over the length and frequency of its sessions, but because it must exercise that authority “by law,” it can be done only when in session.
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1. By authorizing the Legislative Council to set an emergency session through a simple resolution, HEA1123 does not comply with Article 4, Section 9’s fixed-by-law requirement.
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2. By authorizing the Legislative Council to set an emergency session at a time when the General Assembly is not in session, HEA-1123 infringes on constitutional authority vested only in the Governor.
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II. The Governor may pursue this action for declaratory and injunctive relief.
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A. The Governor is a “person” with standing to seek a declaratory judgment, and his claims are ripe to decide.
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1. The Governor is a “person” under the DJA.
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2. The Governor has standing.
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3. The question of HEA-1123’s constitutionality is ripe.
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B. The Governor can hire outside counsel without consent from the Attorney General.
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C. Neither the legislative-immunity doctrine nor the political-question doctrine bars us from deciding the constitutionality of HEA-1123.
The Legislative Parties finally assert that two defenses unique to the Legislature protect them from the Governor’s suit: the legislative-immunity doctrine and the political-question doctrine. Since we find neither doctrine applicable to a constitutional challenge like the one before us, we also reject these final procedural defenses.
1. The legislative-immunity doctrine protects legislators from challenges to their personal conduct, not from constitutional challenges to bills they pass.
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2. The political-question doctrine does not apply since setting legislative sessions is not solely a legislative-branch function.
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Conclusion
The Governor is not procedurally barred from seeking declaratory relief on the constitutionality of HEA-1123, and we hold that the law is unconstitutional. By allowing the Legislative Council to set an emergency session by simple resolution, HEA-1123 violates Article 4, Section 9’s fixed-by-law requirement. And, by permitting the Legislative Council to set an emergency session at a time when the General Assembly is not in session, HEA-1123 infringes on constitutional authority vested only in the Governor and thus violates Article 3, Section 1. Simply put, absent a constitutional amendment under Article 16, the General Assembly cannot do what HEA-1123 permits. This does not, however, mean the Legislature lacks the constitutional authority to set additional sessions. While our Constitution authorizes only the Governor to call a special session, the General Assembly can set additional sessions—but only by fixing their length and frequency in a law passed during a legislative session and presented to the Governor. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. [Footnote omitted.]
David, Massa, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur.