Mathias, J.
Michael C. Niccum appeals his sentence following the trial court’s revocation of his probation. Niccum raises a single issue for our review, namely, whether the trial court failed to properly award him accrued time and good time credit for time he spent in jail across three days pending the revocation proceedings. The State concedes that the trial court failed to properly award Niccum his accrued time but asserts that Niccum is not entitled to good time credit because the date of Niccum’s arrest should be excluded from the calculation of good time credit. On this question of first impression, we hold that the calculation of good time credit is a function of the defendant’s accrued time. As Niccum’s accrued time is three days, he is entitled to one day of good time credit. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s omission of Niccum’s credit time from its calculation of his sentence and remand with instructions for the court to award to Niccum three days of accrued time and one day of good time credit.
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The question on appeal thus turns to whether Niccum is entitled to any good time credit, and the parties’ dispute on this issue presents a question of first impression. [Footnote omitted.] The parties agree that any award of good time credit here falls under Indiana Code sections 35-50-6-3.1(c) and -4(b)…
Niccum asserts that, because he has three days of accrued time, those statutes entitle him to one day of good time credit. In response, the State asserts that Indiana Code section 35-50-6-3.1(c) refers to “days,” and that the proper interpretation of “day” excludes the “triggering event,” that is, the day on which Vigo County law enforcement arrested Niccum. Appellee’s Br. at 9–10. Thus, according to the State, February 27 does not count for the good time credit calculation under section 35-50-6-3.1(c).
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We are not persuaded by the State’s argument. Dobeski was not about the calculation of good time credit, and we are not persuaded that our legislature intended the award of good time credit to be determined by our rules of procedure. Rather, the calculation of good time credit is a function of the defendant’s accrued time.
The statutory scheme for determining credit time makes our legislature’s intent clear. Indiana Code section 35-50-6-3.1(c) states that a person assigned to Class B earns one day of good time credit “for every three (3) days the person is imprisoned . . . or confined.” (Emphasis added.) Similarly, Indiana Code section 35-50-6-0.5(4) defines “[g]ood time credit” as “a reduction in a person’s term of imprisonment or confinement awarded for the person’s good behavior while imprisoned or confined.” (Emphasis added.) And, again, the definition of “accrued time” is “the amount of time that a person is imprisoned or confined.” Thus, accrued time is the amount of time a person is imprisoned or confined, and an award of good time credit turns on how many days the person is imprisoned or confined.
The unambiguous language of the statutory scheme for determining credit time makes clear that our legislature intended the calculation of good time credit to be a function of the defendant’s accrued time. The State’s argument to the contrary contravenes the plain language of the statutes and would disharmonize the statutory scheme. See Reinhart, 112 N.E.3d at 711. We therefore reject the State’s argument.
As Niccum has earned three days of accrued time, he is entitled to one day of good time credit under Indiana Code section 35-50-6-3.1(c). We reverse the trial court’s imposition of the entirety of Niccum’s previously suspended sentence and remand with instructions that the court award Niccum three days of accrued time and one day of good time credit against his sentence.
Reversed and remanded with instructions.
Bailey, J., and Altice, J., concur.