Mathias, J.
Maria L. Cole (“Mother”) appeals the trial court’s determination that her minor children, J.M.C. and L.R.C. (“the Children”), have their “habitual residency” in the Federal Republic of Germany under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (“the Hague Convention”), implemented in the United States by the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 9001-9011 (“ICARA”). [Footnote omitted.] We hold that the trial court erred when it determined that the Children have their habitual residency in Germany and not in the United States. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment.
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Under the Hague Convention, “a child wrongfully removed from her country of ‘habitual residence’ ordinarily must be returned to that country.” Monasky v. Taglieri, 140 S. Ct. 719, 723 (2020). The Hague Convention, as implemented in the United States through ICARA, seeks to address “the problem of international child abductions during domestic disputes,” and it operates on the “core premise that the interests of children in matters relating to their custody are best served when custody decisions are made in the child’s country of habitual residence.” Id. (cleaned up).
The Supreme Court of the United States recently clarified the standard to be used in determining a child’s place of habitual residence:
The Hague Convention does not define the term “habitual residence.” A child “resides” where she lives. See Black’s Law Dictionary 1176 (5th ed. 1979). Her residence in a particular country can be deemed “habitual,” however, only when her residence there is more than transitory. “Habitual” implies “[c]ustomary, usual, of the nature of a habit.” Id., at 640. The Hague Convention’s text alone does not definitively tell us what makes a child’s residence sufficiently enduring to be deemed “habitual.” It surely does not say that habitual residence depends on an actual agreement between a child’s parents. But the term “habitual” does suggest a fact-sensitive inquiry, not a categorical one.
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Because locating a child’s home is a fact-driven inquiry, courts must be “sensitive to the unique circumstances of the case and informed by common sense.” Redmond[ v. Redmond], 724 F.3d [729,] 744[ (7th Cir. 2013)]. For older children capable of acclimating to their surroundings, courts have long recognized, facts indicating acclimatization will be highly relevant. Because children, especially those too young or otherwise unable to acclimate, depend on their parents as caregivers, the intentions and circumstances of caregiving parents are relevant considerations. No single fact, however, is dispositive across all cases. Common sense suggests that some cases will be straightforward: Where a child has lived in one place with her family indefinitely, that place is likely to be her habitual residence. But suppose, for instance, that an infant lived in a country only because a caregiving parent had been coerced into remaining there. Those circumstances should figure in the calculus. See Karkkainen[ v. Kovalchuk], 445 F.3d [280,] 291[ (3d Cir. 2006)] (“The inquiry into a child’s habitual residence is a fact-intensive determination that cannot be reduced to a predetermined formula and necessarily varies with the circumstances of each case.”).
Id. at 726-27 (emphases added; footnote omitted). The Court added:
Facts courts have considered [in determining a child’s habitual residence] include: “a change in geography combined with the passage of an appreciable period of time,” “age of the child,” “immigration status of child and parent,” “academic activities,” “social engagements,” “participation in sports programs and excursions,” “meaningful connections with the people and places in the child’s new country,” “language proficiency,” and “location of personal belongings.”
Id. at 727 n.3 (quoting Federal Judicial Center, J. Garbolino, The 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction: A Guide for Judges 67-68 (2d ed. 2015)). The Court further noted the likely importance of “facts indicating that the parents have made their home in a particular place.” Id. at 729.
We conclude that the parties’ evidentiary submissions demonstrate that, by the time of Father’s July 15, 2021, petition under the Hague Convention and ICARA, the Children’s place of habitual residence was South Bend. The Children moved to South Bend in December 2020 by agreement of both Mother and Father. While Mother and Father may have not seen eye-to-eye with respect to the circumstances under which the family might return to Germany, the facts are clear that Mother and Father both saw the family’s move to the United States as indefinite and at least possibly permanent. After discussing the possibility of moving permanently to the United States with Mother in 2019, Father engaged in a more-than-one-year-long process of obtaining a Permanent Resident Card to live in the United States with his citizen-wife and Children. Within about one week of obtaining his Permanent Resident Card, Father terminated the lease to the family’s apartment in Germany; he agreed to liquidate a substantial portion of the family’s assets; he agreed to ship, at significant cost, the vast majority of the family’s remaining personal property from Germany to the United States; and he agreed to deposit the entirety of the family’s financial assets into an account in South Bend. And, shortly after arriving in the United States, Father purchased a vehicle for more than $43,000 in cash and spent more than $3,000 on a new bed frame and mattress. These are not actions one typically takes when he sees his or his family’s residence in a location as transitory.
Likewise, while Father might have believed the family would return to Germany upon the sudden wish of either parent despite the substantial investments the family had made in moving to the United States, Mother and Father had no definite plan to ever return the family to Germany when they left for the United States. While they may have kept an apartment in Germany and German benefits, they actively held themselves out as residents of South Bend. Father admitted that his return to Germany in February 2021 had been planned well before the family left Germany in December 2020. He admitted that, while in Germany in February and March 2021, he and Mother continued to discuss whether to move the family back to Germany. He admitted that he returned to the United States in April 2021, obtained an apartment, and resumed his attempts to obtain a Social Security card and employment in the United States. These circumstances reflect that the parties intended to make the United States their home when they moved in December 2020, and only afterward did Father change his mind about it.
Additional undisputed facts support the conclusion that the Children’s place of habitual residence is South Bend. The Children lived in South Bend, with their Mother and their maternal grandmother, for more than seven months before Father filed his petition under the Hague Convention and ICARA. Mother is now employed in South Bend, teaching third grade. J.M.C. is currently four years old and goes to preschool where Mother teaches. L.R.C. is currently three years old and goes to daycare near Mother’s school. And most of the family’s personal belongings are in South Bend with Mother and the Children.
n its order, the trial court minimized the intent of the parties in moving to the United States in December 2020 and unduly emphasized Father’s wishes in January and February 2021. The trial court failed to consider Father’s undisputed evidence that his return to Germany at that time had been long-planned; that Father returned to the United States in April 2021 and resumed his attempts to obtain a Social Security card and employment; and that the Children had been in the United States, as intended by both parties, for more than seven months at the time of Father’s filing and with no definite end-date in mind by the parties when they moved the Children here.
Accordingly, we conclude that Mother has demonstrated prima facie error in the trial court’s judgment. We hold that the parties’ evidentiary submissions establish that the Children’s place of habitual residence is South Bend, Indiana, and not Germany. We therefore reverse the trial court’s judgment.
Reversed.
Brown, J., and Molter, J., concur.