Mathias, J.
In recent years, our General Assembly has amended our criminal code to permit Hoosiers to possess certain cannabis-based products so long as the percent concentration of THC in those products is below a certain threshold. Here, the State’s only evidence that Lisa Rose Fedij possessed a substance with a THC content above that threshold, rather than a legal substance, was what appears to be manufacturers’ declarations of the THC content on the outside of the packaging that the substances found in her possession apparently came in. Fedij objected to the admission of that packaging on hearsay grounds, but the trial court admitted the packaging into evidence, and she was found guilty of Class A misdemeanor possession of marijuana and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia.
Fedij now appeals and raises the following two issues for our review: I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted the packaging into evidence under the market reports exception to hearsay. II. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support Fedij’s convictions.
We hold that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted the packaging into evidence under the market reports exception to hearsay because nothing about the statements and symbols on the packaging demonstrates the substantial trustworthiness of the products’ claims. We also hold, based on the remaining, admissible evidence, that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Fedij in fact possessed marijuana and not a legal substance. We therefore reverse her conviction for Class A misdemeanor possession of marijuana. However, sufficient evidence shows that Fedij committed Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia, and we affirm that conviction.
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Fedij first argues on appeal that the trial court erred when it admitted the Hard Drops package and the Exotic Carts package to prove the truth of the matters asserted on them, namely, that those products contained levels of THC that made them illegal in Indiana.
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There is no dispute in this appeal that the writings and symbols on the Hard Drops package and the Exotic Carts package were hearsay. Our Evidence Rules define hearsay as “a statement that: (1) is not made by the declarant while testifying at the trial . . . ; and (2) is offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Ind. Evidence Rule 801(c). The general rule is that “[h]earsay is not admissible unless these rules or other law provides otherwise.” Evid. R. 802.
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The State asserts that the hearsay was admissible under Evidence Rule 803(17), the “market reports exception” to the rule against hearsay. That Rule provides that the following statements are admissible hearsay: “Market quotations, lists, directories, or other compilations that are generally relied on by the public or by persons in particular occupations.” Evid. R. 803(17).
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Essential to the State’s application of the market reports exception is our Supreme Court’s analysis of that exception in Reemer. In that case, the defendant purchased multiple boxes of over-the-counter cold medicines containing a salt of pseudoephedrine. The State charged him with Class D felony possession of a precursor in the manufacture of methamphetamine, which required the State to show that the defendant possessed more than ten grams of ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, or a salt of one of those compounds. To prove the identity of the compound in the defendant’s possession, the State offered into evidence the labels from the over-the-counter medicine boxes. Those labels demonstrated that the cold medicines contained a salt of pseudoephedrine. The defendant objected to the admission of the labels as hearsay, but the trial court admitted the labels into evidence under the market reports exception.
Our Supreme Court affirmed [in Reemer] the trial court’s admission of the labels under Rule 803(17). In doing so, the court reasoned: The “market reports” description of admissible items as “market quotations, tabulations, lists, directories, or other published compilations” suggests that the exception exists only for “compilations.” It has however been held to support admission of other published materials where they are generally relied upon either by the public or by people in a particular occupation.
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In a footnote, the court added: At trial, the state claimed that its reason for not offering a lab report which documented the weight and chemical contents of the tablets was because its laboratory had established a policy against running tests on tablets such as the ones found in [the defendant’s] possession. The reason for this policy is not stated. We assume it is because labels adequately describe the chemical makeup of commercially marketed products and laboratory resources are scarce.
Following Reemer, we were asked to determine whether the market reports exception applied to the admission of a product label on a can of starter fluid, which warned consumers that the product contained dangerous ingredients. Forler v. State, 846 N.E.2d 266 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). Some of those ingredients were relevant to the manufacture of methamphetamine, with which the State had charged the defendant. We held that our Supreme Court’s analysis in Reemer demonstrated that the label warning of dangerous ingredients was also admissible.
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We conclude that the trial court erred when it relied on Reemer and Forler to admit the writing and symbols on the Hard Drops and Exotic Carts packages under the market reports exception. First, and most obviously, the writing and symbols on the Hard Drops package and the Exotic Carts package are in stark contrast to the federally regulated drug labels on pharmaceuticals, which were at issue in Reemer. Unlike the labels on pharmaceuticals, nothing in the writing or symbols of the Hard Drops and Exotic Carts packages provides a detailed analysis of the products’ chemical compositions, their directions for use, or specific warnings from their misuse.
Indeed, there is no Indiana or federally regulated labeling on these products at all for a conspicuous reason: they are wholly illegal in both jurisdictions. Thus, unlike in Reemer, the general public cannot “routinely rely on regulated manufacturing practices and mandatory labeling to assure” that these products “are as they are represented to be.” 835 N.E.2d at 1009. And, unlike “the contemporary nature of pharmaceutical practice,” we cannot say that the manufacturing of these federally outlawed products “exemplifies the inherent trustworthiness” of the products’ own descriptions. Id. (quoting Heuser, 661 N.W.2d at 164).
That said, we agree with Forler that the reasoning in Reemer is not limited to pharmaceutical labels. See id. at 268-69. Part of our Supreme Court’s reasoning in Reemer looked to whether the packaging at issue is “generally relied upon either by the public or by people in a particular occupation.” 835 N.E.2d at 1008. That is not the case here. These are not products that, in Indiana at least, one can buy on a supermarket shelf. See id. at 1009 n.7 (approving of foreign precedent that applied the market reports exception where “the consumer public daily accepts as true and relies upon the assertions in labels and brands appearing on packages displayed at the supermarket”) (quoting State v. Rines, 269 A.2d 9, 14 (Me. 1970)).
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In sum, the trial court erred when it relied on Reemer and Forler to conclude that the Hard Drops and Exotic Carts packages were admissible under the market reports exception to hearsay. There is no basis in this record to conclude under that exception that the packages contained sufficient indicia of reliability for the trustworthiness of their representations. Thus, the writing and symbols on the packages contained inadmissible hearsay, and they should have been excluded.
Having concluded that the trial court erred in admitting the writing and symbols from the Hard Drops and Exotic Carts packages, we also conclude that the erroneous admission of that evidence was not harmless… Both products are conspicuously cannabis-based products. The Hard Drops package included a picture of a marijuana leaf and the writing “THC INFUSED” on it. Ex. Vol. 4 p. 8. The Exotic Carts package stated that its product was “100 percent dank” and contained “THC 80 to 85 percent.” Tr. Vol. 3 p. 12. Indeed, the writing on the Exotic Carts package was the State’s only evidence of a purported percent concentration of THC in any of the seized materials, and the witnesses were clear throughout the trial that the percent concentration of THC is essential to determining whether a substance is legal hemp or illegal marijuana. Further, the analysis of the plant material was unable to differentiate it between hemp and marijuana. We therefore cannot say that the erroneous admission of the writing and symbols on the two packages was harmless error.
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We thus turn to the sufficiency of the State’s remaining evidence in support of Fedij’s convictions.
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Fedij correctly asserts on appeal that the State presented no admissible evidence that any of the seized substances had a percent concentration of THC that was more than 0.3%. The forensic analysis of the yellow candy and brown liquid did not determine a percent concentration of THC for either substance.
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Thus, the substantial, uncontradicted evidence was that the only way to determine if any of the seized substances was a legal substance or an illegal one was to test the percent concentration of THC in the substance, which the State did not do. Accordingly, the State had no evidentiary basis from which a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that the seized substances were in fact marijuana and not hemp. Instead, the State has premised Fedij’s Class A misdemeanor conviction for possession of marijuana on nothing more than conjecture, which is not permissible. See Vasquez, 741 N.E.2d at 1216.
We briefly address two additional assertions made by the State in its brief on this issue. First, the State asserts that it “was not required to present an exact THC amount for each item.” Appellee’s Br. at 18. We agree with this proposition in its literal terms: the State did not need to prove the exact percent concentration of THC, but the State did need to prove the substance possessed was marijuana.
And that brings us to a final point. The State also asserts that “[i]t is not, and never has been, the State’s burden to prove what the substance was not,” i.e., hemp, because “that was Fedij’s obligation.” Id. at 21. The State grossly misunderstands Fedij’s position. She has never asserted that the evidence shows that the substances were in fact hemp; her defense has been that the State has not shown that the substances were in fact marijuana. The statute proscribes possession of a specific substance, and if the State seeks to obtain a conviction under that statute, it is entirely the State’s burden to prove that the proscribed substance was in fact in the defendant’s possession. Leaving the fact-finder to simply guess whether a substance is legal or illegal from equivocal evidence is not a sufficient basis to sustain a criminal conviction. Thus, we hold that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to show that Fedij possessed marijuana. We reverse her Class A misdemeanor conviction for possession of marijuana accordingly.
Finally, Fedij asserts that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support her conviction for Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia.
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We think it is beyond dispute that the bong, smoking pipe, and smoking bowl met that burden. Accordingly, we affirm Fedij’s conviction for Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia.
For all of these reasons, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted the writing and symbols from the Hard Drops and Exotic Carts packages into evidence under the market reports exception to hearsay, Evidence Rule 803(17). We further hold that the State failed to present sufficient admissible evidence to support Fedij’s conviction for Class A misdemeanor possession of marijuana. However, we affirm Fedij’s conviction for Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. Thus, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions for the trial court to vacate Fedij’s conviction and sentence for the Class A misdemeanor conviction.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions. Bailey, J., and Altice, J., concur.