Weissmann, J.
The Mayor of Madison revoked Robert Waller’s appointments to both the City of Madison Plan Commission (Plan Commission) and the Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) after a heated exchange at a meeting of the Madison Board of Public Works and Safety (Board of Public Works). Waller believes he was wrongfully removed from those positions, and he wants them back. The trial court denied his request for a preliminary injunction, and he now appeals. We find the trial court applied the wrong meaning of “for cause” in determining whether the mayor properly removed Waller from these two appointed boards. We also find the trial court misapplied the law related to Waller’s free speech claims. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. [Footnote omitted.]
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Indiana Code §§ 36-7-4-218(f) and -906(f) permit removal for more banal acts or omissions by empowering the “appointing authority” to remove members of the Plan Commission and the BZA “for cause.” These procedures allow for broader discretion than the Removal Statute, which requires specific acts of misconduct. The broader discretion reflects the specific relationship between appointees to the Plan Commission and the BZA and their “appointing authority.” As Waller’s “appointing authority,” the Mayor can follow Indiana Code §§ 36-7-4-218(f) and -906(f).
Neither the Removal Statute nor Indiana Code §§ 36-7-4-218(f) and -906(f) claims to be the exclusive means for removal. See Neff, 117 N.E.3d at 1267 (“[O]ur Constitution provides ways to remove an official outside of an election in certain circumstances. One such way is through a judicial proceeding pursuant to the Removal Statute.” (internal citations omitted)). The Mayor did not err by employing Indiana Code §§ 36-7-4-218(f) and -906(f) rather than the Removal Statute. The existence of one form of removal does not offend the existence of another; they are two paths to the same destination.
B. “For Cause” Removal Under Indiana Code §§ 36-7-4- 218(f) and -906(f)
Waller’s case hinges on the meaning of “for cause.” Indiana Code §§ 36-7-4- 218(f) and -906(f), which govern the Plan Commission and the BZA, respectively, state: “The appointing authority may remove a member . . . for cause.” But “for cause” is not defined anywhere in the relevant Title, nor have we had occasion to define the term previously in this context. Waller argues that these provisions prohibit a board or commission member’s removal for anything except a “miscarriage of his obligations as a member.” Appellant’s Br., p. 17
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Despite its common usage, the meaning of “for cause” can be difficult to pin down. See, e.g., 32 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 229 (originally published in 1995) (“[T]here is no generally accepted definition of ‘good cause’ in employment litigation.”)…
Tier Two lies somewhere in between removal at the pleasure of some authority and removal pursuant to specific causes specified by statute. Removal “for cause” cannot be within the removing entity’s complete discretion, like Tier One removal, because removal “at the pleasure” is prescribed by statute. City of Peru v. Util. Serv. Bd. of City of Peru, 507 N.E.2d 988, 992 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (“When certain words are specified in a statute, then, by implication, other words not specified are excluded.”). Moreover, we have consistently treated Tier One “at the pleasure” removal differently from Tier Two “for cause” removal, with “for cause” removal allowing for less latitude in removing an appointee. See, e.g., id. at 990 (citing Morrison v. McMahon, 475 N.E.2d 1174 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985); State ex rel. O’Donnell v. Flickinger, 211 Ind. 361, 7 N.E.2d 192 (Ind. 1937)). On the other hand, “for cause” must allow greater discretion than the Tier Three statutes, which list specific grounds for removal. This is true even for statutes like the economic development commissioner removal statute, which lists “good cause” as one of many grounds for removal. As a rule of statutory construction, the meaning of a general term that follows specific terms is limited by the specific terms. See Loparex, LLC v. MPI Release Techs., LLC, 964 N.E.2d 806, 819 (applying the doctrine of ejusdem generis).
Within Tier Two, we decline to adopt the trial court’s distinction between “for cause” and “good cause” and its conclusion that “for cause” merely requires some reason for removal. App. Vol. II, p. 64. If any reason is acceptable cause, “for cause” removal becomes almost indistinguishable from removal “at the pleasure” of the appointing authority. And because “good cause” and “for cause” can be used interchangeably in the employment context, are not defined by statute, and are used similarly within the relevant Title, we interpret these phrases to mean the same thing here…
2. Construing “For Cause” within this Framework
Few Indiana cases define “for cause” in the appointee removal context, but State ex rel. Manning v. Mayne, 68 Ind. 285, 1879 WL 5667 (Ind. 1879), is instructive… In other words, “cause” must be something related to an appointee’s ability to perform the post in question and not just any reason relied upon by the appointing authority. Manning undermines the trial court’s interpretation of “for cause” as encompassing any reason proffered by the appointing authority.
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Using Manning as our guide, we conclude that an appointee removable “for cause” may be removed only for acts or omissions that diminish the appointee’s ability or fitness to perform the duties of the appointment. Such cause must be sufficient under law and not merely any reason that the removing authority in the exercise of unlimited discretion may deem sufficient. Because this is not the standard applied by the trial court, we reverse and remand for further proceedings to determine whether Waller’s conduct at the Board of Public Works meeting diminished his ability or fitness to perform his duties on the Plan Commission and the BZA. This analysis should include whether the Mayor’s reasons for removal constituted the type of cause that the law recognizes as legitimate grounds for Waller to no longer occupy his board positions.
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Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
Mathias, J., concurs. Tavitas, J., dissents with a separate opinion.
Tavitas, Judge, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion in this interlocutory appeal. The only issue here is whether the trial court properly denied Waller’s motion for a preliminary injunction.
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Moreover, we must keep in mind that we are reviewing only the denial of the motion for preliminary injunction. We are not, at this time, tasked with addressing the merits of Waller’s petition for judicial review, despite Waller’s efforts to have us do just that.
Based upon the record before us, I would affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion for preliminary injunction. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.