Rush, C.J.
Although no trial is ever perfect, it is axiomatic that defendants are entitled to a fair trial. Here, Ramirez’s proceeding fell short of that mark. An impermissible local rule and an improperly issued protective order prevented his defense attorney—despite multiple attempts—from obtaining a copy of the alleged victim’s interview. And when the State disclosed extensive new evidence the day before trial, the defense repeatedly requested a continuance—even as little as one day—to investigate the new allegations and reconstruct trial strategy. But those requests were denied without the balancing of interests our precedent requires. On this record, the errors relating to counsel’s inability to receive a copy of the interview do not require reversal, but the denial of a continuance does. We therefore reverse and remand for a new trial.
…
Ramirez claims he was denied a fair proceeding because of his attorney’s inability to obtain a copy of A.P.’s forensic interview during discovery and his unsuccessful request for a continuance. As for not receiving a copy of the interview, Ramirez maintains that the Local Rule, on which the trial court relied in denying his motions to compel, is void because it conflicts with the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure. And he also asserts that the court erred in granting the State’s motion for a protective order for the video because the State did not establish that the order was necessary. As for the trial court’s denial of his continuance request, Ramirez maintains that he suffered prejudice because the court did not properly weigh and evaluate his need for additional time to defend against the new accusations.
We hold that Ramirez was denied a fair proceeding. The Local Rule is void because it imposes requirements not found in our trial rules for obtaining otherwise discoverable evidence. And the record is devoid of any specific reason to support the court’s issuance of a protective order for the video. Although we ultimately find that neither basis requires reversal, we conclude that the trial court’s denial of Ramirez’s motion for continuance does. The court abused its discretion because there is no evidence it engaged in the appropriate balancing of interests when it denied the request, and Ramirez made specific showings as to why additional time was necessary and how it would have benefitted the defense. We therefore reverse Ramirez’s conviction and remand for a new trial.
…
Our trial courts are authorized to establish local rules for their own governance. Ind. Trial Rule 81(A); Ind. Code § 34-8-1-4. These rules are generally procedural in nature and “are intended to standardize the practice within that court, to facilitate the effective flow of information, and to enable the court to rule on the merits of the case.” Meredith v. State, 679 N.E.2d 1309, 1310 (Ind. 1997). Importantly, local rules must supplement, not conflict with, the Indiana Trial Rules. T.R. 81(A); S.T. v. State, 764 N.E.2d 632, 635 (Ind. 2002). When there is a conflict, the local rule is “without force and effect.” Spudich v. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 745 N.E.2d 281, 286 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied.
One way a conflict arises is if a local rule attaches a condition to a trial rule. For example, in Lies v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., we considered a challenge to a local rule that required counsel to remind a judge to decide a certain motion five days before the applicable trial rule’s deadline. 259 Ind. 192, 286 N.E.2d 170, 172–73 (1972). While we acknowledged that “[c]ourtesy and discretion may dictate that counsel remind the judge that the time is about to expire,” we emphasized that our trial rules contained no such requirement. Id. at 173. We therefore struck down the local rule because it created “an impingement” on the relevant trial rule by purporting “to attach a condition to its application.” Id.; see also In re Marriage of Murray, 460 N.E.2d 1023, 1027 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (striking down a local rule that attached a condition on Rule 12(B) motions).
Here, just as in Lies, the Local Rule impinges on the Indiana Trial Rules by attaching conditions to their application. The Local Rule provides in relevant part: The State shall provide legible copies of existing written statements . . . . Other items shall be provided for examination, testing, copying, photographing, or other proper use either by agreement or at specified reasonable times and places. Defense counsel shall provide reasonable notice of such examination and shall schedule these examinations in cooperation with the State. An application to the court shall be made to obtain copies of audio or videotape. Said application shall state in specific terms the necessity for such copies. Allen LR02-TR26-1(B)(1) (emphasis added). So, under this rule, to obtain a copy of relevant, nonprivileged video evidence in the prosecutor’s possession, defense counsel must submit an application to the trial court and state a specific need for the copy.
The Local Rule impermissibly attaches conditions to our trial rules in three ways. First, under our trial rules—which are meant to allow liberal discovery, Beville, 71 N.E.3d at 18—determining whether nonprivileged evidence is discoverable is a question of relevance, T.R. 26(B)(1), not relevance plus necessity. Second, our trial rules—which are also intended to allow for minimal trial court involvement, Whitaker, 960 N.E.2d at 115—do not require any party to apply to the court to receive a copy of otherwise discoverable evidence. Rather, as Trial Rule 34 provides, “Any party may serve on any other party a request . . . to inspect and copy” relevant, nonprivileged evidence. T.R. 34(A). And finally, our trial rules do not require the requesting party to state a specific need for copies. Instead, the requesting party need only describe the item “with reasonable particularity” and “specify a reasonable time, place, and manner” for copying the item. T.R. 34(B). By attaching these conditions, the Local Rule impermissibly conflicts.
Yet, the State maintains there is no conflict because both the Local Rule and the Indiana Trial Rules “require a party to request a copy of discovery” and “the trial court makes the final decision whether providing a copy is appropriate.” To be sure, these similarities exist. Compare Allen LR02-TR261, with T.R. 26(B)(1), 26(C), 34(B). But the relevant question isn’t who makes the request or whether the trial court is authorized to limit discovery. Instead, the question is whether a local rule can attach conditions not required by our trial rules on a defendant’s ability to obtain a copy of otherwise discoverable evidence. It cannot, and thus, the Local Rule is without force and effect. So, as a matter of law, this rule cannot support the trial court’s denials of Ramirez’s motions to compel. But whether the court erred when it prohibited Ramirez from obtaining a copy of the video by issuing a protective order is a separate inquiry.
…
All in all, we conclude that the trial court’s pretrial decisions prohibiting Ramirez from obtaining a copy of the recording were erroneous. Yet, reversal for these errors is required only if refusal to take such action is “inconsistent with substantial justice.” T.R. 61. Though Ramirez never received a copy, he had over seven months to view the video at the prosecutor’s office—and did so. On this record, we cannot say Ramirez’s inability to receive a physical copy is “inconsistent with substantial justice.” See id. Reversal is therefore not required on this basis. Ramirez, however, asserts a second basis for reversal: the trial court’s denial of his motion for continuance.
Ramirez claims the trial court committed reversible error by denying his motion to continue, which he filed to have more time to investigate new allegations disclosed the day before trial.
…
In Vaughn, the defendant moved for a continuance on the morning of trial so that his sister, who was in labor at the time, could testify in person. 590 N.E.2d at 135. She was his only witness and had testified on his behalf in the first trial, which resulted in a mistrial. Id. The trial court denied the motion but played audio of the sister’s testimony from the first trial. Id. The jury found the defendant guilty as charged. Id. We reversed for three reasons. First, the defendant’s reasons for a continuance “clearly predominate[d] over” the State’s reasons in opposition. Id. at 136. Second, moving the trial would not have burdened the court: at the time of the request, “prospective jurors had not yet been questioned,” and the sister’s absence was unlikely to “result in an unduly lengthy or indefinite delay.” Id. And third, it was of “crucial importance” to the defense that the sister be able to testify in person. Id.
We made similar observations in reaching the same conclusion in Flowers, 654 N.E.2d at 1124. There, the defendant’s DNA expert unexpectedly withdrew from the case during trial, and the court denied a request for a one-day continuance “to find a replacement.” Id. at 1125. The trial proceeded, and the jury found the defendant guilty. Id. We reversed, finding “nothing in the record indicating that the appropriate balancing was done.” Id. Further, there was no evidence a short delay would burden the State, and it was “obvious” that a continuance would satisfy “important interests of the defense.” Id.
We acknowledge that Ramirez did not move for a continuance due to the absence of a particular witness as in Vaughn and Flowers, but our reasoning in those decisions compels the same result here. Nothing in the record indicates that the trial court engaged in the requisite balancing of interests. And because Ramirez made specific showings on why he needed additional time and how it would have benefitted his defense, he has established prejudice.
…
Simply put, just as in Vaughn and Flowers, there is no evidence that the trial court made any effort to evaluate and compare the parties’ competing interests when it denied Ramirez’s request for a continuance. So, we next consider whether Ramirez has established prejudice from the denial.
…
Ramirez offered compelling reasons showing why he needed additional time, and he also demonstrated how that time would have benefited the defense. Specifically, because of the new allegations, the theory of defense was significantly impaired, and counsel needed time to depose Angelica and A.P., interview the newly identified witnesses, and conduct further investigation.
A.P.’s and Angelica’s statements materially changed the theory of defense—that Ramirez accidently touched A.P. Previously, A.P. disclosed that Ramirez inappropriately touched her “over the clothing” with “one hand.” It is well settled that mere touching alone is insufficient to constitute child molesting. See, e.g., Bowles v. State, 737 N.E.2d 1150, 1152 (Ind. 2000). The State must also “prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the act of touching was accompanied by the specific intent to arouse or satisfy sexual desires,” which can be inferred from the defendant’s conduct. Id. Aside from A.P.’s initial disclosure, the only evidence from which to infer Ramirez’s intent was Angelica’s and A.P.’s statements that Ramirez had told A.P. not to tell Angelica, that he had admitted to Angelica he had touched A.P., and that he had apologized after the conduct was reported to police. Ramirez, however, claimed he accidently touched A.P. when he was “halfway asleep,” and he apologized because A.P. “had the wrong idea of something.” So, Ramirez’s planned defense was that the State could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that any touching was accompanied by the requisite sexual intent.
…
Further, because the new accusations included statements to previously unidentified individuals, Ramirez’s attorney understandably wanted to interview these people. Angelica revealed that, after A.P.’s disclosure, she had “sought counsel from her pastor and church leaders,” and that Ramirez had “told the pastor” he had touched A.P. It is reasonable that counsel—to prepare an effective defense—would want to speak with those people. A.P. and Angelica also recited statements allegedly from Ramirez, to which the State asserts that “additional time . . . to investigate his own statements . . . was unnecessary.” But this assertion assumes the statements’ veracity, which Ramirez has denied. So, it is also reasonable that counsel would want to investigate and locate potential evidence or witnesses to corroborate or refute the statements. Ramirez’s attorney also explained that he needed time to both reexamine the forensic interview and potentially discuss plea negotiations. Simply put, it is unrealistic to expect the defense, within a few hours, to investigate the new allegations, evaluate the evidence, adapt trial strategy, and complete final preparations. Cf. Williams, 576 F.3d at 389 (observing that to expect the defense, within four days, to meaningfully investigate new evidence “misunderstands both the reality of trial and defense attorneys’ resources”).
In sum, Ramirez’s counsel offered specific, compelling reasons why he needed additional time to provide an effective defense, and he indicated how that time would have benefitted the defense. And so, just as in Vaughn and Flowers, Ramirez has established prejudice from the court’s denial of his motion for continuance.
Though the trial court ultimately erred in its pretrial decisions that prohibited Ramirez from receiving a copy of A.P.’s forensic interview, those errors do not require reversal. However, because the court abused its discretion when it denied Ramirez’s continuance request, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
David, Massa, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur.