Rush, C.J.
Indiana common law has long required a landowner to use reasonable care to prevent injury to the motoring public on adjacent highways from “unreasonable risks” of the landowner’s creation. Though this duty is well established, defining its scope has posed challenges.
Today, we examine and synthesize decades of caselaw to determine whether the duty applies when a condition on the land imposes a visual obstruction but is confined to the land. Court of Appeals panels have reached divergent answers to that question, and we now firmly endorse the position from Sheley v. Cross, 680 N.E.2d 10, 13 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), trans. denied. Under these circumstances, there is no duty.
Here, the tall grass that inhibited drivers’ views was wholly contained on the property of Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., and Tyson Foods, Inc. (“Tyson”). Accordingly, Tyson owed no duty to the motoring public to avoid creating or maintaining the particular visual obstruction and therefore, could not be negligent. Thus, summary judgment in favor of Tyson was appropriate, and we affirm.
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Under Indiana common law, one who owns or occupies land has a duty to the traveling public on adjacent highways to exercise reasonable care to prevent injury to travelers from “unreasonable risks” the owner or occupier creates. Pitcairn v. Whiteside, 109 Ind. App. 693, 700, 34 N.E.2d 943, 946 (1941). Today, we examine Indiana precedent to clarify what types of land uses or conditions implicate this duty in cases where motorists claim their views were obstructed.
Tyson aligns itself with the Court of Appeals majority and argues that, as a matter of law, it owed no duty to passing motorists because the tall grass—the alleged unreasonable risk—was confined to its property. Reece disagrees and asserts, as did the dissent, that issues of fact remain before a court can determine whether the grass implicated Tyson’s duty to the traveling public. Reece, 153 N.E.3d at 1204 (Baker, Sr. J., dissenting in part).
Both parties cite various Indiana cases to support their respective positions, revealing a measure of tension concerning duty in this context. To clarify any confusion, we adopt the bright-line rule the Court of Appeals announced in Sheley: landowners owe a duty to passing motorists on adjacent highways not to create “hazardous conditions that visit themselves upon the roadway”; but when a land use or condition that may impose a visual obstruction is “wholly contained on a landowner’s property, there is no duty to the traveling public.” 680 N.E.2d at 13.
Here, the tall grass in the ditch was indisputably confined to Tyson’s property, and because that visual obstruction did not intrude on the public right of way, Tyson did not owe a duty to the traveling public. Given the applicable bright-line principle, there is no need to determine preliminary factual questions, such as whether the grass was an artificial or natural condition, or how dense the population in the area was.
We begin by examining relevant Indiana caselaw addressing a landowner’s duty to traveling motorists. Seeing how this duty has been treated over time is critical to understanding why we explicitly adopt Sheley’s rule today.
I. Indiana precedent persuades us to adopt a bright-line rule: when visual obstructions are wholly confined to the land, a landowner owes no duty to the motoring public.
Both Tyson and Reece present defensible positions on the duty issue, understandably leading to the split decision below. Precedent has touched upon various aspects of landowners’ duty to nearby motorists: harms physically intruding upon the roadways, the lack of duty to continually inspect the land’s perimeter, third parties’ versus agents’ negligence, situations involving a landowner’s trees in densely populated areas, a land’s artificial versus natural conditions, and conditions confined to the land. Some of those cases use broad language to support narrow holdings, while others conflict with one another. Yet, despite any inconsistencies, our common law has always sought to delicately balance owners’ property rights with the motoring public’s safety—without imposing undue or unreasonable burdens on either. We now trace the meandering evolution of Indiana law in this area over the past eighty years to the bright-line rule that we adopt today.
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Thus, we now expressly adopt the rule announced in Sheley: a landowner owes a duty to passing motorists on an adjacent highway to not create “hazardous conditions that visit themselves upon the roadway.” 680 N.E.2d at 13. But when a land use or condition that may impose a visual obstruction is “wholly contained on a landowner’s property, there is no duty to the traveling public.” Id. To the extent that Spears and other case authority conflict with this rule, we disapprove them.
We stress two points, however. First, our holding in no way prevents the General Assembly or local legislative bodies from enacting statutes or ordinances to impose a duty on landowners to refrain from creating or maintaining visual obstructions on land adjacent to highways in favor of the motoring public. We hold only that Indiana common law imposes no such duty. Second, our holding is confined to visual obstructions that do not come in contact with traveling motorists, and it does not address situations where a motorist comes in contact with a condition that is wholly contained on the land. See generally Ind. Limestone Co. v. Scaggs, 672 N.E.2d 1377, 1381 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (recognizing a duty upon owners of land adjacent to roadways to not “endanger . . . passage by excavations or other hazards so close to the road”), trans. denied.
We now decide whether, under the expressly adopted Sheley rule, Tyson owed a duty to Reece.
II. Because the visual obstruction was wholly contained on the land, Tyson owed no duty to the motoring public.
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Conclusion
Under the facts of this case, Tyson owed no duty to the traveling public. The visual obstruction was completely contained on its land and did not visit itself upon the adjacent roadway. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for Tyson.
Massa and Slaughter, JJ., concur.
Goff, J., concurs in result with separate opinion in which David, J., joins
Goff, J., concurring in result.
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In my view, the rule articulated in Justice is the more practical solution, allowing our trial court judges to sensibly balance a landowner’s right to peaceful enjoyment of private property against the public’s interest in safe travel on public roads. But, even under this rule, the Reeces’ claim falls short because they failed to designate evidence that could show the tall grass unreasonably imperiled travelers. Therefore, I concur in result.
David, J., joins.