Weissmann, J.
Paul Carmouche appeals his conviction for Class A misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury, arguing that his jury trial waiver was invalid and the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. We agree with Carmouche on both issues and reverse his conviction. Because the State failed to prove that he committed the battery as alleged by the State, Carmouche is discharged.
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The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution guarantee all criminal defendants the right to a jury trial. Dadouch v. State, 126 N.E.3d 802, 804 (Ind. 2019). This right is automatic for people charged with felonies. Id. But people charged with misdemeanors waive the right unless they affirmatively assert it. Id.; Ind. Crim. Rule 22. Waiver “must be made in a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary manner, with sufficient awareness of the surrounding circumstances and the consequences.” Dadouch, 126 N.E.3d at 804. For waiver to be knowing, a defendant must be advised of their rights either on the record or in writing. See Duncan v. State, 975 N.E.2d 838, 844 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (finding defendant’s waiver was invalid “because he was not adequately informed of his rights and obligations as set out in Criminal Rule 22”).
Carmouche argues that he was never advised of his rights, invalidating his waiver. The State conceded the point, and we agree. The record contains no evidence that Carmouche was ever informed that his jury trial right was not automatic, let alone how to assert it. And the recurring references to a jury trial were likely misleading in this regard. Accordingly, we reverse Carmouche’s conviction. See Dadouch, 126 N.E.3d at 805.
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The State alleged that Carmouche knowingly touched Brown “in a rude, insolent, or angry manner by kicking a door at and against” her, “striking her in the knee, resulting in bodily injury, that is: physical pain.” App. Vol. II, p. 21. Carmouche argues the video footage clearly shows that the door did not touch Brown’s knee, indisputably contradicting the State’s case. The State urges us to defer to the trial court, arguing both that the video footage is partially obstructed, meaning that we cannot see if the door hit Brown’s knee, and that the video footage corroborates Brown’s testimony. We agree with Carmouche.
Although full view of Brown’s body is partially obstructed in the video, view of the door is not. The video footage reveals that the door never contacted Brown’s right knee, though it did hit her left foot. Figures 1 and 2, supra, show the only contact the door made with Brown’s body. Though the door hits her foot, there is always daylight between the door and Brown’s knee. Other relevant factors support our conclusion that the video indisputably contradicts the trial court’s findings: the video may be grainy, but it is well-lit, the angle affords a good view of the altercation, and the entire incident is recorded. See Love, 73 N.E.3d at 699. The State did not offer evidence to explain how the contact with Brown’s left foot would cause her right knee to ache. The evidence is therefore insufficient to show that Carmouche’s kick to the door caused Brown bodily injury. See id.
In light of this finding, Carmouche cannot be retried for Class A misdemeanor battery. See Vest v. State, 621 N.E.2d 1094, 1096-97 (Ind. 1993) (citing Burks v. State, 437 U.S. 1 (1978)) (“The Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution bars retrial in cases of reversal for insufficient evidence.”). The trial court is reversed, and Carmouche is discharged.
Robb, J., and Pyle, J., concur.