Slaughter, J.
Clarence Lowe, an employee of the Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District, claims he was injured at work. We must decide whether the District, which operates a government-owned railroad, is a “state agency” or “political subdivision” under the Indiana Tort Claims Act. If the District is a state agency, the Act requires that pre-suit notice be served within 270 days of the injury; if it is a political subdivision, pre-suit notice must be served within 180 days. We hold that the District is a political subdivision under the Act. Thus, it was entitled to notice within 180 days of Lowe’s alleged injury. Because Lowe did not provide notice until 263 days after his injury, his notice was untimely, and his suit is time-barred.
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As a threshold matter, we ask first whether the Act applies to FELA suits against state entities and hold that it does. Lowe argues that the Act cannot apply to a FELA lawsuit because a state statute cannot abrogate a right to file an action granted by a federal statute. But he cites no case from any jurisdiction holding that a state’s tort-claims act does not apply to a FELA action. To the contrary, we note at the outset that Congress enacted FELA under its Article I powers. See, e.g., Parden v. Terminal Railway of the Alabama State Docks Dep’t, 377 U.S. 184, 190–92 (1964), overruled on other grounds by College Savs. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 680 (1999). Congress does not have the power under Article I to subject nonconsenting states to private suits for damages in state courts. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999). To determine whether Indiana has consented to suit under FELA, and under what circumstances, we would turn to the Act. Esserman v. Indiana Dep’t of Env’t Mgmt., 84 N.E.3d 1185, 1190 (Ind. 2017). Thus, the mere fact that FELA is a federal statute does not automatically exclude from consideration the procedural constraints of our state’s Tort Claims Act. We note further that Lowe has not argued that FELA preempts the Act; nor have we discerned from FELA’s text that Congress intended to occupy the field of negligence claims against railway employers. Thus, we see no reason not to apply here the general rule allowing states to “apply their own neutral procedural rules to federal claims, unless those rules are preempted by federal law”. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 372 (1990); accord Mondou v. New York, New Haven, & Hartford Railroad Co., 223 U.S. 1, 2, 59 (1912) (requiring states to adjudicate issues under FELA assuming “their jurisdiction, as prescribed by local laws, is adequate to the occasion”).
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Next, we ask whether the District is a state agency or political subdivision under the Act. We hold that the legislature defines the District as a political subdivision for purposes of the Act, and thus Lowe was subject to its 180-day notice requirement. We then address Lowe’s arguments that even if the Act applies to FELA claims against state entities in general, we should not apply the Act’s 180-day notice requirement here. Finding Lowe’s arguments unavailing, we affirm the trial court’s order granting summary judgment to the District.
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Despite the Act’s plain terms and Lowe’s concession that the District is a political subdivision under the Act, Lowe argues that he is not subject to the 180-day requirement. First, he argues that he substantially complied with the Act by filing within 270 days. Second, he argues that he is entitled to relief under the Eleventh Amendment for alternative reasons: either Indiana consented to suit under FELA or the District cannot enjoy sovereign immunity as an arm of the state under the Eleventh Amendment while simultaneously being a political subdivision under the Act. Because we find Lowe’s arguments unavailing, he is not entitled to relief.
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Under the Act, the District is a political subdivision, and any claim against it is barred unless a claimant provides notice within 180 days of the injury. Lowe’s arguments neither legally nor factually excuse his failing to provide timely notice. Thus, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for the District and against Lowe.
Rush, C.J., and David, Massa, and Goff, JJ., concur.