Rush, C.J.
“Probation officers shall serve at the pleasure of the appointing court and are directly responsible to and subject to the orders of the court.” Ind. Code § 11-13-1-1(c). This legislative determination reflects trial courts’ inextricable link with probation officers. And because trial courts are units of the judicial branch of our state’s constitutional system and thus state entities, that link is also with the State. See Ind. Const. art. 3, § 1; id. art. 7, § 1.
Recognizing the connection between trial courts and probation officers, our General Assembly granted the judiciary primary authority over probation officers’ employment. See I.C. §§ 11-13-1-1, -3, -8, -9. And our precedent has consistently recognized that these officials are court employees. But counties are responsible for paying probation officers’ salaries and certain expenses. Id. § -1(c). This dual system of responsibility raises a question of first impression: for determining which entity is responsible for defending and indemnifying probation officers in a lawsuit, are these officials state or county employees?
Based on a close reading of the relevant statutes and caselaw, we hold that probation officers are state employees for purposes of Indiana Code section 4-6-2-1.5 which requires the Attorney General to defend state employees. And because the legislature has not required a different entity to pay for their legal representation, we conclude that this statute applies to probation officers.
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We agree with Lake County. Based on a review of relevant statutes and caselaw, we first hold that probation officers are state employees for purposes of Indiana Code section 4-6-2-1.5. We then hold, based on a plain reading of subsection 11-13-1-1(c), that “legal expenses” are not “actual expenses necessarily incurred in the performance” of a probation officer’s duties. Accordingly, the general statute requiring the Attorney General to defend state employees applies to probation officers. We therefore reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the State Appellees.
I. Probation officers are state employees under Indiana Code section 4-6-2-1.5.
Indiana’s judiciary is a branch of our state’s constitutional system. See Ind. Const. art. 3, § 1; id. art. 7, § 1. As units of the judicial branch, trial courts discharge their constitutional obligation to keep courts open for the administration of justice in part with the assistance of more than 1,500 probation officers statewide. See In re Madison Cnty. Prob. Officers’ Salaries, 682 N.E.2d 498, 501 (Ind. 1997) (citing Ind. Const. art. 1, § 12). Indeed, probation officers serve a vital role in our trial courts and are on the frontlines of ensuring public safety. They are the officials appointed to supervise, investigate, and report on the conduct of those assigned to probation. They also conduct prehearing and presentence investigations and help courts make pretrial-release decisions. In short, probation officers have an inseparable relationship with the judiciary—a state entity—which leads to our conclusion that probation officers are state employees. This conclusion is grounded in statutes and caselaw. We address each in turn.
A. A plain reading of the relevant statutes supports that probation officers are state employees.
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B. Indiana courts have previously determined that probation officers are court employees and that probation departments are state entities.
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II. “Actual expenses necessarily incurred” in the performance of probation officers’ duties do not include legal expenses.
Since we’ve determined that probation officers are state employees, the general statute requiring the Attorney General to defend state employees should apply. However, the legislature could override this requirement by enacting a more specific statute that orders a different entity to either defend or pay the legal expenses of probation officers. The State Appellees say the legislature did just that, pointing to Indiana Code subsection 11- 13-1-1(c). That statute, besides requiring counties to pay probation officers’ salaries, further entitles the officers “to their actual expenses necessarily incurred in the performance of their duties.” I.C. § 11-13-1-1(c). The State Appellees argue that this language covers legal expenses “incurred as a result of” the officers being sued “in the performance of their duties.” We disagree. Based on a plain reading of the relevant statutes, legal expenses are fundamentally different from expenses “necessarily incurred” in the everyday performance of a probation officer’s duties as outlined in section 11-13-1-3.
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Conclusion
Based on our statutes and caselaw that establish probation officers’ unique and inextricable link with the judiciary—a state entity—we hold that probation officers are state employees for purposes of the general statute requiring the Attorney General to defend state employees. And since no other statute requires another entity to pay their legal expenses, that statute applies to probation officers. We thus reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the State Appellees and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. {Footnote omitted.}
David, Massa, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur.