Slaughter, J.
A commercial truck driver sustained injuries when his cargo fell on him. The issue is whether liability for his injuries belongs to the carrier or the shipper. We adopt the Fourth Circuit’s “Savage rule”, which holds that carriers have the primary duty for loading and securing cargo. If the shipper assumes a legal duty of safe loading, it becomes liable for injuries resulting from any latent defect. But if a shipper’s negligence is apparent, then the carrier remains liable for the injuries. Applying the Savage rule, we hold that the trial court was correct in granting summary judgment for the shipper and its agent and against the driver.
….
On the merits, we start with a question of first impression for our state courts: whether to adopt the longstanding federal common-law rule from United States v. Savage Truck Line, Inc., 209 F.2d 442, 445 (4th Cir. 1953). Savage sets out the following two-part framework: first, under federal statutes and common law, the “primary duty” for safely loading cargo rests with the carrier; and, second, as a matter of federal common law, the shipper is liable if it takes responsibility for loading cargo, ibid., but only if the defect is “latent” or “concealed”, ibid. In other words, the liability for safe loading shifts to the shipper only if (1) the shipper takes responsibility for loading the cargo, and (2) the defect is latent or concealed. Ibid. Otherwise, liability remains with the carrier.
….
In addition, we hold that the Savage rule is consistent with Indiana law. By statute, Indiana incorporated the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations, which provide regulatory standards for those operating commercial vehicles in interstate commerce in Indiana. See Ind. Code § 8- 2.1-24-18(a). These standards require carriers and their drivers to make certain determinations before a driver may operate a motor vehicle. One such determination is that the cargo has been “properly distributed and adequately secured”. 49 C.F.R. § 392.9(a)(1). Another is that drivers must ensure they have complied with applicable regulations before operating their vehicles. See id. at § 392.9(b)(1). But drivers are relieved of their duty to inspect the cargo if, among other things, the commercial motor vehicle “has been loaded in a manner that makes inspection of its cargo impracticable”. Id. § 392.9(b)(4). This regulatory framework—incorporated into Indiana law—is consistent with the common-law rule set forth in Savage. Under the Savage rule, carriers have a primary duty of safe loading, but shippers may also assume a legal duty of safe loading if they take responsibility for loading the cargo. To resolve these competing duties, Savage holds a shipper liable only for latent defects in loading that a carrier could not observe even if the carrier successfully discharged its duty. Given both the rule’s sound policy and its consistency with Indiana law, we formally adopt the Savage rule.
Here, Wilkes challenges on appeal the trial court’s order granting summary judgment to Celadon on his negligence claim. Having adopted the Savage rule, we apply it to this record and consider, first, whether Celadon assumed a legal duty of safe loading. We conclude it did. Second, we consider whether any alleged defect in loading was latent. On this record, we conclude it was not and should have been apparent to Wilkes through a reasonable inspection.
The first inquiry under the Savage rule is whether the shipper owed a duty of safe loading. The clearest way for the shipper to assume this legal duty is to load the trailer itself without any help from the carrier…
….
Here, there is no dispute that a Celadon employee loaded the trailer without any help from Wilkes or another agent of the carrier. The designated evidence shows that when Wilkes arrived at the facility, a trailer was already loaded with the trays. The fact that Celadon loaded the trailer without any participation from Wilkes is sufficient to hold Celadon assumed the legal duty for loading the trailer. Because Celadon assumed this duty, it had a duty to load safely, meaning without latent defect. Under Savage, even if the shipper assumes a legal duty to load without latent defect, the carrier retains its primary duty to inspect for apparent defect. See Savage, 209 F.2d at 445. To determine whether Celadon is liable for Wilkes’s injury, i.e., whether it breached its duty of safe loading, we turn next to whether the loading was defective and, if so, whether that defect was latent.
2
The second inquiry under Savage is whether the shipper breached its legal duty of safe loading by loading with a latent or nonobvious defect. In other words, for the shipper to be liable, its loading must be defective and the defect one that “cannot be discerned by ordinary observation by the agents of the carrier”. Ibid….
….
We thus hold that Celadon met its burden to establish no genuine issue of material fact as to the lack of a latent loading defect, and Wilkes failed to meet his burden to designate contrary evidence upon which a jury could conclude that any alleged defect in loading was latent. Wilkes did not inquire into the safety of the loading. Celadon did not provide any affirmative assurances that it loaded the trays safely. And any defect in loading or securing the cargo should have been apparent to Wilkes through a reasonable inspection.
* * *
For these reasons, we expressly adopt the Savage framework, meaning that Knight Transportation, as carrier, was presumptively responsible for the injuries that its driver, Wilkes, sustained when the cargo fell on him. Celadon, as the shipper’s agent, assumed responsibility for loading the trays onto the trailer, but Celadon is not liable for the injuries because on this record any alleged defect in loading the trailer should have been apparent. We affirm the trial court’s entry of judgment for the Celadon and Cummins defendants and against Wilkes.
Rush, C.J., and Massa, J., concur.
Goff, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with separate opinion, in which David, J., joins.
Goff, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I respectfully dissent from the Court’s decision as to Celadon and would find the designated evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether there was a loading defect and whether that defect was latent. [Footnote omitted.] And because resolution of this single fact-sensitive case doesn’t require adopting a rule that could likely impact the entire trucking industry, I would decline to adopt the Savage rule at this time.
….
David, J., joins.